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     The number of multinational military exercises—that is, military training events between two 
or more states—has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold War.  Moreover, many of these 
training events involve non-allies and serve functions other than deterrence or preparation for 
war.  Why do major powers conduct military exercises with non-allies and why have these 
training events increased since the end of the Cold War?  Training has remained a vital military 
activity since the advent of war but the purpose of holding exercises has evolved over time.  
States traditionally use military exercises to deter or prepare for war, yet since the end of the 
Cold War major powers have increasingly employed training events as a ‘non-war’ means to 
shape their strategic environments by influencing partners and rivals.  I argue that major powers 
conduct multinational exercises with non-allies in order to reduce strategic uncertainty; 
moreover, exercises have grown since the end of the Cold War due to an increase in uncertainty 
wrought by the rise of violent non-state actors, as well as the habitual nature of military 
cooperation.  This dissertation offers a novel understanding of military behavior in the post-Cold 
War environment in which interstate war is rare but the persistent threat and consequences of 
terrorism, ethnic war, transnational crime, and natural disasters seems unending.  I test my 
argument with both quantitative and qualitative methods using a new dataset, in-depth 
interviews, large-N regressions, and illustrative case studies.  This dissertation seeks to provide 
an update to the traditional works in military doctrine by highlighting the important role of 
shaping operations in the post-Cold War era and how these types of military activities affect 
international security.
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Part I 
Puzzle, Arguments, and Research Design 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION, PUZZLE, AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
1.1 Introduction     
    In 1995, at a remote base in the swamps of Louisiana, a journalist asked an Albanian Army 
officer about his recent experience training with American soldiers in a multinational exercise.  
He responded, “America, for us, has been the great enemy of the world…Now America is our 
best friend.”1  Three years later, an American non-commissioned officer participating in a 
different exercise in Uzbekistan remarked, “This is history being made…If you’d told me 10 
years ago that we were going to have an exercise in what used to be the Soviet Union, I’d have 
told you you [sic] were crazy.”2  For soldiers who trained to prepare for conflict against their 
Cold War adversaries, conducting military exercises alongside those same former enemies would 
be surprising, if not absurd.  Yet during these training events, soldiers from previously rival 
countries fired each other’s weapons, maneuvered together, and simulated evacuating casualties 
as fellow comrades. 
    Military training has always been an essential aspect of warfare, yet the purpose of conducting 
exercises has changed over time, most dramatically over the last century.3  Until the onset of 
World War II, exercises were largely conducted unilaterally in order to test troop readiness and 
emerging doctrine.  However, after World War II great powers began increasing the number of 
bi-and multi-lateral exercises, most notably within the major peacetime treaty alliances: the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.  These exercises were 
                                                                   
1 Gary Fields, “East, West Practice Partnership for Peace,” USA Today, August 25, 1995, LexisNexis 
Academic. 
2 John Valceanu, “Centrazbat ‘98’,” Soldiers, 52.2, February 1999, LexisNexis Academic. 
3 Though there are different terms describing military training, I interchangeably use ‘exercise’, ‘maneuver’, or 
‘training’ as opposed to other terms used by journalists, such as war games, which implies preparation for war.  As 
described in this chapter, preparation for war serves only one of several functions of military training. 
2 
 
conducted not only to test the readiness of multinational combat units for war, but also to deter 
the other alliance from attacking.  Interestingly, despite the end of superpower rivalry at the 
conclusion of Cold War hostilities, the number of multinational military exercises (MMEs) 
involving a major power actually increased substantially from the 1990’s through the 2010’s 
(see Figure 1.1 below).  Moreover, as opposed to the last decade of the Cold War, major powers 
expanded combined training with unusual exercise partners: non-allies, defense pact signatories 
that never deploy together, and even rivals (Figure 1.2 below).  From 1990 to 2016, these non-
allies participated in an average of about 57% of MMEs, compared to only 18% during the 
1980’s.4  Interestingly, although military training is traditionally viewed as a means to prepare 
for war, this rise in multilateral exercises in the 1990s and 2000s actually coincided with a 
decrease in war, both interstate and intrastate.5  Thus, not only did the post-Cold War 
environment experience as much or more multinational exercises than during the era of great 
power rivalry, but this increase in training grew as the incidence of war decreased. 
                                                                   
4 Note- All statistics, graphs, and figures throughout the dissertation are derived from my two original datasets, 
described in Section 1.4. 
5 Andrew Mack, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline,” Coping with Crisis 
Working Paper Series (International Peace Academy Publications, 2007).  
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Figure 1.1: Number of Land-Based MMEs per Year Involving a Major Power, 1980-2016 
 
Figure 1.2: Number of Land-Based MMEs Per Year Involving a Major Power, Including Either 
Only Allies (“Ally”) or at least one Non-Ally (“Non-Ally”), 1980-2016 
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    Why would major powers conduct MMEs with these types of partners and why have 
multilateral exercises increased since the end of the Cold War?  Major power military training 
with non-allies is puzzling for several reasons.  MMEs are resource-intensive, require extensive 
international cooperation and planning, and may be considered unattractive to large armies that 
prefer to operate unilaterally.  Conducting training with rivals may draw scrutiny from domestic 
popular opinion and possibly violate military principles of secrecy and deception.  Moreover, the 
opportunity for a ‘peace dividend’ after the conclusion of superpower rivalry would seem to 
provide incentives for major powers to reduce their defense budgets and focus resources on 
domestic issues.6  Yet all major powers eventually increased multilateral training after the end of 
the Cold War.  Importantly, many of these exercises served purposes beyond what militaries are 
assumed to be concerned with most; that is, deterrence or preparation for combat.  Although 
major power militaries continued these traditional types of exercises, they also increased training 
for ‘non-war’ purposes, such as military diplomacy, strategic engagement, and partner capacity-
building.   
    Current theories in the international relations subfield of international security are inadequate 
in understanding this post-Cold War military behavior.  In the current literature, militaries are 
conventionally understood as a state’s instrument to threaten or use violence.  The traditional 
works on military doctrine, in particular, imagine state militaries as organizations that develop 
plans and exercise units in order to prepare for large-scale conventional war with other state 
militaries through the use of offensive and defensive operations.  Though a few contemporary 
research programs have focused on the military use of force and threat of violence during 
                                                                   
6 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 297.  For an argument in favor of exploiting the peace dividend, see Jeane Kirkpatrick, “A 
Normal Country in a Normal Time,” National Interest (Fall 1990): 40-43. 
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humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency, little scholarly work has 
explained the uses of the military for non-war cooperative activities.  This puzzling increase in 
cooperative exercises with non-allies calls into question our conception of what purpose 
militaries serve, how major powers use armies as an instrument of statecraft, and the manner in 
which militaries view their role in fighting (and preventing) wars.  
    This dissertation offers a novel understanding of military behavior in the post-Cold War era.  
In addition to preparation for major combat, militaries have increasingly adopted roles for 
executing non-warfighting activities such as military diplomacy and security force assistance; 
these types of actions are also known as ‘shaping operations’.  Though attributed to the US 
military, shaping operations, which include non-war activities such as military diplomacy, 
strategic engagement, and building partner-capacity, are practiced to varying degrees by all 
major powers since the end of the Cold War.7  I argue that due to an increase in strategic 
uncertainty after the collapse of communist states in the early 1990’s, as well as increase in the 
reach of transnational terrorism in the 2000’s, major powers expanded the amount and scope of 
shaping operations to reduce uncertainty in their strategic environments.  In other words, in 
addition to planning and rehearsing the use and threat of force as codified in conventional 
military doctrine, major power militaries also use cooperative activities to actively shape their 
environments through prevention and mitigation, which reduces strategic uncertainty.  As 
unpredictability about the source of threats grew, militaries responded by increasing the number 
of shaping operations to manage this unpredictability.   
                                                                   
7 An overview of US-led shaping operations is provided by Derek S. Reveron, “Shaping the Security 
Environment,” in Shaping the Security Environment, ed. Derek S. Reveron, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 
2007). 
6 
 
    Though shaping operations are comprised of many activities, MMEs serve as a prominent tool 
for major power militaries to influence their environments: exercises with non-allies are used to 
secure partners for multilateral missions, prevent the onset of war by strengthening the capacity 
of weaker militaries, and create friends out of enemies.  By decreasing the uncertainty of 
potential allies and threats, major power militaries hope to reduce the risk of conflict and better 
provide security for their citizens and partners.  The rising employment of shaping operations by 
major powers challenges the conventional wisdom that the military (and military doctrine) is a 
means of statecraft uniquely intended to ‘fight and win’ its nation’s wars.  Instead, this newer 
approach imagines the post-Cold War military as a security-provider for its citizens against a 
wide-range of threats: in addition to other large state militaries, major powers must also confront 
non-state challenges such as rogue states, terrorists, transnational criminals, natural disasters, and 
the consequences of ethnic conflict.  This updated view holds that militaries are interested in not 
only waging and achieving victory in war, but also averting or moderating the consequences of 
war and instability.  With this work, I claim that traditional theories of military doctrine would 
benefit by including shaping operations—which are not only codified in major power strategic 
documents but also executed regularly before, during, and after conflict in an ambiguous security 
environment—in order to better understand modern military behavior.  As major interstate war 
has grown increasingly rare, but combat against non-state actors seems endless in the era of 
“persistent conflict”, an updated understanding of military behavior and doctrine for the post-
Cold War environment is required.8 
 
                                                                   
8 On the reduced incidence of major interstate war, see John Mueller, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An 
Assessment,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No. 2 (Summer 2009): 297-321.  On the long-run nature of war 
against non-state actors, see Iavor Rangelov and Mary Kaldor, “Persistent Conflict,” Conflict, Security, and 
Development, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July 2012): 193-199. 
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1.2. The Puzzle: Why do Major Powers conduct MMEs with Non-Allies? 
Traditional Functions of Military Exercises 
    According to US military doctrine, land-based military exercises, in general, are intended to 
improve mission readiness by training commanders, staffs, and units in simulated wartime 
operations.9  All multinational exercises—exercises between two or more states—seek to 
improve interoperability: that is, the ability for two or more military forces to execute each 
other’s doctrine, conduct joint planning, and ensure that technologies are compatible.10  Land-
based MMEs vary extensively by number of participating troops and type of training tasks: 
large-scale conventional maneuver exercises may include over 100,000 troops while small 
disaster relief training may involve only a few hundred soldiers.  Many exercises are conducted 
on a regular basis (such as annual and biannual), while others are conducted only as single 
events.  MMEs are traditionally viewed as serving one of two functions: rehearsal or 
deterrence.11  Rehearsals are conducted in order to test whether allies or coalition partners are 
properly prepared for an upcoming or potential mission, which can include war, humanitarian 
intervention, peacekeeping, disaster relief, or other tasks charged to the military.  Rehearsals may 
be used to practice mobilizations for invasions or counterattacks, such as the Russian Kavkaz-
2008 or Zapad-2013 exercises, while others may prepare militaries and other governmental 
agencies for humanitarian crises, such as the European Union’s MILEX planning and training 
                                                                   
9 Army Exercises, US Army Regulation 350-28 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 9, 
1997), 2. 
10 Multinational Operations, US Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 
16, 2013), I-9. 
11 In one of the few academic works on military exercises, Blackwill and Legro do not separate MME functions 
by rehearsal or deterrence but point to both of these functions as objectives in NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises 
during the Cold War; see Robert D. Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Constraining Ground Force Exercises of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/1990): 68-98. 
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events.12  Rehearsals also include exercises intended to test emerging doctrine, as demonstrated 
by Imperial Germany’s annual Kriegsspiel that allowed senior army officers to experiment with 
different operational concepts at the turn of the twentieth century.13 
    MMEs to signal deterrence are conducted by two or more states that seek to convince an 
opponent that the costs of attack outweigh the benefits, either through denial or punishment.  
Military exercises signal deterrence in two ways: (1) by denial through the showcasing of 
capabilities that would make invasion too costly and (2) by punishment through performing tasks 
that demonstrate the military’s ability to counterattack across borders as a response to an 
invasion.14  Armies may use exercises to signal both immediate and general deterrence: in times 
of immediate crisis, a military exercise can send a clear signal of capability and resolve to a 
specific opponent.  For general deterrence, military training can also be used to “maintain a 
broad military capability” and discourage any opponent from contemplating attack.15  Annual 
exercises ‘Foal Eagle’ and ‘Team Spirit’ between the US and South Korea are examples of 
maneuvers intended to deter an invasion from North Korea.16  Of course, one military exercise 
can serve both functions of deterrence and rehearsal, as was the case for NATO REFORGER and 
Warsaw Pact exercises during the Cold War; however, this combination of the two functions is 
                                                                   
12 Pauli Järvenpää, Zapad-2013: A View from Helsinki, August 2014 (Washington D.C.: The Jamestown 
Foundation, 2014), 1-6; “Press Release: EU Military Exercise 2007 (MILEX 07) to be conducted from 7-15 June 
2007,” Press Release from the Council of the European Union, June 4, 2007, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/94472.pdf. 
13 For a discussion of how (unilateral) exercises serve as opportunities to evaluate and improve doctrine, see 
Nina Kollars, “Genius and Mastery in Military Innovation,” Survival, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2017): 125-138. 
14 I borrow the language of deterrence by punishment and denial from Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and 
Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 14-16.  Snyder 
attributes this distinction to Robert E. Osgood, “A Theory of Deterrence,” unpublished manuscript, 1960. 
15 For a discussion of the difference between general and immediate deterrence, see Patrick M. Morgan, 
Deterrence Now, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.  See also Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A 
Conceptual Analysis, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983). 
16 Vito D’Orazio, “War Games: North Korea’s Reaction to US and South Korean Military Exercises,” Journal 
of East Asian Studies, Vol. 12 (2012): 275-294. 
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not necessary, such as exercises in preparation for deployments to an active war zone or 
peacekeeping mission. 
 
Non-Traditional Functions of Military Exercises 
    Since the end of the Cold War, major powers have increasingly employed non-traditional, 
cooperative exercise functions in addition to deterrence and rehearsal.  I categorize these non-
traditional functions into four types: recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-
developing.  Major powers employ recruitment exercises in order to attract potential allies to join 
a defense pact, support a multilateral coalition, or simply to develop positive military 
relationships.  Major powers use capacity-building exercises to train fragile state militaries to 
provide their own national and regional security in order to obviate the need for future major 
power intervention.  In role-forming exercises, major powers attempt to influence what role (or 
function) the partner military serves for its society.  For instance, in addition to the traditional 
mission of national security, a military may fulfill the roles of regime defense, domestic military 
assistance, or nation-builder; major powers seek to shape which role a partner military 
assumes.17  Finally, trust-developing exercises are conducted between major powers rivals that 
seek to avoid inadvertent war through changing soldiers’ mutual perceptions from hostile to 
friendly.  I conceptualize non-traditional exercises as a prominent form of shaping in which 
major power militaries seek to influence non-allies through the cooperative, non-war use of 
force. 
 
                                                                   
17 Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, and Andrew Cottey, “Armed Forces and Society: A Framework for 
Analysis,” in Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe, eds. Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, and 
Andrew Cottey, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 8-15. 
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The Puzzling Phenomenon of Major Power Exercises with Non-allies 
    Training to rehearse for potential missions or to deter adversaries are commonly conducted by 
allies; that is, permanent, defense-pact signatories (formal alliances) or mission-based (‘ad-hoc’) 
coalition partners.18  Training with these types of partners is commonsensical: they allow major 
powers and partners to practice interoperability and serve the functions of deterrence, rehearsal, 
or both.  However, major powers have increasingly conducted MMEs with non-allies, which fall 
into one of the following categories: (1) partners that are not treaty allies or ad-hoc coalition 
partners; (2) defense pact signatories that do not actually operate together in missions or attempt 
to deter an adversary; and (3) rivals.  Figure 1.3 below provides a categorization of exercise 
types by MME purpose and partner type.   
MME Purpose 
 
Threaten or Rehearse the 
Use of Force 
(Traditional) 
Shape the Strategic 
Environment 
(Non-Traditional) 
MME Type Deterrence 
Rehearsal 
 
Recruitment 
Capacity-Building 
Role-Forming 
Trust-Developing 
General Partner Type Allies Non-Allies 
Specific Partner Type Defense Pact Allies or 
Coalition Partners 
Potential Allies 
Fragile States 
Transitioning States 
Rivals 
Figure 1.3: Categories of MME Type by Purpose and Partner Type 
 
    Exercises with non-allies are puzzling for several reasons.  First, MMEs are resource-intensive 
and involve opportunity costs for training.  Scare resources, such as time and funding, that could 
                                                                   
18 For defense-pact signatories, I use “Type I” formal defense pacts according to the Correlates of War 
typology; see Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648-2008, Volume 2, (Washington D.C.: CQ 
Press, 2009).  A list of ground-based multilateral coalitions that I apply in my dataset from 1980-2016 is listed in 
Appendix B. 
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be contributed to unilateral training are dedicated to coordinating and executing multilateral 
exercises.  Some military officers view small-scale non-traditional exercises as a time and 
resource distraction from more large-scale, realistic training.19  Moreover, armies, especially 
those from major powers, may prefer to train alone and see MMEs as an opportunity-cost 
burden.  Though these material costs may be viewed as necessary evils for training conducted 
between allies, the fact that major powers would be willing to pay these costs for non-allies is 
puzzling.  Second, MMEs require extensive international cooperation; for example, the typical 
lifecycle for a multilateral exercise between the US and Asian-Pacific partners is, “a 12- to 18-
month process that includes multiple planning conferences, such as a concept development 
conference, initial planning conference, mid-planning conference, and final planning 
conference.”20  Prior to the training event itself, planning international troop movements and 
logistics requires major coordination within and between militaries, as well as between 
government officials.  Extensive legal documents, such as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), 
must be written, staffed, and agreed upon by all participants.21 
    Furthermore, what is even more surprising is when current rivals conduct training as partners.  
Armies traditionally hide information or technology that may be damaging if gained by an 
opponent: even among allies, militaries are hesitant to expose force structure or equipment that 
could fall into the hands of enemies.  In addition to secrecy, armies practice military deception in 
                                                                   
19 Brigadier General (Danish Army, retired) Michael Clemmesen, former Defence Attaché to the Baltics and 
Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Skype interview by author, June 12, 2017; Colonel (US Air Force, 
retired) Sam Gardiner, former NATO staff officer and Chairman of the Department of Joint and Combined 
Operations at the National War College, phone interview by author, June 9, 2017. 
20 Government Accountability Office, “Army Pacific Pathways: Comprehensive Assessment and Planning 
Needed to Capture Benefits Relative to Costs and Enhance Value for Participating Units,” Highlights of GAO-17-
126, November 2016, 6. 
21 Anonymous former US official at NATO familiar with NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, phone 
interview by author, July 26, 2017. 
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an attempt to mislead by convincing an opponent the opposite of its intentions.22  Both secrecy 
and deception contribute to an army’s ability to ‘surprise’ an opponent and are compromised 
when adversaries train with one another.  Yet major power rivals, such as the US with Russia or 
India with China, have, to varying degrees, increased their cooperation since the end of the Cold 
War.  Some military officers object to such cooperation, fearing the loss of secret information: 
Vincent Pouliot interviewed a German colonel who believed that Russia joined NATO naval 
operations in the Mediterranean “to gain intelligence” on the alliance.23  Oftentimes, these 
exercises are not well received by domestic audiences.  When the US invited China to the ‘Rim 
of the Pacific’ (RIMPAC) naval exercise in 2014, Zachary Keck of the The Diplomat titled his 
article covering the story: “US Welcomes China’s RIMPAC spying”. 24  A US congressman 
criticized an exercise between the US and Russia on American soil in 1995 and cited the 
potential for classified information to be leaked as an objection—as well as the financial cost of 
the training event.  Residents in the local area signaled similar concerns with hosting the former 
Soviets.25  Thus, these exercises may be troubling for both military officers and domestic publics 
alike. 
 
 
                                                                   
22 US Military doctrine on deception and secrecy—also known as Military Deception (“MILDEC”) and 
Operational Security (“OPSEC”)—is discussed in Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, January 17, 2017), III-21-22, III-36-38, VIII-18, A-3.  See also Jon Latimer, Deception 
in War: the Art of the Bluff, the Value of Deceit, and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in Military History, 
from the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War, (New York: Overlook Press, 2001). 
23 Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 104. 
24 Zachary Keck, “US Welcomes China’s RIMPAC Spying,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2014, accessed May 26, 
2017, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/us-welcomes-chinas-rimpac-spying/. 
25 James Brooke, “Kansans Finding Their Russian Visitors Not So Foreign,” The New York Times, October 30, 
1995, LexisNexis Academic. 
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International Security and Traditional Theories of Military Doctrine 
    Not only is training with non-allies puzzling from a practical resourcing- and military-
perspective, this phenomenon is also challenging to explain with traditional international 
relations theories.  Most structural realist accounts would expect exercises to increase or decrease 
in response to changes in the structure of the international system.26  For instance, as the military 
capability of a major power’s rival diminishes, a structural realist would anticipate the number of 
training events with allies or non-allies to also decrease.  Yet as shown in Figure 1.1 above, not 
only did exercises after the end of the Cold War and Soviet collapse not decline, they actually 
increased substantially throughout the 1990’s.  A different realist perspective, such as the one 
proposed by William C. Wohlforth and Stephen G. Brooks, may explain an increase in US-led 
MMEs as a result of American primacy since the end of the Cold War: because unipolarity 
grants the US an environment with few constraints, the US military is able to conduct exercises 
with partners all over the world to support the goals of its grand strategy.27  In a similar vein, 
several policy and scholarly accounts have raised concern about the creeping dominance of the 
military in US foreign policy.28  However, Figure 1.4 below reveals that exercises have increased 
for all non-NATO major powers since the early 2000’s, not just the US or its major-power allies.  
                                                                   
26 For structural realist arguments concerning state responses to changes in the structure of the international 
system, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, 
The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist International Theory 
and the Study of World Politics,” in New Thinking in International Relations Theory, eds. Michael W. Doyle and G. 
John Ikenberry (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 163-201. 
27 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the 
Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
28 For several works concerned with the militarization of American foreign policy, see Rosa Brooks, How 
Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2016); Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray eds., Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy? 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How 
Americans are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of 
Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004). 
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Moreover, Figure 1.5 reveals that in contrast to US participation in 79% of MMEs in the 1990’s, 
the US only took part in an average of 66% of exercises from 2000 to 2016.   
 
Figure 1.4: Number of Land-Based MMEs Attended by China, Russia, and India 
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Figure 1.5: Number of Land-Based MMEs Per Year Involving a Major Power, US as a 
Participant (“US MMEs”) vs. US not as a participant (“Non-US MMEs”) 
    
    This increase in non-traditional exercises is most problematic for current theories of military 
power and doctrine.  In the subfields of international security and strategic studies, militaries are 
conventionally understood as a state’s instrument for threatening or using force.  For instance, 
Stephen Biddle’s conception of military power focuses on military capability with “the mission 
of controlling territory in mid- to high-intensity continental warfare” through the destruction of 
enemy forces and seizure of enemy land.29  David Baldwin differentiates ‘military’ from other 
forms of statecraft—such as economic or diplomatic—by referring to “influence attempts relying 
primarily on violence, weapons, or force.”30  Similarly, the traditional works in military doctrine 
                                                                   
29 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 6. 
30 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 13-14.  In a separate 
work, Baldwin highlights the preoccupation with “military force” in the majority of IR scholarship on power, most 
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conceptualize militaries as organizations that prepare for large-scale conventional war and 
develop doctrines geared toward traditional war-fighting operations: offense, defense, and 
deterrence.  Scholars diverge on the sources of military doctrine —whether doctrine is derived 
from the structure of the international system, organizational pathologies, or the domestic 
balance of power—yet there is little disagreement that state militaries develop doctrine during 
peacetime to combat other state threats during large-scale war.31  In this respect, military doctrine 
is viewed as a composite of plans and preparations for imagined conventional war when combat 
is required; that is, either when civilians order an attack or the military is forced to respond 
defensively.  Before the onset of war, civilian diplomats attempt to muster allies while militaries 
focus on unilaterally preparing their soldiers and equipment for potential conflict.  Most of these 
arguments draw extensively from organization theory and bureaucratic politics; they expect 
major power militaries to prioritize either offensive or defensive conventional doctrines against 
other state adversaries in pursuit of greater institutional size, wealth, prestige, or autonomy.  This 
conception of military doctrine fits within the conventional understanding of military behavior, 
which assumes that major powers use militaries as the threat or use of violent force. 
    Even the more recent security literature on counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention, and 
peacekeeping imagines the role of the military as the threat or use of force, albeit to fulfill other 
state interests or fight against different types of actors (non-state).32  Using the traditional 
                                                                   
of which assumes military statecraft is used as the threat or use of force.  David A. Baldwin, Power and 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 109-111, 178-188. 
31 Traditional scholarly works on military doctrine include Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: 
France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, The 
Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1984), 27; Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International 
Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984): 58-107; Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the 
Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British 
Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
32 For a sampling of the vast literature on the military use of force in counterinsurgency, humanitarian 
intervention, and peacekeeping, see Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining 
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framework, we would expect to observe major power-led exercises that are consistently 
traditional—serving the functions of either deterrence or rehearsal—since militaries have 
organizational interests in conventional doctrine (or preparation for interventions, 
counterinsurgency, or peacekeeping).  Yet as Figure 1.6 reveals, after the end of Cold War not 
only did exercises increase, but the amount of non-traditional (shaping) exercises eclipsed 
traditional (deterrence and rehearsal) exercises from the mid-1990’s to the early 2010’s.  
Separate from security studies, a few works discuss the role of how individual officers are 
socialized through international military education, yet there is little discussion of how military 
units use a traditional war-fighting activity (training) as a non-warfighting operation to influence 
their environments.33  The puzzling increase in non-traditional exercises provides an opportunity 
to better understand major power military behavior in the post-Cold War environment. 
 
                                                                   
Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter, 2009): 67-106; Martha 
Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs of Intervention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); 
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
33 Regarding the positive impacts of military officer socialization, See Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions 
as Agents of Socialization?  NATO and the ‘New Europe’,” International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 
2005): 973-1012; Carol Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military Educational Exchange, 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).  For a counterargument which highlights the negative 
consequences of military officer education, see Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, “When Human 
Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups,” Journal of Peace Research 
Vol. 54, No. 4 (2017): 542-557. 
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Figure 1.6: Land-Based MMEs by Exercise Type,  
Traditional (Deterrence/Rehearsal) vs. Non-Traditional 
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since the end of the Cold War?  The first part of my argument is that major powers usually 
conduct MMEs with non-allies in order to reduce uncertainty in their strategic environments.  
The manner in which major powers reduce strategic uncertainty is through shaping operations, 
which are the non-war use of military force to set the conditions for successful future operations 
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comprised of non-warfighting activities such as military diplomacy, strategic engagement, 
security assistance, and building partner capacity.34  Non-traditional MMEs serve as a major 
instrument of shaping operations.  Major powers use these training events to address an 
ambiguous security environment: when the type and location of threats are largely unknown, as 
well as which states will offer military or diplomatic support, shaping MMEs serve as an attempt 
to influence partners, improve relations between militaries, and strengthen weaker armies to 
reduce these sources of uncertainty and better provide security for their citizens and partners. 
    By uncertainty I refer generally to the lack of predictability and transparency perceived by an 
organization; this lack of predictability leads to a sense of the loss of control over decisions and 
outcomes.35  Uncertainty could also be thought of as the inability to confidently assign 
probability values to outcomes (or consequences).36  With regards to military planning, officers 
make an assessment of threats to national security interests and determine the best tools to ensure 
these interests are protected.  Yet uncertainty rises when the type and location of threats become 
unknown, as well as which potential allies will contribute in addressing these threats.  As 
uncertainty increases, military responses need to be adjusted and shaping operations are a tool by 
which major powers address this strategic unpredictability.  This strategic uncertainty is separate 
from other forms of uncertainty commonly discussed in the traditional works in military 
                                                                   
34 The concept of shaping operations is explored in greater detail in Chapter 2, but see Reveron’s Shaping 
Operations and the US Military Joint Operations manual for an overview:  Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-
0 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 17, 2017), V-8 through V-9.   
35 This broad definition is provided by Gudela Grote in Management of Uncertainty; Grote explores other 
classical and more recent definitions of uncertainty, such as those proposed by Milliken (1987) and Lipshitz and 
Strauss (1997), yet settles on this definition as it relates to an organization’s sense of lack of control.  Gudela Grote, 
Management of Uncertainty: Theory and Application in the Design of Systems and Organizations, (London: 
Springer, 2009), 11-21.   
36 This definition is common in both economics and organization theory: see Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, 
and Profit (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1921), 19-20, 259-260 and James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, 
Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), 113-114, 137-138.  For an application of the difference 
between risk and uncertainty to International Political Economy, see Stephen C. Nelson and Peter J. Katzenstein, 
“Uncertainty, Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2008,” International Organization, Vol. 68 (Spring 2014): 361-392. 
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doctrine.  Militaries must also grapple with organizational uncertainty that develops from 
external institutional interference, inter-service rivalry, and lack of internal unity: unknown 
budget allocations, civilian intervention, and unstandardized procedures are the main sources of 
this type of uncertainty.  Barry Posen argues that militaries develop offensive doctrines in order 
to limit this type of uncertainty.37  Strategic uncertainty is also separate from what I label 
technological uncertainty, which is a concern about which weapons, vehicles, and other 
equipment enemies will adopt and employ in future war.  Although military planners must work 
with government officials and scientists to determine which optimal systems to procure, this 
process assumes the enemy source (such as the Soviet Union for the US) is known.38 
    The second aspect of my argument is that non-traditional MMEs have increased since the end 
of the Cold War due to an increase in non-state threats and the habitual nature of exercise 
relations.  The increase in prominence of non-state threats is a product of two main factors: (1) 
the collapse of communism in Europe and Asia and (2) the forces of globalization.  The rise of 
new types of threats, such as ethnic war, terrorism, and transnational crime, as well as the 
consequent problems for military planning, required a response by militaries to develop new 
means to adequately address these growing international concerns.  Non-traditional MMEs, in 
particular, served as an effective means for major powers to address the uncertainty wrought by 
non-state threats.  Another factor responsible for the rise of MMEs since the end of the Cold War 
is the habitual nature of multinational exercises.  Although major powers usually initiate shaping 
activities in response to particular crises (such as an outbreak of civil war, terrorist attack, or 
                                                                   
37 Posen also notes that offensive doctrines allow militaries to impose a designated scenario on an enemy; 
however, this assumes that the military plans to fight a conventional war against a peer or near-peer adversary, 
which is usually already known (e.g. interwar planning between the French and German armies).  Posen, The 
Sources of Military Doctrine, 41-47; Barry R. Posen, “Forward: Military Doctrine and The Management of 
Uncertainty,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2016): 159-160. 
38 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), 221-250. 
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escalation between rivals), exercise relations become habitual over time.  As previously stated, 
training is necessary for all militaries to prepare for combat; exercises are conducted on a regular 
basis to train and test the readiness of units.  Many, but not all, MMEs are held on an annual, 
biannual, or quadrennial basis.  As major powers build military relationships with other states, 
these partnerships sometimes last beyond the initial exercise as major powers view these 
continuing relationships as positive for national security.  Thus, like military training in general, 
MMEs are inherently ‘sticky’, creating a cumulative effect as military relations continue over 
time.  
 
Militaries and Strategic Uncertainty 
    Uncertainty presents an acute problem for military planning, both before and during conflict.  
Militaries attempt to minimize uncertainty through reconnaissance and the collection of 
intelligence, which provide information about potential enemies and battlefields.  Military 
planners incorporate numerous variables into their plans, including geography, weather, history, 
civilian considerations, enemy composition, as well as the capabilities of their own forces and 
allies (among a host of other variables), in order to gain an advantage and reduce unpredictability 
during battle.39  Yet war’s inherent uncertainty results in the inability for planners to confidently 
predict the outbreak, outcome, and consequences of conflict.40  Even before large-scale 
conventional war, when planners are confident about which enemy they will be facing and the 
general direction in which to anticipate attack, a level of uncertainty still remains about how the 
                                                                   
39 See, for instance, Joint Planning, US Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
June 16, 2017), IV-10 through IV-14. 
40 Concerning the inability to predict the outcomes of war, see Jonathon Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for 
War?” Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000): 143-150.  See also Jonathon Kirshner, “The Economic Sins 
of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative,” World Politics, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2015): 155-183. 
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battle will ensue.  For instance, French military planners before World War I were unsure about 
whether the German army would invade through Belgium or the Alsace-Lorraine; decisions 
about where to position forces and whether to conduct counteroffensives were tied to this 
uncertainty.41 
    Even after battle commences, warfare is in itself an unpredictable and chaotic human 
endeavor.  When armies do engage in war, they are challenged by multiple factors that make the 
outcomes of fighting unpredictable: imperfect knowledge of an opponent’s actions and will, 
unreliable intelligence estimates, unforeseen circumstances in weather or geography, 
misunderstood orders, individual battlefield heroics, and at the most basic level, the pervasive 
influence of chance.  Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz noted that although 
military leaders attempt to make war an objective “matter of assessing probabilities,” the element 
of chance makes warfare essentially a gamble: “In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, 
factors never find a firm basis in military calculations.  From the very start there is an interplay 
of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and 
breadth of the tapestry.  In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a 
game of cards.”42  Since the outcomes and consequences of warfare are difficult to predict, 
militaries are not only unsure about whether they will achieve victory in their own battles, but 
are also forced to confront the possible negative implications of other wars for their citizens and 
partners, especially those emanating from civil wars and fragile states.   
    The problem of strategic uncertainty for military planning becomes even more severe when 
threats and assistance are unknown.  Especially given the unpredictable nature of non-state 
                                                                   
41 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 41-48. 
42 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Indexed Edition, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 82-86. 
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threats (such as terrorism and transnational crime) as well as expansive potential locations of 
threats (e.g. failed states, overpopulated cities, impoverished regions), military planners are faced 
with a complex strategic environment.  When militaries are unsure about who is a threat, from 
where threats will emanate, and who will be an ally against these threats, they are unable to 
properly plan for contingencies and develop an appropriate conventional doctrine to address this 
uncertainty.  I argue that militaries face strategic uncertainty from two sources: (1) who is a 
threat and from where does it emanate; (2) who will provide assistance in addressing these 
threats.  Militaries may be uncertain about two aspects of threats: namely, their character and 
location.  First, military planners assess the ‘who’ of threats: whether danger will originate from 
state conventional (and nuclear) adversaries, non-state insurgents, transnational criminals, or 
natural disasters.  Second, uncertainty may also arise from an inability to predict the location of 
threats, especially in regards to violent non-state actors, pandemics, or natural disasters.  Military 
planners are concerned about the assistance they receive from others: whether potential allies 
will contribute to multilateral missions and whether fragile militaries are capable and willing to 
provide security for themselves.  In order to address these two sources of uncertainty in their 
strategic environments, military planners have begun to implement shaping operations. 
    My argument holds that shaping exercises have proliferated since the end of the Cold War due 
to an increase in strategic uncertainty, wrought by the rise in non-state threats.  Though the risk 
of high-intensity, conventional war was high during the Cold War, the source (state actors) and 
location (Europe) were generally known by strategic planners.43 However, especially since the 
                                                                   
43 The assumption that the source and location of potential war during the Cold War was between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact in Europe was prevalent in both policy and academic debates in the 1980’s.  For an example, see 
John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen, Steven J. Zologa, Malcom Chalmers, and Lutz Unterseher, 
“Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment and the Tank Gap Data Flap,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 
(Spring 1989): 128-179. 
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end of the Cold War, major power militaries have increasingly struggled to predict the source 
and location from which threats will emanate.  US senior military leaders have emphasized this 
growing uncertainty.  The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the graduating class of 
the National Defense University in 2016: “In the environment we are in today, with the 
complexity and volatility and variety of challenges we have, how do we assess risk? ... How do 
we assess the capabilities or capacities that must exist in the joint force?  A part of this is also 
how to prepare for the unexpected.”44  Comparing the current strategic environment to the Cold 
War, US Army Pacific Commander General Robert Brown noted in a recent interview:  
It's amazing how complex the world has become. I often would joke, 'The last 
time I was bored was in the Cold War.' I was a company commander, and I had a 
responsibility in an area against the Soviets. You know, they could have come 
across but you kind of knew they wouldn't be that crazy. We had learned to fight 
outnumbered and win. We had almost 300,000 in Europe. We trained hard, but 
there was still time to get bored. I have not been bored since, and I don't think 
we'll be bored for another 50 years. The world is just so interconnected and 
complex.45 
 
This concern about unpredictability is also manifest in most current US military operational 
doctrine: 
The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and can change rapidly, 
requiring military leaders to maintain persistent military engagement with 
multinational partners…The strategic environment is fluid, with continually 
changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that 
rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge.  While it is impossible to predict 
precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can 
expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist.46   
 
                                                                   
44 Jim Garamone, “Dunford Details Implications of Today’s Threats on Tomorrow’s Strategy,” US Department 
of Defense News, August 23, 2016, accessed August 26, 2017, 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/923685/dunford-details-implications-of-todays-threats-on-
tomorrows-strategy/. 
45 Derek Grossman, “General Robert Brown on the U.S. Army’s Role in Asia,” The RAND Blog, October 25, 
2017, accessed January 19, 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/general-robert-brown-on-the-us-armys-role-
in-asia.html. 
46 Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 17, 
2017), I-2 through I-3. 
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In order to effectively deal with these types of unpredictable and sometimes unknowable threats, 
major power militaries increased their use of shaping operations, especially non-traditional 
MMEs.  A further description of the rise in strategic uncertainty since the early 1990’s is 
provided in Chapter 2. 
 
Major Power Strategic Environments 
    I define a major power’s strategic environment as the land-geographic sum of its allies, 
potential allies, and threats; these regions serve as the priority areas in which militaries plan and 
resource for future or potential operations.47  Strategic environments are determined by a state’s 
grand strategy, which places emphasis on particular geographic locations and sovereign history; 
each major power places varying emphasis on either factor.  Though the concept of a strategic 
environment may seem amorphous, I argue that these planning environments are observable 
through a military’s regional commands, permanent advisory units, and grand strategy.  Usually, 
major power militaries establish regional commands or strategic advisors that are responsible for 
these regions; they are also mentioned in their strategy documents as comprising an important 
area for contingency planning.  Though major powers are relatively certain that their allies will 
not be threats and will contribute to operations, they are less sure about whether potential allies 
will offer help during missions or from which locations threats will become manifest.  Strategic 
environments vary for each major power.  The strategic environment of the Western European 
major powers—the UK, France, and Germany—is comprised of the European continent and 
these powers’ former colonies; for the Eastern powers of Russia, China, and India, the 
environment is largely along their borders and within the region; because of American primacy, 
                                                                   
47 I distinguish between ‘land’ and other component environments (such as air or sea) because I am focused on 
land-based exercises, which I argue elsewhere should be conceptualized differently than these other components. 
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the US strategic environment is global.  Major power strategic environments are further explored 
in Chapter 3. 
 
Shaping MMEs to Reduce Uncertainty 
    How do major powers reduce strategic uncertainty through exercises?  The initiative for 
shaping exercises usually originates from military officers, defense ministry civilian officials, or 
as a joint endeavor between planners from both fields.  These planners attempt to manage the 
two sources of strategic uncertainty elucidated above—threat and assistance—through four types 
of non-traditional MMEs: recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-developing.  
First, major powers use recruitment exercises to prepare partners for alliance membership, enlist 
the help of other states to assist in multilateral missions, or simply to build friendlier ties.  Major 
powers, especially the US, have incentives to gain the diplomatic or military support of other 
states for multilateral missions, as long as the time horizon and operational commitment allow.48  
By gaining the support of other militaries, major powers seek to reduce the uncertainty 
associated with which states will offer assistance to these types of missions.  Moreover, major 
powers may use recruitment MMEs simply to build friendlier relations with other states and 
create more certainty about which states are friendly and which are threatening.  Second, 
militaries use capacity-building training to increase the ability for fragile state militaries to 
provide security for themselves and prevent the necessity for future major power intervention.  
These types of exercises attempt to address the uncertainty of both the type and location of 
threats, especially terrorism, ethnic conflict, and natural disasters.  By providing the training and 
mentorship necessary to carry out their own operations, major power militaries seek to reduce 
                                                                   
48 Sarah E. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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the uncertainty of threats emanating from fragile regions.  Moreover, major powers hope that the 
capabilities of the partner are increased to the degree that future intervention becomes 
unnecessary.  Thus, major powers ‘delegate’ responsibility to these fragile partners.  
    Third, major power militaries use role-forming exercises to influence a partner military’s role 
that it serves for its society.  By encouraging certain practices during exercises, such as respect 
for international law or stability through repression, major power militaries hope to create 
expectations of military behavior and reduce the uncertainty of the source of threats.  By 
influencing the role these partners serve for their societies, major powers hope that these non-
allies will become friendlier to the major power’s interests in the future.  Fourth, in order to 
reduce the risk of unintentional war with rivals, major power militaries conduct trust-developing 
exercises with one another as a means of removing one potential source of threat from their 
strategic environment.  Though major power rivals view each other with suspicion, if they are 
not engaged in open hostility they often will attempt to ameliorate tensions and build friendly 
relations.  Major power rivals attempt to prevent the onset of accidental war through joint 
training by altering their soldiers’ perceptions of one another to be viewed as more ‘human’ than 
adversarial.  As rival soldiers interact along contested borders, on the seas, or in proxy states, 
major powers hope these individuals or units can de-escalate crises by not assuming the worst of 
intentions in one another but cooperate to find a mutual solution.  The rise of non-state threats 
such as terrorism provides a suitable excuse for major power rivals to cooperate.   
 
Exercises by Partner-Type 
    In general, major powers choose which type of exercise to conduct based on partner-type: 
rehearsal and deterrence exercises are conducted with allies, recruitment with potential allies, 
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trust-developing with rivals, capacity-building with fragile states, and role-forming with 
transitioning (or consolidating) states.  Planners determine which exercise-type is most 
appropriate by observing a partner’s capability: if partner armies are advanced enough to be 
useful for multilateral operations, they are recruited; if partner armies are well-established but 
have endured state transition or continued consolidation, role-forming is most useful; if partners 
are fragile with a military that needs to be built ‘from the ground up’, capacity-building is 
necessary.  In order to quantify these categories, I develop indices based on state capacity and 
ability to contribute to multilateral missions.  By fragile state I refer to those states that are 
considered to experience ‘extreme’ or ‘high’ fragility according to the Center for Systemic 
Peace’s State Fragility Index; by transitioning state, I refer to states with ‘low’ to ‘serious’ 
fragility.49  Militaries in fragile states are usually developed post-war and operate with little-to-
no effectiveness (e.g. Afghanistan post-2001); conversely, transitioning militaries are generally 
previously stable organizations that undergo reform due to a regime transition or attempt to 
consolidate rule (e.g. former Soviet republics).  Figure 1.7 below depicts each MME-type by 
partner-type, source of uncertainty, and major power mechanism to reduce uncertainty.  If a 
partner is not an ally, the major power may attempt to enlist the cooperation of the state for 
upcoming or potential missions.  If the partner is not a rival or potential ally, the major power 
chooses an exercise function based on the partner military’s level of development: for relatively 
functioning and stable forces in transitioning states, major powers seek to shape the roles that the 
partner militaries serve for their societies.  For fragile states with extremely weak armies, major 
                                                                   
49 The Center for Systemic Peace categorizes state fragility based on composite scores of the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of security, political, economic, and social factors.  For state fragility criteria, see Monty G. Marshall, 
“Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946-2016,” Center for Systemic Peace, June 15, 2017, accessed June 21, 
2017, http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm.   For time series data of state fragility, see “State Fragility 
Index and Matrix, Time Series Data, 1995-2015,” Center for Systemic Peace, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
29 
 
powers need to start ‘from the ground up’ to build their capacity to function as effective military 
forces.  It is important to note that this typology is idealized and allies often participate in non-
traditional MMEs to support a major power’s shaping, such as NATO Partnership for Peace 
exercises that involved many NATO members and a few transitioning partners. A decision tree 
for partner-type selection is included in Chapter 3. 
 
Non-
Traditional 
MME-Type 
Source of 
Uncertainty 
Common 
Partner-Type 
Mechanism to Shape and Reduce 
Uncertainty 
Recruitment 
Assistance, 
Threat 
Potential Ally 
Encourage and prepare partners for 
alliance membership or multilateral 
mission 
Capacity-
Building 
Assistance, 
Threat 
Fragile State 
Strengthen partner to provide own 
security or participate in regional missions 
Role-Forming Threat 
Transitioning/
Consolidating 
State 
Influence character of partner military to 
be more trustworthy or capable of 
preventing revolution 
Trust-
Developing 
Threat Rival 
Change perceptions from hostile to 
friendly to prevent escalation of 
inadvertent war 
 
Figure 1.7: Non-Traditional MMEs by Sources of Uncertainty, Partner-Types, and Mechanisms 
 
 
State-Centric Approach to Military Exercises 
    My argument assumes a ‘state-centric’ approach to international politics: I presume that 
states—comprised of central decision-makers such as executive national leaders, militaries, and 
foreign ministries—act as rational, unitary actors apart from the private interests of bureaucracies 
and society—that is, legislative bodies and interest groups. This framework assumes that in the 
realms of foreign policy, security, and defense, government officials that lead major military and 
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foreign bureaucracies commonly act in pursuance of goals set by national leaders.50  Thus, I 
expect that militaries generally pursue national (as opposed to private, bureaucratic) interests, of 
which security is a vital state goal.  I believe the state-centric approach is appropriate for my 
argument for two main reasons.  First, national security is one of the main functions of all 
governments and protecting citizens ranks high as a priority of the national interest, regardless of 
regime-type.51  Civilian government officials are concerned about providing security and task the 
military with the responsibility for protecting the nation.  Although military preferences may 
diverge from their civilian masters’ regarding whether to use force abroad in particular cases 
(usually humanitarian) or in certain policy decisions52, I argue that in general both civilian 
government officials and military officers seek to provide security for their citizens (and 
partners) and develop policies accordingly.  Second, the conclusion of the Cold War has resulted 
in a complex security environment in which civilian leaders and diplomats often rely on military 
power to address strategic uncertainty—that is, when the source and location of threats, as well 
as potential allies to meet these challenges, are relatively unknown.  As government officials 
struggle to prevent, anticipate, and react to non-state threats, they both task and assume that the 
military will implement policies to address these new security problems.  Thus, because of my 
focus on national security and the unique nature of the post-Cold War environment, I argue that a 
state-centric approach is appropriate for my analysis.  However, there are two main challenges to 
                                                                   
50 My use of a state-centric approach is derived from Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw 
Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 10-12, 26-27; my 
approach is also similar to M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s 
Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 13-14. 
51 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).  Although Wolfers problematizes the means and extent to which 
states seek security, he acknowledges great powers seek to achieve national security for their citizens.  Arnold 
Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International 
Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 147-165.  Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National 
Interest (New York: Knopf, 1951). 
52 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 180-233. 
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my argument and assumptions, both of which are supported by the traditional works in military 
doctrine, described below. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
    In order to support my argument, I test my theory against two alternative explanations that 
represent the traditional perspective on military doctrine.  My approach and the traditional 
approach contain diverging expectations for military behavior in the post-Cold War environment 
in two major aspects.  First, the traditional works anticipate that major power militaries conduct 
MMEs to serve the purposes of deterrence or rehearsal in order to fulfill the conventional 
postures of offense, defense, and deterrence.  Even in the post-Cold War environment, major 
powers need to rehearse for combat missions against non-state threats; accordingly, rehearsals 
may be conducted to prepare for counterinsurgencies, peacekeeping missions, or humanitarian 
interventions.  The implication of this theory is that the size and composition of exercises are 
significant enough to serve the purpose of preparing for combined operations or sending a 
credible deterring signal to a third party.  If the traditional view is correct, following the end of 
the Cold War we would expect to observe that MMEs are primarily (but maybe not wholly) 
concerned with preparing for or deterring war (or other missions), even with non-allies.  
Conversely, if major powers use exercises with non-allies as a type of shaping operation instead 
of the threat or use of force, the traditional view would be undermined.   
    Second, the traditional view would anticipate that shaping MMEs are simply a more modern 
attempt by major power militaries to pursue narrow organizational interests.  In this view, 
although national leaders expect militaries to provide national defense and protect citizens, 
militaries often purse their own parochial interests that diverge from civilian preferences.  In this 
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light, militaries are imagined as vast bureaucracies that rely on standardized procedures, biased 
decision-making, and resource-seeking behavior which create military policies that diverge from 
the national interest.  In regards to shaping operations, the traditional literature would expect that 
militaries pursue these exercises not purely to provide security, but more so to increase 
organizational size, wealth, prestige, or autonomy.  This perspective applies organization theory 
and bureaucratic politics to the study of military doctrine and there are two implications resulting 
from this approach.  First, if this approach is correct, we would anticipate that shaping operations 
would provide incentives to diverge from the national interest; in particular, increases in 
organizational size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy from civilian oversight.  Second, this 
approach expects that civilian decision-makers—national leaders and government ministers—
would anticipate this parochial behavior and intervene in military policy to prevent a divergence 
from the national interest.  Thus, we should observe contestation between uniformed soldiers and 
government civilians about the necessity and value of shaping operations.  The alternative 
explanations and their implications are explored in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.4 Mixed-Method Research Design: Case Study Process-Tracing and Large-N Regression 
    In order to determine why major powers conduct MMEs with non-allies, as well as why these 
exercises increased since the end of the Cold War, my identification strategy is two-fold: case 
study process-tracing and large-N binomial and multinomial logit regressions.  I test my 
argument against the alternative explanations as well as four other hypotheses using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods.  I use a mixed-method research design due to nature of my 
argument and the indicators for my hypotheses: in general, I use case studies to illustrate each 
non-traditional function and determine whether they serve the function of shaping or, instead, 
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point to the expectations of the alternatives.  I also use the process-tracing method to test 
arguments that rely on indicators that are difficult to quantify in large-N regressions, such as a 
perceived increase in uncertainty and civil-military competition over resources.  On the other 
hand, I use statistical models to test arguments that are more clearly appropriate for 
quantification, such as whether partners conducted exercises in a time period or in which region 
exercises occur. 
    My unit of analysis throughout the study is the state (expressed as a major power, ally, non-
ally, or partner) comprised of central government decision-makers, civilian-led ministries, and 
militaries; my observations are military exercises between at least two partners.  Though the 
concept of ‘major power’ carries different interpretations, I include as major powers those 
delineated by the authors of the Correlates of War State System Membership Project, which is 
essentially a state that has certain capabilities and behaviors reminiscent of a major power 
(agreed upon by the coders).53  From 1945-2016, these countries include the United States, Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and Japan.  However, I make two caveats to this list: 
(1) though Japan may be considered an economic major power, I exclude the country due to its 
constitutional inability to project military force outside of its borders54; (2) I include India, 
which, as of the most recent Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (NMC) list, had 
the third highest Composite of National Capabilities (CINC) behind the US and China and the 
                                                                   
53 For my use of ‘major power’, see Correlates of War Project, "State System Membership List, v. 2016," 
Online, http://correlatesofwar.org and “State System Membership List Frequently Asked Questions, Version 
2002.1.” Online, February 21, 2017, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership. For an 
extended discussion of the concept of major power, see Daina Chiba, Carla Martinez Machain, and William Reed, 
“Major Powers and Militarized Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 6 (2014): 976-1002. 
54 If Japan is constitutionally unable to deploy military power, then the country’s armed forces would not 
conduct ‘rehearsals’, but only ‘deterrence’ in self-defense.  Thus, the case of Japan may be partly biased away from 
traditional explanations.  Moreover, according to my data, Japan has only conducted exercises with the US as a 
participant, as opposed to the other major power that conducted (at least some) exercises without the US.  Japan’s 
military reliance on the US calls into question its independence in military doctrine. 
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fourth largest military in 2012.55  My universe of cases includes both actual land-based MMEs, 
as well as the counterfactual ‘no-MMEs’, every year between 1980-2016.56   
 
Case-Study Process-Tracing 
    My case studies are intended to test the first part of my argument—that major powers conduct 
shaping MMEs in order to reduce strategic uncertainty—against both of the alternative 
explanations.  My argument and the alternatives will be tested in four illustrative case studies: 
one for each non-traditional function.  Although I develop my general theory from US military 
doctrine and operations, the illustrative case studies explore each exercise function employed by 
different major powers—specifically, the US, UK, Russia, China, and India.  The case studies 
represent the most well-known and consistent exercise programs for these major powers (with 
regards to each non-traditional type).  I chose these cases not only due to their prominence—
statistics are provided in the following paragraph—but also to highlight how shaping exercises 
are not just unique to one major power (e.g. the US), one region (e.g. the West), or regime-type 
(e.g. democracy), but all major powers.  Each chapter will explain the purpose of the exercise 
type, describe how these shaping activities reduce strategic uncertainty, and locate the sources of 
these exercises within major power doctrine or the practices of international organizations.   
                                                                   
55 Correlates of War Project. 2017. "National Military Capabilities, v5.0." Online, http://correlatesofwar.org.  
See also Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power 
War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1972), 19-48.  
For a discussion of whether India should be included as a great or major power, see Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Is India a 
Great Power? Understanding Great Power Status in Contemporary International Relations,” Asian Security Vol. 11,  
No. 1 (2015): 1-30. 
56 By land-based exercise, I exclude computer-simulated, staff, air-defense, air, and naval exercises, as well as 
international military workshops or seminars.  I chose to single-out land-based exercises for several reasons.  First, 
as opposed to computer-simulated and staff exercises, land-based exercises are financially costly and require trade-
offs by the participating militaries.  Second, though naval or air assets may play a supporting role to land-based 
exercises, I exclude naval and air training because these types of exercises are sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between regular joint patrols.  Moreover, air and naval exercises are more often conducted than land exercises for 
practical purposes, such as avoiding collisions in the global commons with other military or commercial vessels. 
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    In each illustrative case study, I process-trace the history, decision-making, and execution of 
each MME program.  In Chapter 4, I analyze the US and NATO’s use of recruitment exercises to 
enlist the aid of others for multilateral missions and India’s attempts to build friendlier relations 
with other militaries.  Recruitment exercises are illustrated by the US-led field exercises as part 
of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program during the 1990’s.  According to my dataset, 
PfP MMEs make up the majority of Western major power recruitment exercises since the end of 
the Cold War: 66% for the US, 77% for the UK, 39% for France, and 80% for Germany.  
Chapter 5 covers American, British, and French attempts to build partner capacity through 
military training, illustrated by the case of the UK training program in Sierra Leone from 2002-
2016.  In Chapter 6, I discuss Russian and Chinese use of regional security organizations to 
conduct role-forming exercises with Central Asian and Transcaucasian partners; these types of 
MMEs are illustrated by Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises 
to encourage regime stability in its ‘near abroad’ from 2003-2012.  CSTO and Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) exercises comprise roughly 53% of Russian shaping MMEs, 
while SCO exercises make up about 44% of Chinese MMEs.  Finally, in Chapter 7 I observe 
trust-developing exercises with a discussion of major power rivals’—such as the US and 
Russia—attempts to use MMEs as confidence and security-building measures.  The illustrative 
case study involves India and China’s counter-terrorism and disaster relief exercises between 
2006-2016.   
    My process-tracing method relies on two sources of evidence: (1) state behavior and (2) what 
military leaders, government officials, and strategic documents say.  My evidence draws largely 
from texts (news reports, operational military doctrine, security strategies, and national security 
‘white papers’) and expert interviews.  I conducted eleven in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
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with military officers and government officials from different countries to gather evidence for 
each case study.  For militaries to which I have limited access, such as China or Russia, I 
interviewed experts and military officers from states in the surrounding region with experience 
working with those types of military practitioners.  I evaluate my argument against the two 
alternative explanations.  Evidence that would support my argument are statements (public and 
private) and military behaviors that indicate that the purpose of the training events was to reduce 
strategic uncertainty through shaping operations.  Evidence that would undermine my argument 
are actions and statements that point to other reasons for conducting these MMEs: namely, as 
opportunities to rehearse for/deter war, or to serve parochial organizational interests. 
 
Large-N Logit Regressions 
     In order to test my arguments statistically, I conduct binomial and multinomial logit 
regressions with fixed-effects specifications of four hypotheses using a novel dataset of pooled 
time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data.  I developed this dataset by collecting over 1,000 
ground-based exercises between at least one major power and another state from 1980 to 2016 
and coded each by date, participant states, training tasks, number of troops, MME function, 
alliance or security organization involved, exercise program, and, if available, when the exercise 
program began.  These categories of information serve as indicators for my variables described 
below.  Each exercise was reported in the news or announced by military public affairs office.  I 
include only land-based MMEs in order to separate actual exercises from workshops, seminars, 
or computer-simulated exercises; I also exclude air, air defense, and naval exercises, which serve 
other functions.57  I borrow most observations from a dataset compiled by Vito D’Orazio, but 
                                                                   
57 See footnote 53 for further explanation on my decision to study land-based MMEs exclusively. 
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code more exercises and re-code some of his observations to reflect training task, number of 
troops, organization or alliance involved, exercise program history, and function.  D’Orazio’s 
Joint Military Exercise dataset (v. 3) covers the years 1970-2010; my dataset includes the years 
1980-2016 because the data before 1980 is not as reliable.58  I also created over 40,000 ‘partner-
years’ between a major power and every other state in the international system from 1980-2016; 
this set is applied to the four hypotheses explained below. 
    For each hypothesis, I use partner-years for each major power and every other state in the 
international system from 1980-2016.  Because I use a TSCS dataset, I include lagged dependent 
variables, fixed effects, and random effects in various models.  My hypotheses test expectations 
of my theory and are explained below (explanatory, outcome, and control variables for each 
hypothesis are described in Chapter 8).  My first argument anticipates that major powers are 
more likely to conduct non-traditional (shaping) MMEs with non-allies.  Hypothesis 1a below 
tests this assumption: 
 
H1a (Argument One: General Partner-Type): Major powers are more likely to conduct non-
traditional (recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, or trust-developing) exercises than 
traditional exercises with non-allies. 
 
I also test to determine whether major powers are likely to conduct certain MMEs with certain 
partners: 
H1b (Argument One: Specific Partner-Type): Certain partners are more likely to participate in 
certain MME functions: allies conduct deterrence and rehearsal, rivals conduct trust-
developing, fragile states conduct capacity-building, transitioning/consolidating states conduct 
role-forming, and potential allies conduct recruitment exercises. 
 
                                                                   
58 Vito D’Orazio’s Dataset (JME Data v. 3) can be accessed at http://www.vitodorazio.com/data.html.  
D’Orazio’s data was originally collected as part of his dissertation project; see Vito D’Orazio, “International 
Military Cooperation: From Concepts to Constructs” (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2013). 
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If major powers conduct traditional MMEs with both allies and non-allies, or if there is no 
discernible difference between exercise function and partner-choice, my argument would be 
undermined.  Second, because I argue that major power militaries are more likely to conduct 
shaping MMEs within their strategic environments, I test the following hypothesis: 
H2 (Argument One: Strategic Environments): Major powers are more likely to conduct MMEs 
with non-allies in their ‘strategic environments’ than with other states outside of their strategic 
environments. 
 
If major powers are more likely to conduct MMEs within their strategic environments—globally 
for the US, within Europe and former colonies for the Western powers, and along the borders for 
the Asian powers—my argument would find support.  Conversely, if there are no geographic or 
historical determinants of exercise participants, my theory would be challenged.   
    I test my second argument using two hypotheses that help inform why shaping MMEs have 
increased since the end of the Cold War.  Specifically, my argument anticipates that MMEs have 
expanded due to the increase in strategic uncertainty wrought by the rise of non-state threats and 
because of the habitual nature of exercise relations.  The two hypotheses are: 
 
H3 (Argument Two: Increase in Uncertainty): Major powers are more likely to conduct shaping 
exercises when uncertainty is greater; that is, after the fall of communism (1992-2016) rather 
than before (1980-1991).  
 
H4 (Argument Two: Habitual Exercise Relations): Major powers are more likely to conduct 
MMEs with non-allies with which they have conducted MMEs in the past. 
 
 
These four hypotheses attempt to test the predictions of both parts of my argument by applying 
the full universe of cases; that is, both MMEs and ‘non-MMEs’ between major powers and every 
other state in the international system. 
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1.5. Contributions and Plan of the Dissertation 
    This study hopes to contribute to the scholarly literature and policy community in several 
ways.  First, this dissertation seeks to provide a supplement to theories of military doctrine for 
the post-Cold War environment.  The dramatic changes in the security environment, the blurring 
of war and peace in the fight against non-state actors, and the rarity of open conventional warfare 
between state actors require an updated understanding of the ways in which major powers are 
active in providing security for their citizens through ‘non-war’ means.  By studying the 
behavior of major power militaries and their partners in both the final decade of and after the end 
of the Cold War, I highlight the transition from traditional ‘use and threat of force’ to ‘shaping’ 
activities that has occurred over time.   
    Second, though warfare is studied extensively, military exercises are under-theorized in the 
international relations literature.  Military exercises, both traditional and non-traditional, offer a 
useful indicator of modern military behavior.  For those few works that discuss multinational 
training, the focus is usually on deterrence or a vague concept of ‘military cooperation’ that is 
not problematized.  Especially since the early 1990’s, large-scale conventional war has been rare 
and scholars must look to other military activities to determine military behavior.  Thus, my 
study will contribute to the international security literature by introducing a theory of military 
exercises and highlight the important role they have played in an era of fewer wars but also 
persistent low-intensity conflict. 
    Third, this dissertation offers not only a novel theory of how exercises are used to provide 
security but also a quantitative measure which provides insights into which type and how often 
major power militaries employ both traditional and shaping activities.  By comparing the relative 
frequency of traditional and non-traditional exercises, this work hopes to provide empirical 
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support for the growing relevance of shaping as an emerging tactic for all major power militaries.  
Moreover, this study offers policymakers and practitioners alike a useful dataset of exercises by 
partner-type, training task, number of troops, alliance or security organization, program history, 
and function as well as extensive, in-depth case studies of military exercises.  This project 
attempts to provide a better understanding of why major powers conduct exercises and how they 
seek to shape their environments. 
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
    This dissertation is organized as follows.  Part I includes the introduction, puzzle, research 
design, key concepts, and theory.  Chapter 2 is a detailed explication of my argument; it 
explores the literature on military doctrine and how traditional theories have addressed military 
responses to uncertainty.  Moreover, the chapter discusses the rise in strategic uncertainty since 
the end of the Cold War and how major powers increasingly used shaping MMEs to address this 
unpredictability.  Chapter 3 provides a description of key concepts: a brief history of MMEs, 
trends in ground-based multinational exercises from 1980-2016, the functions of exercises by 
partner-type, and how strategic environments drive major power decisions to conduct MMEs.   
    In Part II, I describe the four types of major power MMEs with non-allies and illustrate each 
through the process-tracing of a case study.  In Chapter 4, I depict the first major power exercise 
function: recruitment.  Major powers, such as the US, UK, France, Germany, use recruitment 
exercises to enlist the help of other militaries to provide support for operations, which helps 
reduce uncertainty in who provides assistance to multilateral missions.  Additionally, major 
powers, such as India, use recruitment exercises to build friendlier ties with its neighbors, which 
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provides more certainty over ‘who’ is a threat in the region.  Recruitment exercises are illustrated 
by the US and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program throughout the 1990’s. 
    In Chapter 5, I develop the second type of MME with non-allies: capacity-building.  The 
chapter shows how and why major powers—especially the US, UK, and France—attempt to 
strengthen the ability for fragile state militaries to provide security for themselves without the 
need for future major power assistance.  This exercise function is illustrated by the UK’s 
experience with training the local forces in Sierra Leone from 2000-2016. 
    Chapter 6 offers a description of the third type of exercises with non-allies: role-forming.  
The chapter describes why and how major powers, most notably Russia and China, use these 
types of exercises to influence the function that transitioning/consolidating states serve for their 
societies, which in turn provides security for the major power.  This category of exercise is 
illustrated by a series of training events conduct by Russia and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) from 2003-2012. 
    Chapter 7 covers the final function of military exercises with non-allies: trust-developing.  
These exercises are conducted by major power rivals, such as the US and Russia, that seek to 
build confidence, reduce hostilities, and ameliorate the risk of inadvertent war.  By transforming 
relations from hostile to friendly, major powers hope to reduce one source of threat in their 
environments.  This exercise function is illustrated by a case study of training conducted between 
India and China from 2006-2016.      
    Part III provides my data and statistical tests as well as my conclusions about the impact of 
military exercises on international security.  In Chapter 8, I detail my method for gathering, 
coding, and testing observations in order to provide justification for my argument.  With 
Chapter 9, I offer my conclusions about MMEs and international security.  I discuss how 
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shaping interacts with the growing concern about the militarization of foreign policy, three ways 
in which shaping MMEs negatively affect international security, and the startling return of 
traditional deterrence exercises since 2010, indicating a possible reoccurrence of Cold War 
relations between the US and Russia. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SHAPING, MILITARY DOCTRINE, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
    The purpose of this chapter is to explain my argument in greater detail through an analysis of 
military doctrine, strategic uncertainty, and shaping operations.  I argue that the traditional works 
on military doctrine are insufficient in describing military activities since the end of superpower 
rivalry.  Instead, I hold that in addition to preparations for conventional war, major power 
militaries after the end of the Cold War were forced to respond to a host of other non-state 
threats.  Shaping exercises served as one type of response; the reason why major power militaries 
conduct MMEs with non-allies is to influence their environments and reduce strategic 
uncertainty.  These types of exercises have expanded since the end of the Cold War due to an 
increase in uncertainty wrought by the growing prominence of non-state threats (which arose 
from the remnants of communism and the consequences of globalization).  Moreover, the 
habitual nature of military relations has resulted in a cumulative effect in which both traditional 
and non-traditional exercises have reached unprecedented levels.   
    This chapter will proceed as follows.  First, I explain in greater detail the concept of shaping 
operations, how they situate within the traditional works in military doctrine, and how they are 
expected to reduce uncertainty.  Second, I compare the relative certainty of the last decade of the 
Cold War to the complex, uncertain threats that proliferated after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  Third, I describe how major power militaries reacted to this increase in strategic 
uncertainty through non-traditional shaping MMEs.  Fourth, I discuss why military exercise 
relations are ‘sticky’ which provides a partial explanation to the rise in MMEs since the end of 
the Cold War.  Fifth, I discuss the two alternative explanations, how they challenge my 
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argument, and how my argument responds to these alternative perspectives.  I then conclude as a 
transition to the following chapters on key concepts which help guide my case studies and 
statistical tests. 
 
2.2 Military Doctrine and Shaping Operations 
Traditional Military Doctrine 
    In the political science sub-fields of international security and strategic studies, military 
doctrine has traditionally been viewed as a sub-set of grand strategy that is concerned with the 
military means employed to achieve political ends.  More specifically, military doctrine is 
conceptualized as a national military’s “principles about how to fight”, which can be assessed 
along three aspects: type of operations (offense, defense, or deterrence), level of innovation 
(innovative or stagnant), and degree of integration (well-integrated into political ends, or not).59  
These principles are derived from strategic-level decisions and plans about how do address 
future conventional war.  Doctrine is necessary because resources are scarce: government 
officials work with military leaders to prioritize acquisitions, technology, and force structure 
after an appraisal of potential threats in order to realize political ends.60  Military doctrine 
encompasses military planning all the way from the joint-level—that is, encompassing all 
component services (generally land, sea, air, and nuclear)—down to small-level unit tactics, yet 
most of the focus is on national military strategy.61  The traditional works are generally interested 
                                                                   
59 Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty,” 159-173.  Concerning the three 
dimensions of evaluating military doctrine, see Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 13-19.  Jack Snyder’s 
definition of military doctrine is similarly concerned with preparation for large-scale conventional war: “It is 
primarily military doctrine, a set of beliefs about the nature of war and the keys to success on the battlefield, that 
performs this function for the military planner.”  Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 27. 
60 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 7, 13 
61 Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty,” 159.  
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in national component-level doctrine that is developed in order to prepare for large-scale war; for 
instance, the British air defense system or German plans for a strategic ‘blitzkrieg’-type 
penetration during the interwar period.  These plans and postures stand ready to be employed 
under two conditions: once the order is given by government officials, or in response to an 
attack.  Indicators of military doctrine are found in force posture and weapon systems, which are 
closely monitored by other states in order to anticipate military behavior.62  Analyses of 
warfighting doctrine and doctrinal change are often separated into periods of ‘war’ versus 
periods of ‘peace’ in which the latter environment provides immense obstacles against 
innovation.63 
    The traditional understanding holds that military officers are narrowly concerned with their 
parochial interests—such as organizational size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy—and develop 
military doctrines (often offensive in nature) that emphasize seizing the initiative and denying a 
conventional enemy its preferred strategy even if this doctrine is inappropriate or 
counterproductive to civilian-led grand strategy.64  Military officers’ preoccupation with 
aggressive doctrines derive from their biased view of international politics, interpreted as a 
“zero-sum” environment in which “wars are seen as difficult to avoid and almost impossible to 
keep limited.”65  Military planners thus favor preemptive and preventive strategies: “Seeing war 
more likely than it really is, they increase its likelihood by adopting offensive plans and buying 
offensive forces.”66  Conversely, civilian government officials are uniquely attuned to cues 
provided by the international environment, especially changes in the distribution of military 
                                                                   
62 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 14-22. 
63 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 8-39. 
64 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 47-50; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive,  
65 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 28. 
66 Ibid. 
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capabilities among powers, and work externally with allies and potential allies to meet emerging 
threats.67  When militaries pursue their own interests at the cost of overall grand strategy, 
civilians must intervene and re-integrate military doctrine, lest they risk policy incoherence or 
even catastrophic military behavior.68  More recent works have challenged these earlier theories 
by questioning whether material organizational interests (as opposed to organizational culture) 
drive choice of military doctrine, how militaries are able to innovate despite the organizational 
disincentives to do so, and how specific doctrines of force employment affect battlefield 
outcomes.69  However, even this newer research imagines the military as a ‘threat and use of 
force’ instrument through offensive and defense operations, in which militaries apply combat 
power to either disarm an opponent, seize territory, or protect their own forces and territory 
through the denial of enemy attacks. 
 
Shaping Operations 
    Shaping operations, in contrast to traditional offensive and defensive tasks, comprise the many 
non-warfighting activities that militaries employ to achieve national objectives.  Shaping 
operations are commonly employed before the onset of conflict as a proactive means to influence 
other militaries and often as an attempt to prevent war.  Common shaping activities include 
military diplomacy, security cooperation, and forward presence, among others.  Military 
diplomacy is generally viewed as efforts militaries pursue in order to develop relationships with 
                                                                   
67 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 51-54. 
68 Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International 
Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984): 58-107; Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the 
Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984): 109-110; Posen, Sources of 
Military Doctrine, 14-22. 
69 Kier, Imagining War, 14-20; Rosen, Winning the Next War; Biddle, Military Power. 
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other militaries and their governments, usually for the ultimate purpose of building partnerships 
for future operations or preventing conflict among rivals.  These interactions include senior 
officer visits, student exchanges, workshops, seminars, and port visits, among other activities.  
Military officers view these relationships as necessary to develop before the onset of a crisis in 
order to ensure that a multilateral response is effective.70  ‘Strategic engagement’ is another form 
of military diplomacy which comprises initiatives designed to improve relations and prevent 
conflict among adversaries.71  One of the oldest forms of military diplomacy is the use of 
military attachés, which are liaison officers deployed to the capitals of other nations in order to 
observe the military developments of other states, provide advice to ambassadors, and work with 
host militaries.  Though the term developed in the nineteenth century, the stationing of military 
officers for political or diplomatic purposes can be dated back to the Roman empire.72   
    Though there are competing definitions (and overlap with other concepts such as military 
diplomacy), security cooperation generally refers to military assistance—through funding, 
equipment, intelligence, and advisors—provided to other militaries.  These means of assistance 
are designed to strengthen the ability of partner militaries to operate in missions, maintain 
positive military relationships, and, for some major powers, ensure basing access for future 
operations.73  Security cooperation between allies was common throughout the twentieth century.  
In the years prior to the outbreak of World War I, the French Army helped finance Russian rail 
lines in order to ensure the Russian army was able to mobilize quickly and offset a possible 
                                                                   
70 Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing 
Face of the US Military (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 56-58. 
71 Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation 
and Assistance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 15-29. 
72 Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 3-14. 
73 Reveron, Exporting Security, 126-130. 
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German attack on France.74  During the Cold War the US commonly provided funding and 
weapons to allies in order to ensure they were prepared to defend in the case of Soviet or Chinese 
attack.75  Both the US and Soviet Union provided funding to allies and non-allied proxies in 
South America, Africa, and East Asia in order to develop spheres of influence and prevent the 
ideological expansion of the other superpower.76  Although major powers continue to assist their 
allies with ‘traditional’ security cooperation, they have significantly increased their use of non-
traditional—that is, assistance to non-allies (especially weak and fragile states)—cooperation 
since the early 1990’s.77  Post-Cold War security cooperation is commonly manifested in 
initiatives such as ‘security sector reform’ and ‘building partner-capacity’: the former is usually 
associated with improving ministerial-level management, policies, and budgeting within various 
government departments (not just defense), while the latter normally refers to strengthening the 
ability for partner militaries to provide for their own security or participate effectively in 
multilateral missions.78  Weak and failing states are usually the recipient of funds and advisors 
for these types of programs. 
    Derek Reveron argues that shaping operations are “different in fundamental ways from 
warfighting.  Shaping is about managing relationships, not command and control; it is about 
cooperation, not fighting; and it is about partnership, not dominance.”  In the case of the US 
                                                                   
74 Snyder, The Ideology of the offensive, 43. 
75 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” in The Cambridge History 
of the Cold War, Vol. 1, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 85-88. 
76 Michael E. Latham, “The Cold War in the Third World, 1963-1975,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War, Vol. 2, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
258-280. 
77 On the difference between traditional and non-traditional security cooperation, see Kathleen J. McInnis and 
Nathan J. Lucas, “What is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 
December 18, 2015, pgs. 7-8, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf.  On the expansion of shaping since the end 
of the Cold War, see Cottey and Forster, 3-14; Derek S. Reveron, “Shaping the Security Environment,” 4-5. 
78 Paul Jackson, “Security Sector Reform and State Building,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 10 (2011): 
1803-1822; McInnis and Lucas, 5-8. 
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military, he argues, “To advance American interests, combatant commanders build partners’ 
capabilities and capacity to generate security, influence nonpartners and potential adversaries, 
mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and extremism, and enable rapid action when military 
intervention is required.”79  These types of activities are conceptually separate from the 
traditional war-fighting utilization of militaries; that is, the use or threat of force employed 
through deterrence or offensive and defensive operations.  Instead, these types of operations 
apply non-traditional approaches to managing challenges to security by attempting, primarily, to 
prevent conflict.  As former commander of Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, noted 
about the purpose of shaping operations as proactive influence: “When I assumed command of 
CENTCOM and had the ability to choose between fighting fires or preventing them, I chose 
prevention. If there was any possible approach to making this a less crisis-prone, more secure 
and stable region, I wanted to try it through shaping operations.”80  Multinational military 
exercises serve as one common tool major powers employ to achieve the goals of shaping 
operations.81 
 
US Military Doctrine and Shaping Operations 
    As opposed to offensive and defensive operations, shaping operations are conducted before 
the onset of conflict; as opposed to deterrence, shaping operations are continued throughout the 
duration and after the conclusion of hostilities (in order to prevent future conflict and retain 
influence in the region).  Shaping operations are commonly supervised at the theater-army 
                                                                   
79 Reveron, “Shaping the Security Environment,” 2-3. 
80 Quoted in Derek S. Reveron, “Shaping the Security Environment,” in Shaping the Security Environment, ed. 
Derek S. Reveron, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2007), 6. 
81 Cottey and Forster, 7; Reveron, “Shaping the Security Environment,” 1-5.  
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(strategic) level of command and are employed continuously in order to maintain influence with 
other militaries.  The US military’s conception of shaping and how these activities are situated 
within an operational framework is described in the most recent doctrinal manuals for joint 
operations, multinational operations, and security cooperation: Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, JP 3-
16, and JP 3-20 (respectively).  JP 3-0, the umbrella operations manual, notes that shaping 
activities, which include preventive military engagement, security cooperation, and building 
partner capacity, are expected to be conducted by commanders in order to “help set the 
conditions for successful theater operations.”82  The goal of shaping operations is to “improve 
perceptions and influence adversaries’ and allies’ behavior” and “develop allied and friendly 
military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations,” as well as encourage 
intelligence-sharing and provide the US military with access to bases in the event of contingency 
operations.83  The doctrine notes that shaping initiatives “help advance national security 
objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts (or limit their severity), and reduce the risk of 
employing US military forces in a conflict.”84   
    Because shaping operations often overlap with civilian-led foreign policy, US commanders are 
encouraged to integrate these activities with their diplomatic counterparts, as well as other 
government agencies.  In all theater operations, to include traditional and shaping, JP 3-0 
encourages commanders to work closely with other government agencies: “CCDRs [Combatant 
Commanders] and subordinated JFCs [Joint Force Commands] must work with DOS 
[Department of State] regional and functional bureaus, individual country chiefs of mission, and 
other USG [US Government] departments and agencies to better integrate military operations in 
                                                                   
82 Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 17, 
2017), V-8 through V-9.  The figure is listed as “Figure V-4” on page V-9. 
83 Ibid., V-9. 
84 Ibid., VI-2. 
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unified action with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national 
power.”85  This ‘whole of government’ approach is encouraged in order to align military tasks 
with overall grand strategy.  The doctrinal emphasis on conflict prevention, as well as the 
overlap with civilian foreign policy, is evident in one of the manual’s graphics entitled “The 
Conflict Continuum” (Figure 2.1 below).86  The left side of the figure reveals that the military is 
tasked with employing military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence simultaneously 
with civilian diplomacy and in coordination with other US government agencies (“USG”).  The 
DOD’s [Department of Defense] focus is “Cooperation/Prevention/Deterrence” and the ultimate 
goal of these activities is to “Prevent Conflict”. 
 
Figure 2.1: “The Conflict Continuum” in JP 3-0 
 
                                                                   
85 Ibid., V-7. 
86 Figure is located on page VI-2, Ibid.  
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    Figure 2.2 below describes a typical US military’s planning model that incorporates both 
traditional and shaping operations at different stages of conflict.  The model shows how global, 
theater, and operation-specific shaping activities occur before, during, and after combat in a 
notional campaign plan.  Although traditional combat operations, described in the model as 
“deter”, “seize the initiative”, and “dominate” activities, are the hallmark of conventional 
operations, shaping activities are expected to be conducted before the onset of major combat 
operations and maintained throughout.87  Moreover, shaping is conceptually distinct from 
“stabilize” or “enable” activities, which are commonly conceived as operations to restore 
stability and essential services after the devastation of war, which commonly require the threat or 
use of force to maintain order.  Conversely, shaping is the non-war use of force that underlies 
these traditional operations.   
                                                                   
87 Specific references to deterrence, offensive, and defensive operations are described in Ibid., V-15. 
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Figure 2.2: US Military Shaping in an Operational Context 
 
     The US military views security cooperation (SC) as an integral aspect of shaping operations, 
described in JP 3-16 as “all DOD [Department of Defense] interactions with foreign defense 
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop 
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide 
US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (HN).”88  The manual notes 
that geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) “shape their areas of responsibility through SC 
activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other 
                                                                   
88 Multinational Operations, US Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 
16, 2013), I-4. 
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instruments of national power.  The GCC’s SC provides a framework within which combatant 
commands (CCMDs) engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and 
development.  Ideally, SC activities lessen the causes of potential crisis before a situation 
deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention.”89  JP 3-20 notes the importance of 
integrating security cooperation into overall grand strategy in order to shape the environment and 
dampen the risk of war: “SC [Security Cooperation] represents an application of the military 
instrument of national power in coordination with the other instruments of national power 
(diplomatic, informational, and economic) through which the USG shapes the theater and global 
OEs [Operational Environments] and helps prevent conflicts.”90  Specifically for the American 
ground component, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno notes in the US Army’s 
2014 Operating Concept that the purpose of new Army doctrine is to describe “how future Army 
forces will prevent conflict, shape the security environments, and win wars while operating as 
part of our Joint Force and working with multiple partners.”91  The emphasis on the purpose of 
shaping activities to prevent and mitigate crises is apparent in major contemporary US military 
doctrinal manuals. 
    It is important to note that although shaping operations have become a priority in US military 
activities, the traditional role of the US military remains its core mission.  US military manuals 
emphasize that component services must be prepared for offensive, defense, and deterrent 
operations which are the primary missions for US forces; yet shaping operations are intended to 
obviate the need to employ these operations in large-scale war.  JP 3-0 makes this point 
                                                                   
89 Emphasis added.  Ibid. 
90 Security Cooperation, US Joint Publication 3-20 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 23, 
2017), I-4. 
91 Emphasis added.  The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040, TRADOC 
Pamphlet 525-3-1, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 31, 2014), i. 
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explicitly: “Although the US military is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained, large-
scale combat anywhere in the world, the capabilities to conduct these operations also enable a 
wide variety of other operations and activities.  In particular, opportunities exist prior to large-
scale combat to shape the OE [Operating Environment] in order to prevent, or at least mitigate, 
the effects of war.”92  Thus, US forces, traditionally designed for war, can also be employed in 
the prevention or mitigation of war. 
    The influence of shaping operations on US military planning is evident throughout both 
national security and military doctrines since the end of the Cold War.  In 1995, the Bill Clinton 
Administration published A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which 
emphasized many non-warfighting roles for the military in addition to the traditional function of 
“deterring and defeating aggression”: provide a credible overseas presence to deter conflict and 
underwrite regional stability, contribute to peacekeeping operations, provide advice and training 
to friendly governments, deliver humanitarian aid, and encourage democracy in post-communist 
and fragile states.93  Though the George W. Bush Administration’s 2002 US National Security 
Strategy introduced preemptive (or more accurately preventive) war as a means to defend the US 
against undeterrable threats, the subsequent 2004 National Military strategy emphasized, “that 
the United States must adopt a global posture and take action to prevent conflict and surprise 
attack.  Achieving this objective includes actions to shape the security environment in ways that 
enhance and expand multinational partnerships.”94  The document noted that security 
cooperation helps establish “important military interactions, building trust and confidence 
                                                                   
92 Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0, V-1. 
93 William Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: The 
White House, 1995), 8-17. 
94 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2002), 2. 
56 
 
between the United States and its multinational partners.  These relatively small investments 
often produce results that far exceed their cost.”95  By building capacity and helping partners to 
‘help themselves,’ the strategy encouraged security force assistance as a means to manage 
strategic uncertainty. 
 
Other Major Powers and Shaping Operations 
    Though the source of the shaping concept is attributed to the US military, these measures have 
been practiced by all major powers since the end of the Cold War, though they may be referred 
to by different terms.  The British military labels these types of activities ‘Defense Diplomacy’ 
or ‘Defence Engagement’ in defense reviews and military doctrine.  The UK’s 1998 Strategic 
Defence Review listed these operations as its third priority: “Defence Diplomacy becomes a 
Mission in its own right, reflecting the importance to our security of building and maintaining 
trust and preventing conflict, particularly in Europe.  We anticipate continuing and perhaps 
growing calls for contributions to international peace support and humanitarian operations, some 
of which could be militarily very demanding.”96  British defense diplomacy includes arms 
control, outreach programs through the use of short-term training teams, and educating and 
training transitioning states in democratic accountability.  The UK’s most recent doctrine defines 
Defense Engagement as “the means by which the UK employs Defence assets and activities to 
achieve influence without the use or threat of force.”  Moreover, the manual explains, “By 
integrating the national instruments of power (diplomatic, economic and military – all 
                                                                   
95 Ibid., 12. 
96 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of 
State for Defence by Command of her Majesty, July 1998, 
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underpinned by information) the government seeks to influence, through a range of activities, to 
prevent conflict, protect its legitimate interests and shape a stable world.”97   
    China’s 2006, 2010, and 2015 Defense White Papers refer to these activities as international 
and regional ‘Security Cooperation’; the 2015 document listed military and security cooperation 
as one of the military’s main objectives: “China’s armed forces will continue to develop military-
to-military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third 
party.”98  Moreover, the document states that Chinese forces will, “strive to establish fair and 
effective collective security mechanisms and military confidence-building measures (CBMs), 
expand military and security cooperation, and create a security environment favorable to China’s 
peaceful development.”99  India’s 2016 Ministry of Defense Annual Report calls these types of 
activities ‘Defense Cooperation’, which include military officer staff talks, civic action 
programs, training teams, and multinational exercises.100  Although each major power’s 
responses to uncertainty through shaping MMEs will be explored in the illustrative case studies 
(Chapters 4-7), the following section describes the global increase in strategic uncertainty since 
the end of the Cold War that prompted the need for more military shaping operations. 
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2.3 The Increase in Strategic Uncertainty after the End of the Cold War 
    In order to address strategic uncertainty—that is, when the type and location of threats, as well 
as which states will help combat these threats, is largely unknown—major powers implement 
shaping operations.  Though the Cold War threatened the possibility for great power war, the 
general type and location of threats were largely known by the major powers.  Thus, military 
planners addressed this problem by stationing combat units prepared for large-scale conventional 
attack throughout Europe.  Insurgencies and non-state threats from the post-colonial world did 
pose a problem for military planning, though planners viewed the source of these challenges as 
emanating from the other major power and thus, more predictable.  Conversely, after the end of 
superpower rivalry, the proliferation of non-state threats emanating from various sources posed 
an acute problem for military planning: particularly the type and location of threats, as well as 
which states would aid in confronting these challenges.  Thus, major powers were forced to 
grapple with an increase in strategic uncertainty in the post-Cold War threat environment.  This 
section compares the relative certainty of the last decade of the Cold War with the uncertain 
strategic environment after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
 
The Relative Strategic Certainty of the 1980’s during the Cold War 
    During the final decade of the Cold War, the US (with its NATO allies) and Soviet Union 
viewed one other as the primary threats to each other’s security.  Both superpowers planned for 
conventional war in Europe, evidenced by both strategic planning documents as well as the 
balances of forces that were prepared for an invasion through the Fulda Gap between East and 
59 
 
West Germany.101  This competition between superpowers would also manifest in competing 
spheres of influence as ‘proxy wars’ between insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in Central 
America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.102  Though insurgencies and terrorism represented a 
different type of threat than conventional state actors, they were often directly or indirectly 
supported by the two superpowers and remained an important strategic concern for both states 
actors.  The threat posed by each superpower—either through nuclear, conventional, or 
unconventional force—to one another is evident in both states’ strategy documents and force 
posture, explored below. 
    Though the 1980’s brought change to the US-Soviet relationship, as well as emerging threats 
from non-state actors such as insurgents and terrorists, the US National Security Strategy of 1987 
was clear about the main source of threat: “The most significant threat to U.S. security and 
national interests is the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union.”  Not only did Soviet 
nuclear and conventional forces threaten the US and its allies in Europe and East Asia, but also 
Soviet influence in the Third World: “The evidence of the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and the growth of worldwide terrorism is now conclusive.  Even though the Soviet Union does 
not have direct control over most of the terrorist groups, it supplies massive amounts of arms, 
money, and advisory assistance to revolutionary forces engaged in terrorist activities.  The 
Soviets attempt to disguise such support by using middle men—radical governments such as 
Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria, and Libya, which deal directly with radical terrorists and 
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insurgents.”103  To meet the threat of Soviet conventional power, the strategy calls for employing 
the strengths of American military power in technology, conventional doctrine, alliances, and 
forward-deployed deterrence.   
    US conventional military doctrine in the 1980’s reflected the security strategy with operational 
concepts such as Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) and Air-Land Battle: plans designed to both 
defend and counterattack against a Soviet invasion.  These concepts were enshrined in 
operational manuals such as the 1982 and 1986 publications of Field Manual 100-5: Operations.  
The 1986 doctrine specifically explains the purpose of US ground forces, which aligns with the 
traditional threat and use of force: “The overriding mission of US forces is to deter war.  The US 
Army supports that mission by providing combat ready units to the unified and specified 
commands which are charged with executing the military policies of the United States and 
waging war should deterrence fail.” 104  Concerning which enemies the US army planned on 
facing in combat, the manual cites the Warsaw Pact armies and Soviet-sponsored insurgent and 
terrorist groups across the world.  Certainty about the source and location of the enemy helped 
guide this doctrine: Lawrence Freedman notes that these operational concepts “all took place 
within a cold-war context, in which the enemy was both well known and substantial, and the 
problem to be solved was deterring and if necessary resisting aggression across the inner German 
border.  The focus was therefore on a classic great power confrontation between large armies in 
the center of Europe.”105  Even with regards to warfare against non-state actors, US strategic 
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documents focused on the need to counter Soviet support to anti-government forces: in order to 
counter the influence of the USSR in the Third World, the 1987 security strategy directed the 
military to provide security assistance and encourage fledgling states to provide security for 
themselves.106  Thus, the US strategy called for its armed forces to employ various means of 
military power—direct conventional forces as well as indirect security assistance—to combat the 
influence of the Soviet Union all over the globe.     
    The Soviet Union similarly regarded the US and NATO as its greatest strategic threat.  The 
USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies drew military plans for an offensive conventional strategy 
against NATO in Europe using operational maneuver groups during the 1960’s.  By the late 
1970’s, the Warsaw Pact grew alarmed at increasing NATO’s strength and feared the alliance’s 
annual maneuvers were a potential cover for invasion.107  In the 1980’s, the liberalizing policies 
of Soviet leader Mikhael Gorbachev brought about a ‘new thinking’ in security relations between 
the East and West: by 1987, the Warsaw Pact adopted a conventional defensive doctrine for 
Europe which was followed the next year by Gorbachev’s announcement of a unilateral 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Warsaw Pact allies.108  These measures were designed not 
only to provide freedom of choice for Eastern Europe, but also reduce tensions with the greatest 
perceived security threat: the US and NATO. 
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The End of the Cold War and the Increase in Strategic Uncertainty in the 1990’s 
    Though the decline of superpower rivalry beginning in 1988 brought new hopes for peace 
across the globe, the realities of new types of threats quickly dawned on military leaders.  In the 
preface to the first US National Military Strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell wrote, “For most of the past 45 years 
the primary focus of our national military strategy has been containment of the Soviet Union and 
its communist ideology – we met that challenge successfully.”  Despite the triumph of this 
strategy, however, Powell warns: “Future threats to US interests are inherent in the uncertainty 
and instability of a rapidly changing world.”109  The new military strategy acknowledges that end 
of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR reduces the risk of global major power war; however, 
the loss of the Soviet threat and rise of new types of threats changes how the US plans and 
structures for operations.  Though particular state-threats are identifiable, such as North Korea, 
Iraq, and Iran, other threats are less apparent: “But the real threat we now face is the threat of the 
unknown, the uncertain.  The threat is instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war 
that no one predicted or expected.”110  The strategic document states that the only certainty the 
US military is confident about is that it will be expected to deploy: “It is certain that US military 
forces will be called upon again, but predicting the time, place, and circumstances will be 
difficult, as graphically demonstrated by recent political and military crises in Liberia, Kuwait, 
Somalia, Iraq and Ethiopia, as well as natural disasters in Bangladesh and the Philippines.”111 
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    The uncertainty wrought by decline of the Soviet Union and rise of new threats, as well as 
militaries’ difficulty in grappling with this new ambiguity, was captured in Martin Van Creveld’s 
The Transformation of War, a book that the US Army recommended to its officers for 
professional development.112  Published in 1991, Van Creveld argued that because of the advent 
of nuclear weapons after World War II, large-scale conventional war was replaced by Low 
Intensity Conflict (LIC), a form of warfare that was largely pushed to the ‘nooks and crannies’ of 
the international order.  Wars that resemble LIC share a set of common characteristics: they are 
fought in less developed regions of the world, rely on limited technology, and are rarely waged 
between national armies.  Instead, they are fought by guerrillas, terrorists, and bandits, either 
against states (especially former colonizers) or other non-state actors. Van Creveld argues that 
future wars will resemble the twentieth-century wars of national liberation and the conflicts 
waged before the dawn of the Westphalian order in which ethnic, religious, and tribal 
communities served as the social units that engaged in combat.  Due to their societal diversity, he 
envisioned state fragmentation and ethnic violence not only in the ‘Third World’ of Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean, but also larger states such as the US, China, and India.  This 
type of war is significantly difficult for modern militaries to wage, for advanced technology, long 
supply lines, and distinctions between forward and rear battle lines are useless in the face of non-
state war.113  Because of this imagined future of low-intensity warfare and inability for major 
powers to adequately defeat these threats, Van Creveld believes that militaries are confounded by 
these new threats: “A ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and defense departments all 
over the ‘developed world’—the fear of military impotence, even irrelevance.”  Though most of 
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Van Creveld’s predictions were less than prescient—he argued that LIC would “put an end to 
large-scale military-technological research and development” and “strategy in the classic sense 
will disappear”—his predictions touched upon a fundamental anxiety experienced by state 
militaries facing the prospect of war with non-state actors.114 
    The growing fear about state fragmentation and rise of new threats was also depicted in a 
popular article by journalist Robert Kaplan.  Kaplan’s 1994 piece in The Atlantic titled “The 
Coming Anarchy” envisioned a world similar to Van Creveld’s, though in addition to terrorists 
and guerrillas, threats to security would also emanate from natural disasters, overpopulation, 
immigration, and drug cartels.  Kaplan’s travels to the former Yugoslavia and West Africa 
convinced him that these troubled regions represented the trends of the larger undeveloped 
world: “the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the 
unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.”115  Kaplan interviews 
political scientist Thomas Fraser Homer-Dixon about how the growing scarcity of resources will 
drive overpopulation, massive immigration, and ‘hard regimes’ that will use power over these 
resources to repress their populations.116  Kaplan also explores Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash 
of Civilizations?” as a prediction of future competition in world politics: instead of ideology or 
economics as the source of future struggles (as was the case in the past), Huntington argued that 
differences in culture will comprise the fault lines of conflict.  Because of differences in 
civilization, increasing interactions amongst people from different cultures, and the weakening of 
the nation-state identity, Huntington predicts that “conflicts between groups in different 
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civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between 
groups in the same civilization.”117  Kaplan’s imagined future encompassed the decline of the 
nation-state, the re-drawing of fault lines around civilizations instead of national borders, and the 
growing threat of non-state and environmental destruction.  Though his pessimistic view of 
world politics could have been viewed as unnecessarily alarmist, Kaplan believed that US 
military officers were concerned: “When I asked Pentagon officials about the nature of war in 
the twenty-first century, the answer I frequently got was ‘Read Van Creveld.’ The top brass are 
enamored of this historian not because his writings justify their existence but, rather, the 
opposite: Van Creveld warns them that huge state military machines like the Pentagon’s are 
dinosaurs about to go extinct, and that something far more terrible awaits us.”118 
    The rise of new types of threats expressed by journalists and military historians, as well as 
major power militaries’ anxiety about the appropriate response, is a function of two main 
sources: (1) the end of superpower rivalry and (2) the impacts of globalization.  Though the end 
of the Cold War marked the conclusion of the prospect for great power war, the lack of 
incentives to bolster client states as a buffer against an adversary’s sphere of influence produced 
significant effects.  Kalyvas and Balcells argue that although the number of civil war onsets 
declined after 1991, the end of the Cold War changed the relationship between the two great 
powers and their clients: without the need to counter each other’s influence, both the US and 
Russia limited or withdrew their funding in peripheral regions, causing further state weakness.  
Additionally, the proliferation of sovereign states from the remnants of Yugoslavia and the 
former Soviet Union created more political units with advanced conventional weaponry and 
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motives for conflict against one another or to suppress rebellion.  This change in great power-
client relationships and the consequences of state dissolution shifted civil wars from Asia and 
Latin America during the Cold War to Eurasia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East during 
the 1990’s and 2000’s.119  Thus, although civil wars in the aggregate declined after 1991, major 
power militaries (especially the US and Russia) were faced with the prospect of failed states and 
spillover from ethnic conflict. 
    Another major source of new threats spawned from the consequences of globalization.  Mary 
Kaldor argues that ‘new wars’—conflicts that are fought by public militaries and private citizens 
over identity politics and blur conventional war, organized crime, and violations of human 
rights—arose from the recent impacts of globalization.  As opposed to the ‘old wars’ that were 
fought for national interest or ideology, new wars are waged by groups and individuals over 
particularistic identity: ethnic, religious, and tribal.  Globalization, for Kaldor the “intensification 
of global interconnectedness – political, economic, military and cultural – and the changing 
character of political authority,” was driven by the dramatic improvements in information 
technology, communication, and data-processing beginning in the 1980’s.  Though the roots of 
the more recent manifestation of globalization was present in the 1980’s, the interaction of 
globalization and the dissolution of the Soviet Union accelerated the onset of new wars:  
It is often argued that the new wars are a consequence of the end of the Cold War; they 
reflect a power vacuum which is typical of transition periods in world affairs.  It is 
undoubtedly true that the consequences of the end of the Cold War – the availability of 
surplus arms, the discrediting of socialist ideologies, the disintegration of totalitarian 
empires, the withdrawal of superpower support to client regimes – contributed in 
important ways to the new wars.  But equally, the end of the Cold War could be viewed 
as the way in which the Eastern bloc succumbed to the inevitable encroachment of 
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globalization – the crumbling of the last bastions of territorial autarky, the moment when 
Eastern Europe was ‘opened up’ to the rest of the world.120 
 
She argues that new wars emerge from the loss of political sovereignty and autonomy as well as 
the disintegration of states; without a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, states with little 
capacity are challenged to maintain order and provide security for their citizens.  One of Kaldor’s 
main case studies explores the 1990’s ethnic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which serves as the 
“paradigm case” of her conception of new wars and highlights the change in threats faced by 
militaries after the end of the Cold War.121 
    Major power militaries in the mid-1990’s acknowledged the growing importance of terrorism, 
ethnic conflict, immigration, crime, and resource scarcity as threats to national security.  Yet 
what made these threats particularly troublesome for military planning was the reality that their 
type (state vs. non-state) and location were largely unknown; that is, although the threat of great 
power war imposed a shadow over the Cold War, the source and location of that threat was 
known and relatively certain.  In contrast, terrorism, ethnic war, transnational crime, and 
resource scarcity could arise suddenly and from many parts of the world.  Mikkel Rasmussen 
argues that, “Globalisation means that Western strategy is increasingly focused on managing 
risks rather than creating enduring security.  Following the Cold War, this has meant a gradual 
recalibrating of doctrines from logic of deterrence to a management logic.”122  As the strategic 
environment moved from “predictability to unpredictability”, Western strategists were forced to 
transition away from a reliance on containment against the Soviets when “international security 
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was predictable and calculable.”  Rather, after the end of the Cold War strategists adopted a 
‘meteorologist’ mentality in an attempt to predict and hedge against an unpredictable security 
environment.123  
    This increase in strategic uncertainty is present in most major power security and military 
documents throughout the 1990’s.  The William Clinton Administration’s 1995 US National 
Security Strategy notes, “The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America’s security 
imperatives.  The central security challenge of the past half-century – the threat of communist 
expansion – is gone.  The dangers we face today are more diverse.  Ethnic conflict is spreading 
and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe…Large 
scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threats to undermine 
political stability in many countries and regions.”124  The strategy document continues to 
emphasize a “complex array of new and old security challenges,” in a “period of great promise 
but also great uncertainty,”: these threats range from fragile post-communist states, difficulties in 
transitions to democracy, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, violent extremism, 
narcotics trafficking, and environmental degradation.125  
    Despite earlier pressures to exploit the ‘peace dividend’ and reduce the defense budget, the 
UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review White Paper recognized the impact of new threats in the 
post-Cold War environment: “For the last two hundred years, the dominant force in international 
affairs has been the nation state.  Most wars have been caused by attempts to create or expand 
such states.  In contrast, over the next twenty years, the risks to international stability seem as 
likely to come from other factors: ethnic and religious conflict; population and environmental 
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pressures; competition for scarce resources; drugs, terrorism and crime.” 126  The review goes on 
to note that the break-up of states, such as the former Yugoslavia, have the potential to 
‘overspill’ and weaken new democracies emerging in Europe.  After the breakup of the USSR, 
Russia faced increasing ethnic conflict and transnational crime along its new territorial borders 
with its former satellite states.  The country’s first official military doctrine since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union noted the greatest dangers to security emanated from local wars along its 
borders, the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons, illegal armed formations, organized crime, 
and terrorism, along with traditional threats from “the expansion of military blocs and alliances 
to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security.”127 
 
The Growing Threat of Transnational Terrorism After 9/11 
    Though religious terrorism posed a threat to major powers since the 1980’s, the Al Qaeda 
attacks on US soil in September 2001 showcased the surprising ability for a few individuals to 
inflict massive destruction on the most powerful country in the world.  The ability for 
transnational terrorists to coordinate actions and carry out operations half-way across the world 
created a challenge for major power military planning.  This ‘globalization of informal violence’ 
proved that geography was no longer an obstacle for technologically inferior non-state actors to 
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inflict great harm on civilians from distant locations.128  The attacks made clear that the source 
and location of threats to the homeland, especially one surrounded by two large oceans and 
friendly neighbors, became more uncertain.  The scale and unpredictable nature of the attacks 
brought full attention to states’ responsibility to protect their citizens from not only state, but also 
now amorphous non-state treats, to their citizens.  Audrey Cronin argues that the 9/11-era 
“current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented 
threats from non-state actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it”.129  
The ability for terrorists to coordinate operations using the internet and cell phones across 
national borders, gain access to unconventional weapons, and fund their operations using modern 
financial transactions were made possible by globalization.  At the same time, globalization 
spawned more international contact that both created a greater awareness of societal differences 
as well as perceived cultural attack against indigenous customs, creating a backlash against 
perceived Western encroachment.  Thus, modern terrorism was both made possible by and 
served as a reaction to globalization, a challenge Cronin argues, “is perhaps the leading threat to 
long-term stability in the twenty-first century.”130 
    US strategic documents in the aftermath of 9/11 reflected the growing concern about 
transnational terrorism and the need to proactively address the security problem internationally.  
The George W. Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy asserts that “The United 
States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach.  The enemy is not a single 
political regime or person or religion or ideology.  The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, 
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politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”131  The document cites efforts to 
militarily disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but also 
the need for prevention through military force: against both rogue state actors and transnational 
terrorists.  The emergent doctrine that legitimized preemptive and preventive war was seen as 
necessary to protect US citizens against an uncertain threat: “The greater the threat, the greater is 
the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.  To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively.”132  The Bush administration’s preventive war against Iraq was putatively an 
attempt to deal with the uncertainty surrounding Saddam Hussein’s future behavior133; ironically, 
the use of military force to remove Saddam’s government generated even greater uncertainty by 
spawning the rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and later the Islamic State. 
    The confluence of various non-state threats, including terrorism as well as ethnic conflict and 
transnational crime, led US military leaders to believe that uncertainty had pervaded all realms of 
planning by the early 2010’s.  In the preface to the US Army’s 2014 Operating Concept, the 
Training and Doctrine Commander General David Perkins spells out the uncertainty of the 
current threat environment: “The environment the Army will operate in is unknown.  The enemy 
is unknown, the location is unknown, and the coalitions involved are unknown.  The problem we 
are focusing on is how to ‘Win in a Complex World’.”134 
                                                                   
131 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, September 2002), 5. 
132 Ibid., 15.   
133 Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Preventive Wars and Regime Change,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003): 365-388. 
134 The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 31, 2014), iii. 
72 
 
    The growing threat of non-state actors also became more acute for other major powers.  
France’s 2008 and 2013 Defense White Papers argue that globalization and state weakness 
contributed to a growth in non-state threats to French interests, such as civil war, transnational 
crime, and terrorism, especially from Africa and the Middle East.  If states are unable to control 
their own populations and countries, the 2013 paper argues: “The risks and threats that they are 
unable to deal with on their territory may quickly spill over and undermine our own security.”135  
China also increased its efforts to combat domestic and transnational terrorism.  What began as a 
confidence-building measure between China and the Central Asian republics of the former 
Soviet Union in the 1990’s transitioned into a regional security organization designed to combat 
transnational threats: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  After borders were settled 
by the late 1990’s, the organization was transformed into an international institution designed to 
combat the ‘three evils’ of separatism, terrorism, and extremism along the member states’ shared 
borders.  China already faced Islamic and separatist movements emanating from the semi-
autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, communities that developed substantial transnational 
support links across Central Asia.  SCO members agreed in November 2000 to establish an anti-
terrorism body and the organization was formally created in July 2001 (before the Al Qaeda 
attacks), yet the events of 9/11, as well as US military operations in Central Asia, created new 
impetus for militarily addressing transnational threats.136   
    China’s 2004 Defense White Paper notes that regarding the contemporary security 
environment: “Although the international situation as a whole tends to be stable, factors of 
uncertainty, instability and insecurity are on the increase.”  The document explains that in 
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addition to changes in the balance of power between state actors and relative stability between 
Asian neighbors, China has experienced an increase in ‘non-traditional security issues’: 
“Geopolitical, ethnic, religious and other conflicts interact with political and economic 
contradictions, resulting in frequent outbreak of local wars and armed conflict.  International 
terrorist forces remain rampant.”137  Ethnic and religious violence erupted in Tibet in 2008 and 
Xinjiang in 2009, which resulted in a Chinese military response with counterinsurgent forces.138 
    The increase in strategic uncertainty after the end of the Cold War had a profound impact on 
major powers’ ability to plan and employ their forces to meet new types of threats.  Instead of 
relatively more certain ‘imagined war’ between NATO and the Warsaw Pact along the fault lines 
of Europe, military leaders were forced to address ethnic war, transnational crime, humanitarian 
disasters, and a host of other unfamiliar threats from multiple locations around the world.  The 
growth of strategic uncertainty for each major power will be explored in greater detail in the 
illustrative case studies (Chapters 4-7).  Also, the emergence of non-traditional exercises is 
discussed in a brief history of military exercises in Chapter 3. 
 
2.4 Non-Traditional Exercises as Habitual Shaping Operations to Reduce Uncertainty 
    My main argument is that major powers conduct MMEs with non-allies in order to reduce 
uncertainty in their strategic environments.  Non-traditional MMEs—recruitment, capacity-
building, role-forming, and trust-developing—serve as one type of shaping activity that major 
powers have increased substantially since the end of the Cold War.  The two sources of strategic 
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uncertainty discussed in the introduction—threat (type and location) and assistance—are 
addressed to varying degrees by each type of shaping MME.  Recruitment exercises help major 
powers reduce uncertainty about the assistance they receive for multilateral missions as well as 
the source of threat if they are able to build friendly relations with neutral countries; moreover, 
multilateral partners help combat non-state threats in, for instance, peacekeeping missions.  
Capacity-building training allows a major power to reduce the unpredictability of the type and 
location of certain non-state threats by increasing the capabilities of weaker partner militaries.  
These partners assist the major power by preventing violent non-state actors from either 
attacking the major power homeland or creating instability in a strategic region.  Role-forming 
exercises are used by major powers to manage the role a partner military serves for its society: a 
major power may prefer the trustworthiness of a democratic military or the predictability of an 
army designed to provide stability by protecting the authoritarian regime.  Trust-developing 
MMEs are conducted by major power rivals that wish to reduce the risk of inadvertent war 
between one another.   
    Multilateral exercises have increased since the end of the Cold War due to a rise in non-state 
threats, which create a problem for military planning.  However, another important factor about 
MMEs (and their increase over time) is that they often, but not always, serve as a means for 
major powers to build habitual military relationships with their partners.  Although shaping 
usually begins as a response to crisis, major powers often continue these relations to maintain 
consistent influence in their strategic environments.  As the brief history of exercises in Chapter 
3 reveals, military leaders view training as a necessary preparation for combat and often require 
constant maneuvers to ensure battle readiness.  Soldiers are trained at regular intervals to retain 
“battle drills”, automatic individual and unit responses to certain combat scenarios, which are 
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vital in ground units’ ability to effectively respond to enemy maneuvers on the battlefield.139  
Commanders often provide guidance to subordinate leaders about the regularity in which they 
should exercise their units; the US Army’s training regulation lists required training by regularity 
(e.g. quarterly, semi-annually, annually).140   
    Militaries often apply this same training methodology to international partners.  After an 
inaugural exercise between two states, successive training events are often conducted on a 
regular basis, such as annually, biannually, or quadrennially.  They usually involve the same 
partners and often will include the participation of other states in subsequent years.  In fact, about 
16% of MMEs from 1990 to 2016 were a continuation of programs that began during the Cold 
War.  The US Military’s most recent doctrine on multinational operations notes the importance 
of multilateral planning teams, one of which (assigned to the US Pacific Command) built 
standard procedures for interactions with international partners in order to “promote habits of 
cooperation” between the US and Asian-Pacific partners.141  For instance, what originated as an 
annual training event between the US and Thailand since 1982, exercise ‘Cobra Gold’ began 
including Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in different years by 2010.  
Thus, MMEs often become ‘sticky’ or habitual patterns of cooperation between two militaries; 
these consistent relationships are viewed by major powers as positive to provide security for their 
citizens and partners.  This institutionalization of habitual exercise relations partly contributes to 
the proliferation of exercises since 1992; thus, not only were new exercises inducted, but old 
                                                                   
139 Anthony King, “On Combat Effectiveness in the Infantry Platoon: Beyond the Primary Group Thesis,” 
Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2016): 709-714. 
140 Army Training and Leader Development, Army Regulation 350-1, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2014), 166-169. 
141 Multinational Operations, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2013), B-
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ones were retained.  The impact of the cumulative effect of new and old exercises will be tested 
in statistical section in Chapter 8. 
 
2.5 Alternative Explanations 
    Although shaping operations to reduce strategic uncertainty provides a framework in which to 
understand post-Cold War military behavior, there may be other reasons why militaries pursue 
these types of activities.  There are two main alternative explanations for this phenomenon, both 
of which are drawn from the traditional works on military doctrine: (1) major powers conduct 
MMEs with non-allies in order to serve the traditional functions of rehearsal and deterrence; (2) 
major powers conduct shaping MMEs because their militaries are pursuing narrow 
organizational and bureaucratic interests.  Each alternative explanation is described in detail, its 
implications are delineated, and each is initially assessed with regards to shaping operations.  
The alternatives and their implications will be more thoroughly evaluated in the illustrative case 
studies (Chapters 4-7) as well as the large-N regression (Chapter 8). 
 
Alternative Explanation One: Traditional Tasks 
    The traditional works imagine that militaries develop doctrines primarily oriented toward 
offensive, defensive, and deterrent operations and use exercises to test or threaten the use of 
violent military force.  Applying this perspective, multilateral military exercises may simply 
serve the conventional functions of rehearsal or deterrence (‘threat or use of force’) as the 
traditional works on military doctrine argue.  Offensive and defensive doctrines require training 
to ensure militaries are adequately prepared for combat and also to test emerging doctrine; 
exercises often serve this role.  Stephen Rosen notes that although, “Simulating new forms of 
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warfare will always be full of uncertainties, because there is no reality against which to test the 
simulation.  Yet there may be no better way to think through innovative practices in peacetime” 
than through military exercises.142  Jack Snyder highlights the role that map and field exercises 
served in allowing the German army to rehearse battle plans before World War I.143  Barry Posen 
argues that exercises provide an opportunity for militaries to test their capabilities in peacetime; 
however, strategic-level exercises—those involving roughly 90,000 soldiers—are difficult to 
coordinate and resource.144   
    Large-scale exercises are also useful for deterrence by signaling capability and resolve to an 
opponent as NATO REFORGER exercises during the Cold War and US-South Korean MMEs 
demonstrate in the current environment.145  Posen notes that states and alliances often use 
military exercises as “demonstrative uses of force” to display both the capability and will to 
fight.146  Thus, if two militaries plan to deploy together (even for non-traditional missions such 
as humanitarian intervention) or seek to signal to an adversary the costs of invasion, these 
traditional functions would be appropriate.  Thus, the expectation for this alternative would be 
that major power militaries use MMEs for rehearsal or deterrence, regardless of partner-type.  
The implications of this theory are that MMEs are actually useful for preparation for war (and 
not just symbolic) or could credibly signal a deterrent threat to a third party.  However, as the 
illustrative cases will show, non-traditional exercises are usually conducted between states that 
do not plan on operating as a combined force and are commonly targeted at non-state threats.  
                                                                   
142 Rosen, 68-75, quotation on 75. 
143 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 141-147. 
144 Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty,” 166-167. 
145 Blackwill and Legro, 69-73. 
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Thus, shaping operations follow different logics and purposes than either preparation for 
missions or conventional deterrence.   
 
Alternative Explanation Two: Organizational Interests 
    As the traditional theories argue, militaries often pursue certain doctrines in order to serve 
narrow parochial interests: they prefer offensive doctrines which provide increased resources, 
prestige, and autonomy against their civilian or inter-service counterparts.147  Steven Van Evera 
argues that a parochial “cult of the offensive” swept early twentieth century military thinking and 
resulted in ill-advised military policies that led to the disasters of World War I.148  Jack Snyder 
contends that this ideological preference for the offensive was driven by the militaries’ 
simplified procedures and motivational biases for greater prestige and resources.149  He also 
agrees with Van Evera that the lack of civilian oversight led to the inappropriate adoption of 
aggressive doctrines in the early twentieth century.150  Barry Posen argues that militaries prefer 
offensive doctrines because these types of operations require increased organizational wealth, 
size, and autonomy from civilian meddling; that is, sources of organizational uncertainty.  
Because of these organizational and bureaucratic preferences for offensive doctrines, civilians 
are often forced to intervene to re-integrate military policy into grand strategy.151  Elizabeth Kier 
                                                                   
147 Although Graham Allison separates ‘organizational’ from ‘bureaucratic’ interests in his analysis of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, I group both types of interests in the same category since the expectations for military 
behavior for both perspectives are similar.  See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 
148 Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” 58-107. 
149 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 24-34. 
150 Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” 109-110. 
151 Although Posen offers a “balance-of-power” perspective that anticipates some different outcomes than this 
“organization theory” perspective, his case studies reiterate that militaries prefer offensive operations and doctrines 
only become defensive after civilian intervention.  Even in the case of the French defensive ‘Maginot Line’, the 
French army only assented to the defense because of the French legislature’s reduction of the length of conscription 
in 1928, preventing enough trained troops for effective offensive campaigns.  Posen, The Sources of Military 
Doctrine, 41-54, 74-78, 116-121, 173, 222-224; Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of 
Uncertainty” 159-173.   
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argues that particular organizational cultures drive preferences for offensive or defensive 
doctrines.152  Most of the traditional works draw heavily from organization theory; Posen’s and 
Snyder’s emphasis on standardized procedures, routines, and parochial interests is derived from 
arguments developed by the ‘Carnegie School’ theorists of the 1950’s and 1960’s—Herbert 
Simon, James March, and Richard Cyert—as well as other more recent management research 
programs.153  In regards to shaping operations, this traditional literature would expect that 
militaries pursue these exercises not purely to provide security or defend other national interests, 
but more so to increase organizational size, wealth, prestige, or autonomy.  Thus, perhaps 
shaping MMEs are merely an updated, post-Cold War strand of military parochialism in the face 
of threats to budgets and autonomy as the traditional theories imply.   
    Specifically, the traditional works in military doctrine argue that militaries prefer offensive 
doctrines for three reasons.  First, offensive doctrines offer greater resources such as 
organizational size and wealth: due to the complexity of offensive operation, such as the need to 
transport, maneuver, and supply troops at faraway locations, more resources are required.154  
These resources are usually manifest in the number of troops and equipment, as well as overall 
wealth of the organization.  Second, the offensive spirit offers prestige by inculcating a strong, 
aggressive ethos and higher morale amongst soldiers and units preparing to fight in combat.  
Militaries seek to train courageous soldiers to overcome the fear of fighting against devastating 
firepower or superior forces; this indoctrination of the offensive spirit instills a “higher morale” 
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among an army’s troops and units, which is expected to produce victory in battle.155  Moreover, 
especially after victory in major wars militaries enjoy societal deference and heightened self-
image; thus, militaries prefer offensive doctrines designed to decisively defeat adversaries in 
battle and benefit from national recognition for their prowess.156  Third, offensive doctrines offer 
autonomy because civilian policymakers have difficulty in grasping the operational complexities 
of offensive maneuvers (as opposed to defensive or deterrent postures); by demanding offensive 
doctrines, military officers attempt to wage war abroad and keep policymakers out of their 
business.157  Government officials are aware that militaries seek certain doctrines for institutional 
reasons; thus, they intervene when military doctrine is disintegrated from grand strategy.  As 
Posen argues: “Organization theory predicts that soldiers and statesmen will have difficulty 
reconciling policy and military doctrine.”158  The expectation for this explanation is that shaping 
MMEs are conducted for parochial reasons and civilians often intervene in order to prevent 
unsound military policy.  The implications of this traditional theory are that militaries would 
receive organizational and bureaucratic benefits from pursuing shaping operations in the form of 
increased organizational size (troops and equipment), wealth (budgets), or prestige (a ‘warrior 
ethos’ and deference for battlefield success).  Additionally, because militaries seek autonomy 
from civilian oversight, we would expect that shaping operations provide militaries freedom to 
operate independently; government officials would often be forced to change military doctrine 
since militaries pursue policies against the principles of grand strategy.  Although the illustrative 
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case studies (Chapters 4-7) evaluate my argument against the alternatives for major MME 
programs, an initial assessment of each particular organizational goal is provided below.  
 
Increased Resources 
    Though this alternative explanation is persuasive when considering pre-World War II 
militaries’ conventional doctrines, there are several problems when applying this theory to 
shaping MMEs in the contemporary environment.  First, the traditional works argue that 
offensive operations offer greater resources because offensive doctrines require more manpower 
and equipment.  Yet shaping MMEs are not intended to practice for offensive operations, usually 
involve few troops, and do not require extra material resources such as more soldiers and tanks.  
If major power militaries were solely interested in increasing organizational size, they would 
seek more troops and equipment; if militaries sought greater wealth, MMEs only comprise a 
fraction of military budgets and offer few tangible resources.   
    Consider the US Army, whose budget request for 2015 was roughly $120.5 billion (excluding 
Overseas Contingency Operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and 
Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq).159  Conversely, the total cost of all Defense Security 
Cooperation Activities (DSCA) requested for 2015, which includes funding for Partnership for 
Peace, Train and Equip Programs, and Partner Capacity Building for all DoD services, was $544 
million.160  If we include other major MME programs not covered in the DSCA figures, such as 
‘Pacific Pathways’ and the ‘European Reassurance Initiative’, the total cost rises to $619 
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million.161  Thus, shaping exercises comprise roughly .51% of the total Army budget request; 
that is, about a half a percent.  When compared to total ‘modernization’ (acquisitions and 
research & development), shaping MMEs are comparable to about 3.08% of modernization 
costs; compared to only ground-vehicle modernization, shaping MMEs are only 33.83% of the 
cost for additional new vehicles.  Moreover, the cost for shaping is only 1.10% of total personnel 
costs (including active, reserve, and national guard) while comprising only 1.49% of the total 
army operations and maintenance budget.162  Thus, if the US Army sought greater wealth and 
size, it would have been more efficacious to inflate state threats (such as Russia, China, Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea) and demand an offensive doctrine—as the traditional works 
demonstrate—instead of focusing on small-scale shaping MMEs to combat non-state threats. 
 
Increased Prestige 
    The traditional works on military doctrine also assume that militaries seek offensive doctrines 
to increase prestige in the form of a strong, aggressive ethos among its troops and an improved 
self-image that results from societal admiration for victory in combat.  However, especially in 
the realm of non-traditional MMEs, there is reason to question whether these types of shaping 
operations increase such assets for militaries.  First, as opposed to offensive doctrines that allow 
militaries to instill a ‘warrior spirit’ and aggressive initiative in its soldiers, shaping operations 
are oftentimes viewed by military officers and troops as unnecessary, incompatible with the 
traditional role of armies, or even counterproductive to the military’s ability to wage large-scale 
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war.163  Morton Halperin’s seminal work on bureaucratic politics and foreign policy notes that 
the US Army’s “organizational essence” prefers ground combat to other peripheral roles, such as 
“Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) missions, air defense, and the special Green 
Beret, Delta, or counterinsurgency forces”; in other words, shaping activities are considered 
‘peripheral’ to the US Army’s core mission.164  Moreover, since military exercises with non-
allies and training programs with fragile states are largely cooperative in nature, these types of 
MMEs receive little media attention.165   
    Since major powers often use shaping (non-war) activities to make friends out of enemies, 
recruit for peacekeeping, or delegate security responsibility to others, any societal benefits from 
battlefield success are also absent.  Many of these MMEs involve few troops, mix national 
soldiers into small international units, and focus more on camaraderie than on preparation for 
actual missions.  Several of my interviews with senior military officers revealed that shaping 
MMEs (especially NATO’s PfP) were simply a “photo opportunity” or “a waste of time”, 
serving only political objectives and producing little real training value.166  Moreover, senior US 
military officers have recently argued that the focus on counterinsurgency and building capacity 
during the previous 15 years has atrophied the US Army’s ability to wage “large-scale ground 
combat” against a peer enemy.167  Thus, if militaries were interested in building an aggressive 
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ideology amongst its troops and enjoying the societal benefits of battlefield success, shaping 
operations would seem to undermine this goal. 
 
Increased Autonomy and Civil-Military Relations 
    Although offensive operations may provide militaries independence from civilian oversight, 
this does not appear to be the case for shaping operations.  Due to the nature of shaping—
requiring diplomacy, development, and other non-military approaches to non-state threats—
militaries often work closely with government officials, civilian diplomats, aid workers, health 
experts, as well as a host of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  The US military focus on 
‘interagency’ cooperation—between agencies and departments such as State, US Agency for 
Development, Treasury, among others—is prominent throughout most US military manuals.  For 
instance, the current joint operations doctrine encourages combatant commanders to work with 
other agencies because of the understood overlap in responsibilities: “Because DOS [Department 
of State] is frequently the major player in these activities, JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] 
should maintain a working relationship with the DOS regional bureaus in coordination with the 
chiefs of the US diplomatic missions and country teams in their area.”168  Although government 
officials may protest the encroachment of military activities into civilian-led foreign policy, the 
complex security environment often requires an interagency approach to international problems 
in which security, diplomacy, development, and defense are intermingled.169  Thus, if the US 
military was intent on maintaining autonomy from civilian oversight, interagency cooperation 
would not be a means to ensure freedom of action. 
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2.6 Summary 
    The purpose of this chapter was to explain in detail my theory of why major powers conduct 
non-traditional MMEs with non-allies and why these have increased since the end of the Cold 
War.  The chapter began with a description of the US doctrinal understanding shaping operations 
and how they are used to reduce strategic uncertainty; I also noted that all major powers (not just 
the US) apply shaping operations in the current security environment.  I then argued that 
strategic uncertainty increased after the end of the Cold War due to the proliferation of non-state 
threats, which was a product of the collapse of communism and the forces of globalization.  
Because of the nature of military training, shaping MMEs also become habitual or ‘sticky’ over 
time, which major powers view positively as a means to continue to combat uncertainty in their 
strategic environments.  I concluded by laying out the expectations of two major alternative 
explanations, drawn primarily from the traditional works in military doctrine.  This explanation 
of my argument will be followed by a detailed look at my key concepts in the next chapter—in 
which I distinguish exercise types, partner types, and strategic environments—in order to test my 
argument against the alternative explanations in the case studies and large-N regressions later in 
the dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MULTINATIONAL MILITARY EXERCISES AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
    As preparation for war, military training has been conducted since the earliest recorded battles; 
yet the type and purpose of exercises has changed throughout history.  Unilateral exercises as 
rehearsals for combat and tests for experimental doctrine were common from ancient China 
through World War II.  The latter half of the twentieth century saw the advent of multinational 
exercises between the two major peacetime alliances, which served the traditional exercise 
functions of rehearsal and deterrence through the threat of conventional force.  After the end of 
the Cold War, however, new types of non-traditional MMEs with radically unique functions 
were intended for different purposes than the multinational training of years past.  Although 
some shaping MMEs did occur during the Cold War, major powers greatly expanded their use 
thereafter.  The purpose of this chapter is to explicate key concepts for the argument and 
proceeds in five steps.  First, I will provide a brief history of military training to highlight the 
changing purposes behind unilateral and multilateral exercises over time, as well as the 
emergence of shaping MMEs.  Second, I will explore contemporary conceptions of MMEs and 
explain key concepts integral to understanding this phenomenon: exercise tasks, partners, and 
functions.  Third, I will explain how partner-type has an impact on which exercise a major power 
chooses to conduct.  Fourth, I will describe each major power’s strategic environment through an 
exploration of regional commands, permanent advisory units, and grand strategy.  Finally, I 
conclude with a short summary of the chapter as preparation for the case studies to follow. 
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3.2 A Brief History of Military Exercises 
Preparing for War 
    Readiness for combat has always been an integral aspect of warfare, yet the manner in which 
warriors and soldiers are trained has evolved over time.  As war is a violent contest of wills, 
combatants are required to be prepare for conflict and the inherent danger it presents.  At the 
most basic level, combatants need to be ready to operate their weapons under pressure, stand 
firm in formations against an oncoming enemy, and execute the orders commanded by their 
superiors.  The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu argued that there were five constant factors in 
war, one of which is ‘Method and Discipline’.  He advises: “If in training soldiers commands are 
habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad”; 
moreover, “Maneuvering with an army is advantageous, with an undisciplined multitude, most 
dangerous.”170 
    Preparing for war in peacetime meant practicing in exercises as realistic as actual battle.  After 
Rome’s victory against the Jewish uprising (AD 66-73), the Roman historian Josephus remarked 
about Roman soldiers: “They do not sit with folded hands in peace-time only to put them in 
motion in the hour of need.  On the contrary, as though they had been born with weapons in 
hand, they never have a truce from training, never wait for emergencies to arise.  Moreover their 
peace manoevres [sic] are no less strenuous than veritable warfare…Indeed, it would not be 
wrong to describe their manoevres as bloodless combats and their combats as sanguinary 
manoeuvres...”171  The Roman army was well known for its discipline in battle and future 
generations of military leaders would re-discover their training methods to adopt to modern 
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warfare.  During the Middle Ages, kings and lords mobilized armies for specific wars and filled 
the ranks with professional knights and paid or indentured men-at-arms.  Due to the ad-hoc 
nature of Medieval military mobilization, knights were expected to train in peacetime during 
jousting tournaments or melees—originally ‘friendly’ sporting battles that developed into 
mutually agreed-upon violent conflicts—while commoners were expected to use their weapons 
effectively and ride horses as part of daily life.172 
 
The Military Revolution Generates Increased Training 
    As the modern European state took form through the monopolization of force starting in the 
fifteenth century, state militaries began improving and institutionalizing regular training.173  As 
new technology was introduced at the dawn of the military revolution in the sixteenth century, 
military leaders began experimenting with battle formations that would maximize new methods 
of delivering firepower.  In order ensure that soldiers could properly load, operate, and re-load 
their weapons in formation under fire, troops required, as Geoffrey Parker notes, “…practice.  
Troops had to be trained to fire, countermarch, load, and manoeuvre all together.”174  Loading 
and operating muskets to perform volley fire required consistent practice; Dutch military leaders, 
in particular, began drawing inspiration from the works of ancient Roman military techniques, 
such as continuous volleys of fire from javelin and sling-shot throwers.  An officer on Prince 
Maurice of Orange’s general staff in the 1590’s revealed that Dutch troops were “almost 
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constantly at their ‘exercises’, forming and reforming ranks, drilling and parading in the manner 
advocated in Roman times…” As Maurice requested funds for more weapons and training, his 
cousin was concurrently developing a new method for training soldiers through an ‘illustrated 
drill manual’.  The manual described in detail how infantry weapons were to be manipulated and 
the document was circulated throughout Europe.  Swedish general Gustavus Adolphus 
implemented more consistent training in the 1620’s, increasing the reloading speed of his troops 
to the extent that less ranks were required for a continuous volley.175   
    After his army’s successes during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), Frederick II of Prussia’s 
rigorous training regimen was emulated by other militaries.  During peacetime, he held annual 
exercises simultaneously in Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Magdeburg, and military reviews in 
major cities throughout the year.176  His exercises not only trained his soldiers, but also 
demonstrated his army’s prowess to interested onlookers: “Foreign observers flocked to attend 
Prussian military review and the annual maneuvers in Silesia.”177  After observing the last 
exercise under Frederick II, a British Army officer created a training manual based on what he 
observed at the maneuvers, which later became training doctrine for British forces in 1792.178   
    During the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte’s army was notorious for its rigorous 
training.  French inspectors would visit maneuvers to ensure soldiers were proficient and 
sergeants understood drill regulations.  Napoleon personally ordered his leaders to plan and 
execute regular training in the Boulogne camp from 1804-1805: “two days a week to battalion 
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drill, three days to division drill and one day to corps maneuvers.”179  After observing the 
Napoleonic wars, the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz concluded, “No general can 
accustom an army to war.  Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real thing; but 
even they can give an army an advantage over others whose training is confined to routine, 
mechanical drill…It is immensely important that no soldier, whatever his rank, should wait for 
war to expose him to those aspects of active service that amaze and confuse him when he comes 
across them.”  Clausewitz encouraged military planners to develop training exercises that 
introduced friction and uncertainty in order to “train officers’ judgment, common sense, and 
resolution” in a simulated combat environment.180  Yet even Napoleon’s exercises did not always 
mimic the chaos of combat: soldiers often complained the training was, “cruel and largely 
pointless impositions on their lives, endlessly repetitive, and destructive of any enthusiasm they 
might have had for the cause.”  Though French military leaders viewed maneuvers as necessary 
to maintain morale and readiness, soldiers often thought the training was “tedious and 
repetitious” and “questioned its usefulness as well.”181 
 
National Military Exercises to Test Unit Proficiency and Doctrine 
    Military exercises were largely performed unilaterally throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries as coalitions were created and disbanded temporarily to meet particular 
crises.  Even though the 1879 Austro-German alliance marked the beginning of peacetime 
coalitions—bound by treaty to come to the aid of another under specific circumstances—military 
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exercises remained largely a national phenomenon.182  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
military exercises emerged as not only tests for unit readiness, but also experimental doctrine.  
Between 1896 and 1905, the Imperial German army conducted annual Kriegsspiel (“war-
games”) under the supervision of German Chief of the General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen in 
order to test doctrinal concepts such as large-scale attacks and defensive operations in a 
simulated war against France and Russia.  These massive maneuvers, along with table-top 
exercises and ‘staff rides’ (peacetime military officer visits to historical or projected battle sites), 
served as experiments in which to evaluate emerging doctrine.183 
    After World War I, militaries were reduced in size and coalitions were largely disbanded.  
However, states still used military exercises to test experimental doctrine being developed in the 
interwar period.  British military theorists J.F.C Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart began promoting 
the potential of the armored vehicle and their ideas about tank warfare were tested in small 
British military exercises in the 1920’s and early 1930’s.  Interestingly, “the Germans learned the 
most from these efforts and began their armored forces in 1933 based on much of what they had 
learned from observing the British experiments,” while the British largely ignored the lessons 
drawn from their own maneuvers.184  The French army conducted its own experiments, which 
emphasized central control and massive firepower, while the Soviet Red Army tested airborne 
paratrooper concepts in its 1935 and 1936 exercises.  The Germans, more than any other army, 
used the peacetime opportunity to develop simulated war-like scenarios that emphasized small 
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unit decision-making, which was vital in the Wehrmacht’s application of armored tactics in 
World War II.185   
    Though the American army lacked the funding and training for serious war preparation in the 
1930’s, the German invasion of Poland in 1939 prompted American military leaders to re-think 
their training methodology.  In 1940, US Army General George Marshall appointed Brigadier 
General Lesley McNair to test and inspect the proficiency of troops and units.  After observing 
maneuvers in Louisiana and North Carolina in 1941, McNair concluded that although the 
existing training policies were effective, there were still major problems with soldiers’ discipline 
and performance.  Through the end of 1941, these exercises were largely conducted in order to 
evaluate the readiness of units, while thereafter larger-scale maneuvers tested contemporary 
doctrine.  In 1942, the US Army General Headquarters established the Desert Training Center in 
California and Arizona, which provided a more primitive, simulated combat environment for 
soldiers to live and fight during major exercises.186  For all the major powers, exercises were 
conducted throughout World War II to test the readiness of units on their way to combat. 
 
The Advent of Traditional Multinational Military Exercises During the Cold War 
    The establishment of permanent peacetime alliances after World War II marked a significant 
transition in the evolution of military exercises.  From this point on, exercises were conducted 
not just nationally, but internationally as well.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
began conducting regular multinational exercises in the first few years of its existence.  The first 
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NATO Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, noted that there were approximately 100 exercises 
conducted in 1953, including tabletop planning and Command Post Exercises (CPX), but most 
commonly, ground maneuvers.  He explains the purpose of the exercises: “In Allied Command 
Europe most of the manoeuvres were designed to integrate the forces of countries, unaccustomed 
to working together, into a co-ordinated fighting machine, and to practise headquarters and staffs 
in their wartime role.”187  In addition to interoperability, Ismay argued that maneuvers allow the 
allied militaries to test new doctrine: “international exercises have provided opportunities for 
these ‘back-room’ studies to be tested out in practice.”188  He provides the examples of Exercises 
‘Grand Repulse’ and ‘Monte Carlo’, the latter of which saw the first air-ground NATO 
maneuvers to test the application of nuclear weapons on the battlefield.  
    As the Cold War rivalry between the superpower blocs intensified, NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact increased the size and scope of their MMEs; most of these exercises served the functions of 
rehearsal and deterrence.  In 1968, NATO partners conducted the first ‘REFORGER’ (Return of 
Forces to Germany) exercise in order to test the ability of the US and other partners to reinforce 
West Germany in the event of a Soviet attack.  This annual conventional exercise not only 
ensured the readiness of reinforcements, but also signaled solidarity to the alliance and 
deterrence to the Warsaw Pact against the backdrop of US budget constraints and transfers of 
soldiers to Vietnam.  The UK conducted a similar unilateral training event called FULL FLOW 
to test the reinforcement of the European continent by 57,700 British troops.  The REFORGER 
exercises were held in conjunction with other major NATO maneuvers every fall as part of a 
program known as ‘Autumn Forge,’ which involved upwards of 250,000 Atlantic troops in the 
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last decade of the Cold War.189  The US alliance commitment to South Korea following the 
ceasefire with North Korea in 1953 was maintained in annual exercises between the two armed 
forces to rehearse for potential conflict and deter northern aggression.  In 1976, the two countries 
consolidated smaller exercises into a large annual ‘Team Spirit’ training event, which hosted 
roughly 100,000 soldiers in the first few iterations and 200,000 troops by the late 1980’s.190 
    The Warsaw Pact conducted similar large-scale maneuvers with the same objectives.  During 
exercise Buria, the allies conducted their first command post exercise that rehearsed the actions 
of the Unified Armed Forces for a full-scale conventional and nuclear war, which also ran 
simultaneously to the Second Berlin Crisis in 1961.191  Soviet-led exercises throughout the 
1960’s were mostly used for rehearsal and deterrence; John Caravelli asserts that the exercises 
served as: “(1) a tool to increase the military coordination and hence capabilities of the Warsaw 
Pact allies; (2) a psychological instrument to impress or influence Western perceptions of Soviet-
Warsaw Pact capabilities; and (3) a political tool to foster an image both in the West and within 
the Pact itself of Soviet-NSWP solidarity.”192  On a few occasions, joint training events served as 
a ‘cover’ for troop mobilizations and deployments.  As democratic revolution threated the weak 
Czechoslovak regime in May 1968, the Soviet Union announced that exercises were to take 
place from June 20 to 30, 1968.  After maneuvers ended, the Soviet Union left in place between 
6,000 to 24,000 troops in Czechoslovakia throughout July.  More maneuvers (Neman and 
another unnamed exercise) by the Soviet, East German, and Polish troops along the troubled 
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country’s northern and eastern borders in August “served as the springboard for the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia commencing late on August 20.”193  The Pact would also sometimes use 
exercises to deter its own member states’ opposition parties during political turmoil, which was 
evident in Pact maneuvers around Poland in 1980-1981.194  Despite a few exercises to control the 
internal policies of the Warsaw Pact allies, Soviet-led exercises were largely designed to rehearse 
and deter the threat of NATO.   
    The US increased multinational exercises beyond NATO and defense pact alliances in the 
early 1980s.  After the Camp David Accords in 1978 and Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in 
March 1979, the US began stationing infantry troops in Egypt and along the shared border with 
Israel.  In 1980, the US and Egypt conducted its first biannual exercise ‘Bright Star’, intended 
not only to maintain peace between the two Middle Eastern rivals, but also to showcase 
American presence against the growing Soviet influence in the region.  The exercise simulated a 
scenario in which a rapid deployment force from Fort Campbell, Kentucky would aid troops in 
the region from an attacker.195  The US also began or intensified annual and biannual exercises 
with Asian partners in the early 1980’s: exercise ‘Cobra Gold’ with Thailand and ‘Balikatan’ 
with the Philippines.  Though large-scale exercises comprised the majority of training events 
during the Cold War, the US, UK, and France also held regular smaller exercises with Central 
American and African partners to combat communist influence or build capacity in former 
colonies.  Beginning in 1983, the US conducted annual exercises with Honduras to combat 
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communist guerrillas, while France sent troops to Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Togo to strengthen 
the local armies of its former colonies. 
 
The Rise of Non-Traditional Multinational Military Exercises After the Cold War 
    As the end of Cold War brought new hopes about the prospects for peace after the conclusion 
of great power rivalry, the rapid pace of change also brought new challenges to how militaries 
viewed and confronted the international threat environment.  Though the threat of large-scale 
conventional war still loomed with threats emanating from Iraq to North Korea in the early 
1990’s, militaries began preparing for the ‘new threats’ of regional instability, civil war, and 
ethnic fragmentation wrought by the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist Europe.  To 
manage the new international environment and confront these growing non-state threats, major 
powers began engaging in shaping operations.  One activity of shaping operations is what 
Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster coin “Defence Diplomacy”, borrowing the language from 
the 1998 British Strategic Defence Review White Paper.196  The authors argue that as opposed to 
the old defense diplomacy of balance-of-power politics, spheres of influence, and pursuit of 
narrowly-defined national interests, since the end of the Cold War major power militaries have 
engaged in a new form of defense diplomacy which, “involves the peacetime cooperative use of 
armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defense ministries) as a tool of foreign and 
security policy.”197  The tools of the new defense diplomacy involve defense sector advice to 
emerging post-conflict states, international exchanges between defense officials and military 
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officers, and multinational training.  These types of activities are more generally considered 
‘military cooperation’ or ‘military assistance’ and the authors acknowledge some of these 
initiatives were common before the 1990’s: defense attachés served regularly as diplomats in 
nineteenth century Europe, while the UK’s Imperial Defence College was established in 1922 in 
order to educate and develop officers from across the empire. 
    What is different about the post-Cold War defense diplomacy, the authors argue, is the wider 
range of goals and more numerous partners that major powers seek.  First, instead of only using 
military force to counterbalance enemies, assistance is now being used to “build cooperative 
relations with former or potential adversaries, and thereby helping to prevent potential 
conflicts.”198  Second, not only are military funding and training efforts geared toward spheres of 
influence, but also toward promoting democratic reform in transitioning states.  Third, militaries 
are not only teaching transitioning states in conventional battle, but also training others to 
assume peacekeeping duties abroad. In summary: “It is thus possible to distinguish between old 
defence diplomacy, with its realpolitik on countering enemies, and new defence diplomacy, with 
its emphasis on engagement with potential enemies, support for democracy, good governance 
and human rights, and enabling states to deal with their own security problems.”199 
    As a result of the increasing prevalence of defense diplomacy in the 1990’s, major power-led 
multinational military exercises followed suit.  Militaries not only were prepared to use and 
threaten force in the traditional sense, but also began engaging in non-warfighting activities such 
as diplomacy and security force assistance.  Thus, not only were major powers engaging in 
traditional rehearsal and deterrence exercises against potential state threats (such as Iraq, Iran, 
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and North Korea), but major powers increased the number of non-traditional exercises to build 
partner capacity, shape partner roles, build trust with adversaries, and recruit states for 
peacekeeping missions.  The US and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program announced in 1994 
saw the advent on numerous exercises intended to recruit post-communist allies for multinational 
missions throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s (explored in Chapter 4).  France and the UK 
invested heavily in strengthening the capacity of former colonies in Africa and the Middle East 
(Chapter 5).  Russia initiated several exercises with former Soviet republics in the 1990s, which 
coalesced into multiple regular annual exercises with its regional security organization to 
influence the character of partner militaries (along with China, described in Chapter 6).  
Moreover, major power rivals began conducting exercises as post-Cold War era confidence and 
security-building measures (such as China and India in the 2000’s to 2010’s, explored in Chapter 
7).  This cumulative effect of adding non-traditional to traditional exercises led to a proliferation 
in ground-based exercises increasing dramatically after 1991 (see Figure 3.1 below).  The growth 
in shaping MMEs for each major power is represented by Figures 3.2 (Western Powers) and 3.3 
(Eastern Powers), below. 
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Figure 3.1: Total Exercises by Traditional (Deterrence, Rehearsal) and Non-Traditional (Role-
Forming, Trust-Developing, Capacity-Building, Recruitment) Functions, 1980-2000 
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Figure 3.2: Shaping MMEs by Western Powers, 1980-2016 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Shaping MMEs by Eastern Powers, 1980-2016 
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    Trends in MMEs by region are highlighted in Figure 3.4 below.  During the last decade of the 
Cold War, most MMEs took place in Europe, while exercises in Asia and the Americas were also 
prominent.  After the drawdown of Cold War hostilities, European exercises declined until 1994 
but rose against after PfP was announced in 1994.  The 1990’s also saw a major increase in 
Middle Eastern exercises (a consequence of deterrence against Iraq and Iran) as well as slight 
growth in training in Africa by 1997.  Asian exercises declined rapidly by 1995, due in large part 
to agreements between North and South Korea to halt MMEs in pursuit of peace talks.  However, 
exercises in Asia since 1995 have grown almost every year, culminating with by far the most 
exercises for a single region by 2016.  European exercises have also experienced a striking 
resurgence since 2010, largely due to competing traditional exercises between NATO and 
Russia.  Exercises in the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas have largely remained constant 
since the early 2000’s. 
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Figure 3.4: Land-Based MMEs by Region 
 
3.3 Multinational Military Exercise Tasks and Types 
Current Understandings of Multinational Military Exercises 
    Though certain high-profile military exercises, such ‘Foal Eagle’ between the US and South 
Korea and ‘Zapad’ between Russia and Belarus, receive high degrees of interest in the media 
several times a year, MMEs are generally undertheorized as an independent phenomenon.  
Moreover, even scholarly references to MMEs are usually tangential to the main argument and 
are left unproblematized. Celeste Wallander mentions military exercises as one aspect of 
integrated military commands, a general asset NATO used to adapt to its new mission after the 
Cold War, but does not explain their significance in building cooperation.200  Daniel Nexon and 
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Stacie Goddard note that military exercises may be useful for militaries to integrate their 
mobilizations with other states through a process of ‘binding’, but go no further in explaining 
how or why this would take place.201  In explaining his method of practice-tracing, Vincent 
Pouliot provides the example of joint exercises as practices that result in reactions by other states 
based on their particular context and meaning.  He argues, “Between close partners, military 
exercises will likely produce communications sharing, officer exchanges, and follow-up 
meetings.  When it comes to rivals, however, this practice may generate harsh diplomatic 
reactions, military deployments, and countermeasures.  But whatever its effects, the military 
exercise, just like any other practice, will surely cause other practices in its wake.”202  Though 
Pouliot highlights the promise of using practices to analyze military exercises, he provides no 
theory to illuminate his short example. 
    Robert Blackwill and Jeffery Legro do explain the political and military purposes of ground 
exercises conducted by NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, but emphasize the 
traditional roles of rehearsal and deterrence which were the most common functions of joint 
training at the time.203  Vito D’Orazio collected a large sample of land, air, sea, and command-
post multinational military exercises from 1970-2010 to develop a dataset that serves as one of 
several indicators of military cooperation between states.  He argues that liberal democracies use 
military cooperation as both a means to coerce their partners and socialize them to their norms.  
He finds that greater military cooperation with liberal democracies results in fewer instances of 
severe repression enacted by governments against political opposition campaigns.204  Though his 
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findings are important in understanding the impact military cooperation has on partner states’ 
violent responses to political opposition, MMEs are used only as an indicator and not 
problematized themselves.  Moreover, as explained in the section below, exercises serve several 
functions and may not be intended as forms of socialization or coercion.   
 
Exercise Training Tasks 
   I develop exercise types based on several indicators, including training tasks.  Training tasks 
attempt to capture the type of operation in which exercise participants desire to improve their 
performance through teaching, repetition, and evaluation.  Though many types of tasks can be 
involved in an individual exercise, I argue there are five main types of tasks by which ground 
forces train: conventional-maneuver, peacekeeping-stability, counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism, humanitarian-disaster relief, and non-combatant evacuation operations.  A 
single exercise may involve multiple training tasks: for example, an exercise scenario may 
envision a conventional forcible entry into a contested area with follow-on stability operations.  
Conventional-maneuver tasks generally involve the use of traditional means of combat power 
(e.g. infantry, tanks, artillery, aircraft) employed in offensive or defensive operations against a 
similarly organized and equipped enemy.  Though these exercise ‘enemies’ are usually state 
militaries, they may be non-state actors with significant organization and equipment to be able to 
confront state forces in open battle.  Conventional tasks are conceptually separated from 
counterinsurgency-counterterrorism tasks in that the enemies of the latter usually employ hit-
and-run guerrilla tactics and do not desire to meet a conventional force in open battle.  
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Counterinsurgency operations involve the attempt by a counterinsurgent force not only to 
provide security and defeat insurgents in small-unit combat, but also achieve political victory by 
convincing the population that its political authority is more legitimate than the insurgents’.205  
There is often conceptual overlap between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; 
thus, I include them in the same category.206 
    Peacekeeping-stability tasks include activities that Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis 
describe as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction that are ultimately 
intended to end or prevent civil wars.207  Specific peacekeeping or peace enforcement military 
training tasks include separation of belligerents, protection of civilians, convoy security, and 
distribution of humanitarian aid.  Stability tasks include traditionally non-military post-conflict 
reconstruction—commonly referred to as ‘Phase IV’—efforts such as establishing civil security, 
restoring essential services, supporting governance, and aiding economic and infrastructure 
development.208  Due to conceptual similarity, I include both tasks in the same category.  During 
humanitarian-disaster relief training, militaries practice tasks associated with reducing “human 
suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” following civil conflict or natural disasters.209  Non-
combatant evacuation operations (also known as ‘NEOs’) require that militaries are prepared to 
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expeditiously rescue civilians (usually government employees) from hostile environments abroad 
during times of crisis.210 
    Figure 3.5 below highlights the changing emphasis on different exercise tasks over time.211  
As is apparent in the graph, conventional-maneuver tasks are most common throughout the 
1980’s and the post-Cold War era.  Peacekeeping-stability tasks were exercised beginning in the 
early 1990’s, but dropped after 2000.  Counterinsurgency-counterterror tasks grew substantially 
after the Al Qaeda attacks on the US in September 2001, eclipsing conventional-maneuver tasks 
in a few years during the 2000’s.  Humanitarian-disaster relief training tasks have grown slowly 
over time.  What is most interesting is the dramatic increase in conventional-maneuver exercises 
after 2010; the return of conventional exercises and the implications for international security 
will be explored in Chapter 9. 
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Figure 3.5: Land-Based MMEs by Exercise Task 
 
Determining Exercise Types 
    As explained in the introduction, the traditional exercise functions of rehearsal and deterrence 
seek to prepare to use or threaten military force.  Conversely, the non-traditional exercise 
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shaping activity intended to gather assistance from potential allies, transform adversarial 
relations from hostile to friendly, and reduce the uncertainty of threats by influencing and 
strengthening the capacity of partners.  For conceptual clarity, I argue that each MME serves one 
exercise function, even though there may be ‘sub-functions’ within each type.  For instance, 
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deterrence exercises as also serving rehearsal functions (but not necessary the other way around, 
in which an exercise may practice for deployment without the need for deterrence).  Moreover, 
when a major power builds the capacity of a partner state, there is also commonly an attempt to 
form the role that the partner military serves for its society (such as peacekeeping force or regime 
defense).  Despite this overlap, I code one exercise type for each training event.  Each MME type 
is informed by six indicators: (1) the nature of the defense organization or agreement; (2) the 
exercise program history; (3) the exercise training tasks; (4) the number of troops participating in 
the event; (5) the threat (either practiced in the scenario or mentioned in the news report); (6) 
official statements and news reports covering the event.  A summary of the indicators is shown 
in Figure 3.6 below.  
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    The first indicator provides information about what defense pact, regional organization, or 
defense relationship surrounds the event.  Some organizations may plan and resource the training 
event (e.g. NATO), while others may be planned and funded by a major power but includes 
alliance partners (e.g. the US and NATO).  Some exercises fulfill formal defense agreements 
short of alliance pacts, while others serve to realize confidence and security building measures 
signed by diplomats between geopolitical rivals.  In general, deterrence and rehearsal exercises 
are usually conducted by formal alliances and states with standing defense agreements.  Trust-
developing exercises are usually conducted by states within a framework of confidence-building.  
Role-forming training is usually led by a major power in a regional security organization.  Major 
powers usually send trainers to build the capacity of partners in bi- or multi-lateral training 
programs and recruitment exercises are commonly led by alliances or emerging defense 
relationships.  The second indicator involves exercise program history.  Habitual exercises 
(annual, biannual, or quadrennial) often maintain the same program name, such as 
‘REFORGER’ or ‘Cobra Gold’, though this may not be the case.  The exercise program’s 
history, especially year of inauguration and agreements surrounding the beginning of training 
relations, provides telling information on which type of function the exercise serves.  The third 
indicator, exercise training tasks, also help specify function type in several ways.  First, though 
deterrence is a possible function for conventional-maneuver exercises, I exclude deterrence as a 
possibility for the other training tasks of counterinsurgency-counterterrorism, peacekeeping-
stability, humanitarian-disaster relief, and non-combatant evacuation operations because, in 
general, training for these operations are not intended to signal a deterrent threat to an enemy.212  
                                                                   
212 One could argue that state militaries are capable of deterring insurgents and terrorists, primarily through 
decapitating unmanned aerial strikes and targeted killings carried out by special operations forces.  Though fearing 
air and ground strikes is a logical deterrent, I have found little evidence of militaries using counterinsurgency 
exercises (specifically) to signal deterrence and would question whether demonstrations actually deter terrorism.  
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Capacity-building exercises may encompass conventional-maneuver, counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism, or peacekeeping-stability tasks (based on the needs of the partner), while role-
forming training usually excludes the first task since the partners are usually more advanced and 
do not need training in conventional tactics.  Trust-developing exercises usually incorporate 
counterinsurgency-counterterrorism, peacekeeping-stability, and humanitarian relief tasks (but 
not conventional), while rehearsals and recruitment may include all types of tasks. 
    The fourth indicator, number of troops involved (if available), helps provide context in how 
real-world ‘useful’ or merely ‘symbolic’ the exercise is for the partners.  Deterrence exercises 
involve a number of troops effective for signaling (usually at least 5,000, but not always); 
rehearsals must involve a number of troops that would actually be sufficient for a deployment or 
the imagined scenario.  Trust-developing and recruitment exercises are usually symbolic, 
incorporating only a few hundred soldiers which would be too few for actual major operations.  
Major powers usually send trainers or small units (smaller than the partner force) to build the 
capacity of weaker states; while role-forming exercises usually involve similar number of troops 
from both the major power and the partner.  Figure 3.7 below reveals that average troops per 
exercise declined from the end of the Cold War until 2015.  The ‘spikes’ in certain years, such as 
1992 and 1993, are attributed to a few massive exercises: most notably ‘Team Spirit’ between 
the US and South Korea. 
                                                                   
For a discussion of the deterrent effect of targeted killing, see Alex S. Wilner, “Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: 
Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
Vol. 33, No. 4 (2010): 307-329.  
112 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Average Troops Per Exercise, By Year 
 
    The fifth indicator, threat faced by the exercise participants, also influences the function of the 
exercise.  I dichotomize threat by internal and external: I assume internal threats comprise 
insurgencies, terrorists, or violent ethnic factions within a partner state, while external threats 
involve conventional threats, insurgencies, terrorists, or violent ethnic factions outside of the 
partner states.  Deterrence and rehearsals are usually associated with external threats that allies or 
coalition partners must prepare for during training, which may involve deploying for 
peacekeeping or counterinsurgency in another state.  Recruitment exercises are attempts by 
major powers to enlist the help of capable contributors to prepare against external threats.  Trust-
developing exercises may be external or internal, depending on the individual exercise (e.g. 
counterinsurgency at home or peacekeeping abroad).  Capacity-building and role-forming 
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exercises are aimed at combating an internal threat to the partner state.  The sixth indicator 
provides overall context for each exercise.  Public statements by government officials and 
commentary by journalists provide background to what they perceive is the purpose of the 
training event.  For instance, during rehearsals, statements such as ‘preparations for combat’ or 
‘interoperability’ will often signal that the intended purpose of the exercise is only to prepare for 
missions.  Capacity-building and role-forming exercises often draw similar language, such as 
‘building partner-capacity’ or ‘strengthen the ability’ of the partner to assume greater 
responsibility for its own security.  Public officials emphasize the need to ‘gather support’ for 
upcoming missions during recruitment exercises.  Journalists usually provide context and 
mention a ‘history of hostility’ among participants in trust-developing maneuvers. 
    Like exercise tasks, exercise types have varied over time.  Figure 3.8 below shows how each 
function (one per exercise) was emphasized in certain years.  Deterrence/rehearsal functions 
were by far the most prominent during the last decade of the Cold War, dipped in frequency 
during the 1990’s and 2000’s, but have accelerated since 2010.  Pure rehearsals grew throughout 
the 1990’s but dropped in the 2000’s.  Recruitment exercise grew dramatically after 1994, the 
first year in which NATO’s Partnership for Peace program began.  Building partner-capacity 
training increased in the late 1990’s and maintained frequency through 2010.  Role-forming 
exercises increased substantially since 1996 as NATO sought to shape the post-Cold War 
environment, and these exercises grew again in the early 2000’s with the advent of the Russian 
and Chinese-led regional security organizations.  Trust-developing exercises are rare and only 
gained regularity since 2007 (most notably between India and China). 
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Figure 3.8: Land-Based MMEs by Exercise Type 
 
3.4 Determining Exercise Type by Partner Type 
    In addition to being informed by training task, partners are determined by several criteria: (1) 
current alliance or coalition membership, (2) history of rivalry, (3) state fragility, and (4) 
potential (as viewed by the major power) to contribute to current or future operations.  Allies are 
defense-pact allies or current mission-based coalition partners.213  Rivals are major powers that 
maintain a history of intense security competition.  For my purposes, I consider the US-China, 
the US-Russia, and India-China as the three major power rivalries since the end of the Cold War.  
Transitioning/Consolidating States are those countries that experience ‘low’ to ‘serious’ fragility 
                                                                   
213 For a more detailed explication of the difference between military alliances and ad-hoc coalitions, see Scott 
Wolford, The Politics of Military Coalitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 14-22. 
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according to the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index; Fragile States score ‘high’ or 
‘extreme’ fragility on the index.214   
    Potential allies are the most difficult partner-type to determine, yet enjoy their own category 
due to the unique nature of their relationship to major powers.  Major powers view potential 
allies as ‘useful contributors’ to ongoing or potential missions, whether as defense-pact allies or 
coalition partners, and seek recruits based on the strategic environment.  I count as potential 
allies those countries that score higher than ‘low’ fragility on the State Fragility Index and, to the 
NATO major power US, UK, France, and Germany, the countries that constitute the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (which involves all NATO, neutral, and 
former-communist Eurasian states).  I include the OSCE countries as potential allies—even 
Russia—because all these countries were invited the NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program 
beginning in 1994 (see Chapter 4). 
    In general, major powers conduct the traditional exercise types of rehearsals and deterrence 
with allies to either prepare for war or prevent war through the threat of force.  Conversely, 
major powers tend to use non-traditional functions with non-allies as a means to reduce 
uncertainty in their strategic environments.  First, in order to recruit allies to join defense pacts or 
participate as coalition partners in multilateral missions, major powers conduct recruitment 
training with potential allies.  These exercises are largely symbolic and are sometimes used to 
convince partner militaries, as well as their domestic populations, that becoming an ally is 
important for that partner.  Second, major powers employ capacity-building exercises to increase 
                                                                   
214 For state fragility criteria, see Monty G. Marshall, “Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946-2016,” 
Center for Systemic Peace, June 15, 2017, accessed June 21, 2017, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm.   For time series data of state fragility, see “State Fragility Index 
and Matrix, Time Series Data, 1995-2015,” Center for Systemic Peace, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
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the ability for fragile armies to provide security for themselves.  Major powers are optimistic that 
through training, advising, and assisting, weak partners will eventually adopt the requisite 
capabilities to prevent insurgency and the need for future power intervention.  Third, major 
powers use role-forming exercises with transitioning/consolidating states to encourage a 
particular function that partner militaries should serve for their societies.  For instance, major 
powers may encourage the roles of ‘democracy defense’ or ‘peacekeeper’ if the major power 
views liberal democracies as less threatening than other types of regimes.  Conversely, major 
powers may influence a partner military to adopt the role of ‘regime defense’ if the major power 
views regime stability on its borders as vital to its security.  Finally, major powers conduct trust-
developing exercises with their rivals as an attempt to prevent war by increasing trust, reducing 
hostility, and limiting the risk of inadvertent war.  These major power rivals hope that through 
habitual (usually annual) exercises, with different soldiers from rotating units, over time their 
soldiers will adopt a more positive perception of each other as ‘comrades’ instead of 
‘adversaries’ and be better able to manage crises in the future.  Below is a decision tree for 
partner type based on exercise type (Figure 3.9). 
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Figure 3.9: Major Power Decision Tree for Partner-Type Selection 
 
3.5 Strategic Environments 
    Major powers do not conduct exercises with all non-allies; because major powers have an 
incentive to reduce strategic uncertainty, they select non-allies based on their location within the 
major power’s strategic environment.  Strategic environments are the geographic sum of a state 
military’s allies, potential allies, and threats.  Militaries and their subordinate services (land, sea, 
and air) use strategic environments to plan for shaping activities and contingency operations; 
they serve as imagined scenarios for cooperative and competitive engagement with other 
militaries and non-state threats.  Without specified strategic environments, militaries would have 
difficulty prioritizing resources and allocating troops to different regions of the world.  Land-
based armies, in particular, derive their strategic environments from two main factors: geography 
and history.  However, each major power varies in the weight associated to geography and 
history based on its particular grand strategy.  Concerning geography, major powers may be 
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concerned about states and threats along their borders (territorial contiguity) and those within 
close geographic proximity, while others may be concerned about threats farther away.  Major 
powers may also be concerned about their former colonial subjects or sovereign association 
(such as republics of the former Soviet Union), while others share little colonial or political 
history with other states.  Ascertaining a major power’s strategic environment is possible by 
observing three indicators: regional command structure, permanent advisory units, and grand 
strategy.  I group the major powers into three categories based on similar strategic environment 
types: Western powers, Eastern powers, and the US.  Each group will be discussed in detail 
below. 
 
Western Strategic Environments: the UK, France, and Germany 
    The Western European major powers’ strategic environments consist of Europe and the 
powers’ former colonies; these are the regions in which they focus their military planning and 
force structure efforts.  The European major powers are allied with other European states in 
NATO, which began in 1949 but underwent several rounds of enlargement, most recently in 
2017 with Montenegro.  Additionally, France maintains a defense alliance with former colony 
Gabon.  The European militaries are structured around domestic commands, the NATO alliance 
and deployments, as well as several permanent advisory units stationed abroad.  The UK’s 
military command structure is primarily focused on the nation-island, while permanent British 
advisory units are deployed throughout Africa.  Ashley Jackson notes that “Britain’s defence 
presence in Africa relies on four main elements: defence attaches and defence advisors appointed 
to British embassies and high commissions in African countries; four Regional Conflict Advisers 
coordinating the work of the ACPP [Africa Conflict Prevention Pool]; the deployment of British 
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units for short-term visits to African countries to perform training roles and the various works 
associated with goodwill visits; and the maintenance of British Peace Support Teams, British 
Military Advisory and Training Teams, and British Defence Advisory Teams (BDAT).”215  The 
four Regional Conflict Advisors are permanently based in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South 
Africa; other military advisors are stationed in Ghana and Sierra Leone in addition to regular 
defense attaches.216  France maintains permanent troop presence in four sovereign territories—
Antilles, French Guiana, French Polynesia, and New Caledonia—while it also retains troops in 
Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and Abu Dhabi.217  Germany, along with France, contribute forces to 
Eurocorps, but does not maintain other permanent troops abroad.  Many non-NATO European 
states suffered instability in the 1990s, while former colonial holdings often lack state capacity to 
address rebellion and transnational terrorism. 
 
The US Strategic Environment 
    The US currently maintains formal alliances with over sixty countries, all since the aftermath 
of World War II.  US allies are located across the world, including Central and South America 
(the Organization of American States), Europe (NATO), Oceania (ANZUS), and several are 
manifest in bilateral defense pacts: Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, and South Korea.218  
The US military is structured to provide presence and support regional deployments world-wide 
through its system of global combatant commands.  The US military maintains six regional joint 
                                                                   
215 Ashley Jackson, “British-African Defence and Security Connections,” Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 
(September 2006): 362. 
216 Ibid., 351-376. 
217 James Rogers and Luis Simón, “The Status and Location of the Military Installations of the Member States 
of the European Union and Their Potential Role for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),” European 
Parliament Policy Department External Policies (Brussels: European Parliament, February 2009), 12-13. 
218 Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense 
Pacts,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015): 7-48. 
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commands: US Northern Command, Southern Command, European Command, Central 
Command, Pacific Command, and the most recently created Africa Command.  Each joint 
command is charged with the responsibility for a major world region: the US homeland, South 
America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa (respectively).219  Each of the component 
services—Army, Navy, and Air Force—also maintains headquarters and presence in each of the 
joint commands.  Moreover, the US grand strategy of primacy (or ‘deep engagement’) requires 
that the US military is prepared to shape and deploy to all parts of the world.220  Thus, the US 
strategic environment and military planning efforts span the entire globe.  However, because of 
US hegemony over the Western hemisphere, the US military is less certain about threats 
emanating outside of the Americas; thus, shaping operations should be focused primarily outside 
of the Western Hemisphere.221 
 
Eastern Strategic Environments: China, Russia, and India 
    The Eastern major powers’ strategic environments primarily involve the immediate periphery 
bordering their territory; these major powers are challenged by vast borders with more territorial 
contiguous neighbors than anywhere else in the world.  China’s environment, in particular, may 
be considered the most complex in the world: with fourteen land contiguous neighbors across 
14,000 miles of shared territorial borders, China’s unique geography creates vulnerabilities that 
                                                                   
219 “Unified Command Plan,” US Department of Defense Online, accessed October 12, 2017, 
https://www.defense.gov/About/Military-Departments/Unified-Combatant-Commands/. 
220 For several works concerning the grand strategy of US primacy, see Barry R. Posen, “Command of the 
Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2003): 5-46; 
Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case Against 
Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13): 7–51. 
221 Regarding American Hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2014), 140-143, 236-237. 
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the rising power must address in order to provide security for its people.222  Russia experiences 
almost the same territorial complexity as China: the former empire maintains the second largest 
territorial border stretching almost 14,000 miles which also fourteen land contiguous neighbors 
(when including the exclave Kaliningrad); India shares nearly 9,000 miles of borders with six 
other countries.223  Due to invasions from Europe throughout history, one of the goals of 
Russia’s grand strategy is to retain hegemony over its near-abroad, especially west toward 
Central Europe.224  Russia’s most intimate military relationship resides with bordering Belarus 
and the major power leads the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a regional 
security organization of former Soviet republics founded in 2003.  China has only one formal 
ally—contiguous North Korea—but has led the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) consisting of China, Russia, and Central Asian states since 2001.  India has no formal 
allies but became a member of the SCO in June 2017. 
    Indicators for Asian strategic environments are primarily derived from their regional 
commands.  Russia, China, and India all have internal regional commands within their own 
borders and no external regional commands (compared with, for instance, the US global 
combatant command system).  Before 2016, the Chinese military was structured against seven 
‘military regions’ inside the country; in December 2015, the Central Chinese Commission 
announced plans to replace this structure with five ‘theater commands’: Eastern, Southern, 
Western, Northern, and Central theater commands.  Each command is responsible for, 
“responding to security threats from their strategic directions, maintaining peace, deterring wars 
                                                                   
222 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2012), 3-18. 
223 Borders and contiguous neighbors were derived from the CIA World Factbook, accessed October 12, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html. 
224 Ian Brzezinski, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO policy and Advisor 
to the Ukrainian National Security Council and Foreign Ministry, phone interview by author, September 19, 2017. 
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and winning battles” and conducting training.225  Russia’s military structure is comprised of four 
internal military districts: Western, Eastern, Central, and Northern (comprised of the Baltic fleet, 
Kaliningrad district, and former Leningrad and Moscow districts).  Russia rotates military 
exercises throughout each of the four districts every few years.226  India’s army is structured 
along six domestic regional commands: Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western, Central, and 
Southwestern.227  Though each country maintains a few small overseas bases or ports, the fact 
that the three Eastern military command structures are internal to their states reveals that their 
strategic environments mostly comprise the areas surrounding their borders.  Because the eastern 
powers have no ‘allies’, I argue that they are uncertain about the entirety of their strategic 
environments (the contiguous periphery).228 
 
3.6 Summary 
    The aim of this chapter was to provide a brief history of military exercises, an overview of the 
current literature on MMEs, and an explication of key concepts such as exercise types and 
strategic environments.  The chapter showed how military exercises developed from unilateral 
tests of troop readiness and emergent doctrine until World War II, alliance-based rehearsals and 
deterrence during the Cold War, and multilateral shaping activities in the post-Cold War period.  
The discussion of current understandings of MMEs in journalism and political science reveal that 
military training is under-theorized and conceived of only as a vague form of military 
                                                                   
225 Quoted in Dennis J. Blasko, “Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 39, Nos. 5-6 (2016): 689. 
226 Pauli Järvenpää, “Zapad 2013: A View from Helsinki,” in Russia’s Zapad 2013 Military Exercise: Lessons 
for Baltic Regional Security, eds. Liudas Zdanavičius and Matthew Czekaj (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown 
Foundation, 2015), 44-45. 
227 “Indian Army” Government of India Online, accessed October 12, 2017, 
https://indianarmy.nic.in/Index.aspx. 
228 I argue in more detail in Chapter 8 that the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is 
more of a collective-security organization rather than a defense-pact alliance. 
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cooperation.  The section on key concepts explored types of training tasks, determinants of 
exercise types, and developed an idealized decision tree of exercises by partner type.  Finally, the 
last section provided a framework of strategic environments by major power.  The following four 
chapters provide specific descriptions of each non-traditional exercise type as well as an 
illustrative case study to evaluate my argument against the alternatives. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RECRUITMENT EXERCISES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
    During his visit to the first NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) military exercise on American 
soil in August 1995, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili 
discussed with reporters the importance of these training events for the contemporary European 
security environment.  He told the audience, “We talk about the uncertainties, we talk about the 
challenges but we also talk about possibilities.”  He discussed the goal of the partnership 
initiative: “It is not about gadgets, it’s about common procedure.  These exercises are checking 
out whether we’re getting closer and closer.”229  During the exercise, a Ukrainian Army major 
told a reporter that he appreciated the US-led training because “some of his platoon members are 
‘probably’ headed for ‘peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Croatia’.” 230  As violence in the 
Balkans was raging, American and NATO government officials and military officers were 
attempting to address the uncertainty of ethnic war in Europe.  The NATO PfP initiative served 
as a practical means by which the US could attract potential alliance members as well as generate 
support for future peacekeeping missions.  PfP exercises were designed to recruit potential allies. 
    This chapter explores the first category of non-traditional shaping MMEs: recruitment.  Major 
powers use recruitment exercises to attract potential allies, develop military and diplomatic 
support for multilateral missions, or simply to build stronger ties between armies.  This chapter 
discusses in detail the purpose of recruitment exercises, the mechanisms militaries use for 
recruitment, the major powers that commonly conduct these events, and an illustrative case study 
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of one of the most prominent recruitment training programs: NATO’s PfP.  The chapter will then 
apply the illustrative case study to evaluate my argument against the alternative explanations and 
then conclude by way of a summary. 
 
4.2 Recruitment Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty 
The Purpose of Recruitment Exercises 
    In order to build positive military relations with and enlist the support of other states, major 
powers often conduct recruitment exercises.  Major powers attempt to recruit three types of 
‘potential allies’ during recruitment training: states to join as defense pact members in the future, 
states to participate in multilateral operations, and other states with which major powers simply 
seek friendlier relations.  Recruitment exercises are commonly initiated in response to a 
particular crisis, but may also be conducted simply to attract alliance membership or create 
friendlier ties.  There are two mechanisms by which major powers attempt to recruit during 
training: interoperability and relationship-building.  Like all military training, interoperability—
or the ability for soldiers from different nations or services to operate together through common 
doctrine and technology—is a key aspect of recruitment.  However, a more important role of 
recruiting is to provide a training event that brings soldiers together, become familiar with one 
another, and serve as a symbol of positive military relations for those who decide to deploy 
troops abroad: governments and their publics.  As these exercises are largely symbolic, they 
include few troops—usually about 100 to 500 total—and involve many opportunities for soldiers 
from different countries to interact on a friendly, personal level.  Recruitment training events are 
usually “scripted” in that there is little battlefield realism to the scenario; instead, they are 
designed to demonstrate “solidarity” among partners and can be understood as “symbolic flag-
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waving.”231  The adherence to strict, unrealistic training scenarios makes these types of exercises 
seem “non-meaningful” and “unnatural” as compared to large-scale maneuvers.232  The audience 
for recruitment training is mostly the partner countries, which includes the partner government, 
military, and even their domestic populations.  Major powers hope that partner governments—
especially central decision-makers, militaries, and legislatures—and their publics will support 
alliance ascension or multilateral peacekeeping after these training events.  This support from 
partner nations is important to major powers seeking to reduce uncertainty about the source of 
threats (which states will be a threat?) and support they will receive (who will help?) in their 
strategic environments. 
    The most prominent example of recruitment training is NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program in the 1990’s, which sought to build strong military ties with former Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact states, either to prepare for future NATO membership or to enlist for potential peacekeeping 
operations in the Balkans.  Recruitment exercises are far more common in the post-Cold War 
environment, yet they were also used during the 1980s: the biannual US-Egypt ‘Bright Star’ 
exercise program was largely an attempt by the US to strengthen ties to Egypt not only to 
continue to maintain peace with Israel, but also as a counter to Soviet influence in the region.  
Recruitment differs from other non-traditional exercise functions.  Though major powers may 
seek to influence the role of partner militaries during these events (for instance, to be more 
democratic), this secondary objective serves the larger goal of recruiting for alliance membership 
or potential multinational missions.  The partner states (‘potential allies’) are usually more 
militarily advanced than fragile states, which precludes the need to build partner capacity.  
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Moreover, although some training events help build trust between major partners and other 
states, these type of training events usually do not occur between current rivals with competitive 
relationships. 
    Although during the Cold War most exercises were conducted to prepare for or deter war, 
recruitment exercises were sometimes used to draw states into the superpowers’ spheres of 
influence.  In addition to US involvement in ‘Bright Star’, the Soviet Union also conducted an 
exercise with Syria in 1981 to maintain tight military relations and naval bases with the non-
ally.233  At the conclusion of superpower hostilities, recruitment exercises were most commonly 
executed by the US, UK, France, Germany, and India.  The US and European powers used 
recruitment exercises in the 1990’s to prepare former Warsaw Pact and Soviet countries for 
eventual NATO membership or to practice for peacekeeping missions.  France conducts several 
regular exercises with Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE that began in the mid-1990’s and continued 
even after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq precluded the need for major conventional deterrence in 
the region.  These exercises allow France to maintain a presence in the Middle East and continue 
to work with partners to address non-state threats.234  India also recruits through exercise 
programs such as the ‘SAMPRITI’ and ‘SHAKTI’ training events “to develop good relations” 
with Bangladesh and France, respectively.235  Though not as common, China and Russia have 
also increased these types of MMEs: both countries conduct ‘Friendship’ training with Pakistan 
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every few years while Russia conducted its first major exercise with Serbia in 2014 and Egypt in 
2016. 
 
Recruitment and the Management of Uncertainty 
    Major powers use recruitment training to target both the ‘threat’ and ‘assistance’ sources of 
uncertainty in their strategic environments.  First, major powers recruit to reduce the number of 
potential threats in their environment: by drawing other states into defense pacts or simply 
creating positive military relations, major powers hope that these states will not be a source of 
threat in the future.  Not only do alliances provide frameworks for collective defense and 
habitual working relations, they may also socialize certain practices in partner states. For 
instance, in order to prepare Eastern European former communist states for eventual NATO 
membership, one of the goals of NATO’s PfP was to instill democratic practices and 
transparency at the defense ministerial-level.236  Thus, major powers seek to reduce the number 
of threatening states by drawing them in to defense-pact alliances or spheres of influence.  
Second, confronted with ambiguous non-state threats such as terrorism, ethnic conflict, and 
humanitarian disasters, major powers become uncertain about which states will provide 
diplomatic, financial, or military support to address these threats.  Military training provides the 
practical ability for different armies to ensure their systems and technology are compatible in the 
event of joint deployment—that is, interoperability.237  When operational need and time horizons 
allow, major powers often seek the support of other states for multilateral interventions.238  
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Training events allow partner militaries to plan and execute training side-by-side, showcasing 
solidarity and common purpose among nations.  As mentioned above, recruitment could also be 
used to draw states closer to hedge against other state threats, such as US-led ‘Bright Star’ 
exercises served against communist influence.  Thus, recruitment allows major powers to 
minimize uncertainty by addressing potential source of threat as well as the support needed to 
counter these challenges. 
 
4.3 The US, NATO, and India Recruit Potential Allies 
 
Recruiting in Military Doctrine 
    The US, UK, France, Germany, and India use recruitment to reduce the number of threats and 
enlist the help of others in their strategic environments, which were introduced in Chapter 3.  The 
US grand strategy of deep engagement requires that the US military cooperate with militaries all 
over the world and is prepared to conduct operations in far-off regions.  US military activities to 
build interoperable forces with partner nations are delineated in the US joint and multinational 
operations manuals, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 and JP 3-16, respectively.  Regarding 
interoperability, JP 3-0 notes that one of the main purposes of security cooperation with partner 
militaries is to “develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 
multinational operations” while JP 3-16 more specifically explains the need for “rationalization, 
standardization, and interoperability” of doctrine and equipment between partner forces.239  
Regarding the need to build friendly military relations, the US joint manual specifically designed 
for security cooperation (JP 3-20) notes that ambiguous transnational threats “require adaptive 
                                                                   
239 Joint Operations, VI-3; Multinational Operations, I-6 through I-9. 
131 
 
planning to integrate allies and partners as an element of national strategy.  SC [Security 
Cooperation] strengthens the US network of allies and partners that can improve the overall 
warfighting effectiveness of the Joint Force and enable more effective coalition operations.”  
Moreover, in order to begin security cooperation, “An initial step in building a security 
relationship includes some form of partnership.  Also characterized as building partnerships, it 
involves developing long-term security and defense relationships with selected countries, 
designated as PNs, around the globe.”240  Multinational exercises serve as one means to build 
these types of relationships.241  The US uses recruitment exercises with countries as 
geographically disparate as Panama, Albania, South Africa, and India in order to build stronger 
military relations or encourage these states to join in multilateral operations.   
    The European powers, especially the British, also have doctrinal concepts that encourage 
recruitment activities.  The UK’s most current Defence Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-
01) notes that, “Defence engagement activities are built upon developing and maintaining a 
network of contacts and relationships through all available channels and understanding the 
broader benefits of (at times) seemingly unrelated activity.  This demands proactive 
investment.”242  Military training and “overseas joint exercises” are listed as tools to develop 
these relationships.  Moreover, the 2013 British ‘Defense Engagement Strategy’ explains that 
these types of recruiting activities help build “contributions to and political support for current 
and future operations involving UK Armed Forces, including through enhanced interoperability, 
as well as access and basing rights.”243  The UK is mostly concerned with the European 
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continent (through organizations such as NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe)244 and former colonies, the latter of which is emphasized in 
the document: “In a number of regions we can also benefit from our historical relationships, and 
we recognize the need to continue to invest in those important relationships.”245  The European 
powers largely use recruitment to encourage post-communist European states to join NATO or 
engage in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. 
    India has expanded what it labels “Defence Cooperation” since the end of the Cold War and 
more significantly over the last fifteen years: activities which include military-to-military staff 
talks, training team deployments, military education exchanges, and MMEs.246  The 2003 
Ministry of Defense Annual Report noted that the rise of non-state threats required the Indian 
military to seek greater cooperation with foreign militaries: “The emergence of a new and 
virulent brand of international terrorism, as one of the primary threats to domestic and 
international security, has brought about a greater convergence in security perceptions among 
nations and prompted closer security and defence-related contacts, exchanges and cooperation 
with a widening group of countries.”247  MMEs serve as one of India’s major cooperative 
activities: the more recent 2016 review notes that, “Joint Exercises with FFC’s [Friendly Foreign 
Countries] constitute the most visible component of India’s defence cooperation activities.”248  
Former Chief of the Indian Army General V.P Malik argues that the purpose of what he labels 
‘military diplomacy’ is to strengthen diplomatic relations, provide training for the military, 
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develop better understanding of new equipment, and establish a “sphere of influence”.249  India’s 
exercises with Bangladesh and the US, in particular, are geared toward recruitment for friendlier 
military-to-military relations. 
 
4.4 Case Study: the US and Partnership for Peace, 1994-2000 
    As expressed above, recruitment exercises are intended to prepare partners for alliance 
ascension, to court participation for multilateral missions, or simply to develop friendlier ties 
between militaries.  One of the most well-known and expansive recruitment exercise programs is 
NATO’s PfP developed in the early 1990’s, which served as both a political and military 
initiative designed to groom partners for NATO membership (through democracy promotion and 
interoperability), as well as to generate support for potential peacekeeping missions in response 
to the ethnic wars in the Balkans.  The main political goals of PfP was to demonstrate NATO’s 
commitment to potential members (notably Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) as well as 
build diplomatic support for possible multilateral operations.  Although some US and NATO 
officials preferred offering NATO membership to former communist states, PfP was viewed as 
an acceptable compromise to preclude antagonizing a reforming Russia.  The specific 
mechanisms by which the US recruited post-communist (and neutral) European states through 
military exercises were interoperability and the development of strong military relations.  Thus, 
PfP served as an opportunity to both prepare potential members for ascension as well as recruit 
help for potential missions.   
    The following illustrative case study observes the decision-making process that led to the PfP 
as well as the execution of three MMEs in order to reveal why and how this program allowed the 
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US, in particular, to reduce uncertainty in its strategic environment.  My argument will be 
evaluated along with the two alternative explanations to reveal whether this program was 
intended more for traditional rehearsal and organizational interests than a national interest in 
uncertainty management.  Evidence that would support my argument are exercise tasks that 
support interoperability and relationship-building.  Conversely, evidence that would undermine 
my argument are indications that these exercises were actual rehearsals for deployment or 
conducted only in order to pursue purely organizational interests. 
     
Origins of NATO’s Partnership for Peace: Democracy Promotion and Multilateralism 
    When US President William Clinton ascended to the oval office in January 1993, his first 
priority was to deliver on his campaign promise of focusing on the domestic economy.  His 
predecessor, President George H. W. Bush, had presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the end of Cold War hostilities. Despite Clinton’s inheritance of a unipolar international 
order and understandable desire to focus on the economy, he could not escape America’s unique 
opportunity to shape a fragile post-communist Eurasia.  The collapse of communism and 
political disintegration of both former Soviet and Yugoslav states resulted in some of the worst 
European ethnic conflicts in decades.  With no existing policy towards the growing crisis in the 
Balkans and no framework to answer the question of European security, his foreign policy 
needed an overarching strategy to address these pressing international problems.250 
    Clinton’s team approached these issues with a faith in democracy promotion and 
multilateralism.  In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 1993, Clinton 
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declared, “In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and 
strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies.  During the Cold War, we 
sought to contain a threat to survival of free institutions.  Now we seek to enlarge the circle of 
nations that live under those free institutions.”251  Speaking to congress in his 1994 State of the 
Union address, Clinton argued, “Ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a 
durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each 
other; they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.”252  The Clinton 
administration’s belief in democracy promotion as a national security imperative was enshrined 
in an official 1995 document, A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, 
which set out three central components of the team’s strategy: 1) maintain a strong defense 
capability and promote cooperative security measures, 2) open foreign markets and spur global 
economic growth, 3) encourage democracy abroad.  Democracy promotion is clearly at the heart 
of the strategy: “The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in 
the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely 
to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”253  The former Soviet Union was 
specifically stated as a main target of democracy promotion: “Our efforts focus on strengthening 
democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and other 
new states of the former Soviet Union.” 254  In line with Clinton’s stated beliefs and the language 
used in the security strategy, Clinton’s team, especially his first national security advisor, Tony 
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Lake, advocated for the promotion of market-based democracies and an emerging post-
communist Europe appeared to be the ideal region to execute the policy.255 
    In order to realize this objective of enlarging the number of capitalist democracies committed 
to the liberal order, one tactic the Clinton’s team discussed was NATO enlargement.  When the 
topic of whether to leave, remain in, or expand NATO came to the forefront of policy debates, 
those in the administration pointed to the fact that the organization was not only intended as an 
alliance against a great competitor, but also to serve, “as an institution of shared values 
(promotion of democracy and peaceful relations among its members).”256  By recasting NATO as 
a vehicle to promote the liberal international order, the administration would ensure the 
organization’s relevance post-Cold War.  In fact, this new mission for NATO had deep roots in 
the organization’s founding.  Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the political goal of NATO to 
support and protect democracies predated the military policy of containment: the Soviet threat, 
manifested through a totalitarian ideology and aggression toward Eastern Europe, was an assault 
on the liberal community’s identity established prior to and not dependent on the USSR.257  Even 
at the end of the Cold War, NATO’s task of protecting the liberal democratic order was 
championed as its vital mission.  Only a month before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991, NATO produced a strategic concept that reaffirmed the organization’s original 
mission: “Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance 
has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in 
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Europe.  This Alliance objective remains unchanged.”258  NATO’s commitment to democracy, 
human rights, international law, and UN principles were crucial the organization’s mission 
before and after the Cold War. 
    Clinton’s team initially wanted to use prospective NATO membership as an incentive for the 
emerging Central and Eastern European states to reform their political and economic policies to 
more closely mirror market-based democracies.  Secretary of State Warren Christopher believed 
that by setting a high bar for inclusion, the US could shape these emerging states into 
democracies.  In an Op-Ed entitled, “NATO Plus,” Warren insisted that these countries would 
have to show that they adhere to, “the principles of democracy, individual liberty and respect for 
human rights, the rule of law, the peaceful settlements of disputes, the inviolability of national 
boundaries.”259  These democratic benchmarks, later known as the “Perry Principles” after 
further articulation by then Secretary of Defense William Perry, would serve as the tool for 
democracy promotion through NATO.  However, US policymakers were acutely aware that 
expanding NATO would cause problems for democratic reform in Russia. 
    The Clinton administration also sought to develop an international framework to conduct 
multilateral peacekeeping operations, which key officials believed would help share the burden 
of stabilizing Europe and also legitimize the use of force.  The increasing calls for the 
deployment of military force came in response to the crisis in the Balkans, which by the summer 
of 1992 developed into the worst fighting in Europe in forty years.  Uproar over Serbian-
sponsored ethnic cleansing and fears over possible spill-over into other parts of Europe increased 
pressure on the administration to ‘do something’.  Clinton’s team struggled to respond to the 
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growing violence: Secretary Christopher called the crisis “the problem from hell,” while the lack 
of US response was characterized by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian 
Affairs Richard Holbrooke as “the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 
1930s.”260  The desire to intervene in the ethnic war was most salient in Lake, who told reporters 
in a 1994 press briefing: “When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the 
stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict.  I 
want to work to save every child out there.”261  The vexing security problem caused divisions 
within the administration: Lake encouraged intervention while Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell wanted to limit the use of military 
force.262  The ambiguous nature of ethnic war and difficultly in crafting a response led the 
Clinton team to look to NATO as a possible solution.  
    The only existing mechanism the administration possessed for connecting NATO with former 
Warsaw Pact countries was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), announced at the 
1991 Rome Summit as a ministerial body that would promote cooperation among all NATO and 
Eurasian states.  The Rome Summit was also significant in its illustration of new post-Cold War 
non-state threats and how similar they sounded to the Clinton team’s description: “Risks to 
Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the 
Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious 
economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, 
which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe”263  Yet the NACC did not 
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guarantee security for non-NATO states, a problem Clinton’s administration considered to 
rectify by enlarging NATO.  When Secretary of State Warren Christopher prepared for his June 
1993 NATO meeting in Athens, key officials were pressuring him to give more muscle to NACC 
or to acquiesce to states pushing for membership, such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic.264  Yet the topic of enlarging NATO was met with resistance, especially outside the 
White House.  There were few in Congress even interested in enlargement and the military was 
not eager to extend formal commitments to defend new, militarily weak members in a possible 
attack.  Moreover, the military and some policy officials feared the move would alarm a 
fledgling Russia and possibly inhibit security cooperation between the two countries.265  Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin opposed expansion and in mid-September 1993 he wrote a letter to 
Clinton and other NATO leaders arguing that although he understood the sovereign right of 
states to freely seek their own alliances, “relations between [Russia] and NATO should be 
several degrees warmer than relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe.”266  Given the 
multiple obstacles and issues associated with NATO enlargement during the early 1990’s, the US 
had to find a way to encourage democratization and generate support for peacekeeping short of 
offering membership. 
 
The Need for Multilateral Partners and the Problem of NATO Enlargement 
    Given the question of NATO expansion still unanswered and the increasing instability in 
Southern Europe, US Army General John Shalikashvili, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), asked his staff in to look into how NATO would respond to conflicts outside its 
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borders.  He noticed there was no command structure for these sorts of operations, which up to 
this point did not affect the traditional alliance.  He then determined that a flexible Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) command was necessary in order to integrate both NATO and non-
NATO partners—including former communist states as well as neutrals such as Sweden—in 
future multilateral missions, which could be “handed off” to other organizations such as the UN 
or Western European Union.  This CJTF would establish a “common set of practices and 
understanding” between NATO and non-NATO partners.267  He knew that eventual NATO 
enlargement was inevitable, yet he also understood the political and military sensitives 
associated with expansion.  He began to envision the possibility of a compromise between these 
two camps: NATO should develop “patterns of cooperation” with non-NATO militaries that 
were not “just talk” like the NACC.  Though effective in increasing communication between 
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the NACC was largely deemed ineffective at practical 
cooperation on the ground.268   
     General Shalikashvili discussed these ideas with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional 
Security Affairs Charles Freeman Jr., who, with the help of his aides, developed a concept called 
“Peacekeeping Partnership” that they pitched to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in September 
1993.  Not only would this program develop a CJTF to solve the problem of joint command for 
potential out-of-sector peacekeeping missions, the partnership would create stronger military-to-
military ties between NATO and post-communist Eurasian states.  A month later, to distance the 
program from the failed Somalia operation that gave peacekeeping a politically divisive name, 
one of Freeman’s deputies suggested the program be re-named the “Partnership for Peace.”269  
                                                                   
267 Anonymous former US official at NATO familiar with PfP, phone interview by author, July 26, 2017. 
268 Goldgeier, 26-29. 
269 Ibid. 
141 
 
Secretary Aspin first discussed the initiative internationally at the NATO Defense Ministers 
meeting in Travemuende, Germany in October 1993.  His delegation circulated a paper among 
the NATO staff that de-emphasized NATO enlargement but highlighted the benefits of defense 
cooperation through PfP: “Rather than forcing a premature consideration of formal membership 
at the time, the partnership focuses instead on real elements of defense cooperation.”  Moreover, 
“as critical uncertainties about European security are resolved, and nations continue to evolve 
toward pluralistic, democratic states, then the question of expanded membership in NATO can 
be addressed.”270  Secretary Aspin then told reporters: “What we are proposing is a partnership 
that will expand interoperability—joint operations—between NATO as an organization and these 
countries as individual countries.  From that, there will certainly be a certain amount of security 
comfort that will come from that.”271   
    Approaching the Brussels summit in January 1994, the administration decided it was too early 
to enlarge NATO but was enthusiastic about the PfP initiative, which would expand military-to-
military cooperation and exercises without alarming Russia.  Though stopping short of 
enlargement for the time being, Secretary of State Christopher highlighted the benefits of more 
military-to-military cooperation: “There can be no better way to establish a new and secure 
Europe than to have soldiers from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and the other new 
democracies work with NATO to address their most pressing security problems. We believe 
NATO and our Eastern colleagues should establish joint planning and training, and joint 
exercises for peace-keeping. Such cooperation can help ensure that all European peace-keeping 
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operations are conducted in accordance with UN and CSCE.”272  Clinton formally announced the 
PfP initiative at the summit, anticipating disappointment from Eastern European leaders desiring 
immediate NATO membership.  When responding to reporters about what he would tell Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic about membership, he rejoined: “I think I’ll be in a 
position to tell them, number one, the purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to open the 
possibility of NATO’s enlargement as well as to give all the former Warsaw Pact countries and 
other non-NATO nations in Europe the chance to cooperate with us militarily.”273  Thus, senior 
officials in the Clinton administration sought to recruit potential NATO members and 
multinational partners by increasing military and security cooperation through the PfP program. 
 
Partnership for Peace Framework and Exercises 
    The PfP Framework document, signed in 1994 by 23 non-NATO countries, declares: “In 
joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States 
subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic 
societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of 
international law.”274  The program was open to all OSCE members, which included all of 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.275  Not only was the document signed by former Soviet 
states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (who also signed a separate collective security 
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agreement with Russia), historically neutral states such as Switzerland and Ireland also joined 
later in 1996 and 1999, respectively.276  The document delineated five main goals for 
participants: 1) facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; 2) 
ensure democratic control of armed forces, 3) maintain readiness to contribute to operations 
under UN mandate, 4) develop cooperative military relations with NATO for joint planning, 
training, and exercises in the fields of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, 5) develop 
forces better able to operate with NATO militaries.277  
    The first two tasks, budget transparency and civilian control of the military, were largely 
addressed through military and security cooperation at the upper echelons of defense 
ministries.278  These objectives were also met through military-to-military exchange programs, 
such as the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, which 
offered seminars, workshops, and conferences to encourage senior post-communist military 
officers to adopt democratic reform.279  The latter three tasks—readiness for UN missions, 
exercises to train for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and interoperability—were the 
main focus of exercises.  The stated purpose of these MMEs was to, “exercise and simulate 
common peacekeeping tasks from planning through deployment to improve the ability to work 
together in actual missions.”280  The funding for PfP exercises came largely from the US through 
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the Warsaw Initiative, launched in July 1994.  The stated objectives of the initiative were to “(1) 
facilitate the participation of partner states in exercises and programs with NATO countries; (2) 
promote the ability of partner forces to operate with NATO, (3) support efforts to increase 
defense and military cooperation with Partnership partners, and (4) develop strong candidates for 
membership in NATO.”281 
    The program was not without controversy, however.  Some feared that military exercises 
would dominate the program, providing Eastern European military officers greater clout and 
preventing the transfer of democratic accountability to civilian leaders.  Others feared that 
increasing military cooperation with former Soviet satellites would re-ignite mistrust between the 
West and East.  In particular, Russian military officers perceived the PfP as a potential security 
threat and wanted to ensure Russia was provided a special status within the program to prevent 
loss of control over its region.282  Despite these concerns, PfP was widely popular among the US, 
NATO, and former communist countries as a means to develop military cooperation, promote 
democracy, and address new threats to the volatile region. 
     The first exercise, “Cooperative Bridge,” was held in Poland in September 1994 and involved 
13 countries, six of which were NATO members and the others were former communist states: 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine.  During the 
exercise, US soldiers compared weapons, helicopters, and vehicles with previous enemies from 
the Warsaw Pact, attempting to understand how the unfamiliar equipment operates for future 
missions.  The MME allowed former adversaries to see each other at a more human level.  One 
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US lieutenant claimed his soldiers’ opinion of the Polish Army and the Warsaw Pact in general 
was low; after the training event, however, “Now they realize they are soldiers who are quite 
capable and quite human, too.”283  He goes on to describe sharing a room with a Polish lieutenant 
whose wife was pregnant, which to him provided a more personal experience to build trust for 
future peacekeeping operations.  After-hours socializing allowed the soldiers to see each other as 
friends and overcome the prejudices that Cold War hostilities encouraged.  The desire to join 
NATO was present in some Eastern European soldiers, as one officer put it, “I think every 
officer in the Czech army would like to be in NATO because we see it as a chance to make our 
army better.”284   
    The MME did uncover problems of interoperability: not only did soldiers need a cadre of 
translators to communicate even in person, the former communist militaries’ low defense 
budgets precluded purchasing enough fuel for the exercise.  Moreover, US officers noticed how 
the command structure of the former Warsaw Pact states reflected the heavily hierarchical Soviet 
system, which tended to suppress initiative, possessed a weak noncommissioned officer corps, 
and maintained a sharp distinction between officers and enlisted soldiers.  US Army European 
Commander General David Maddox admitted, “There are clearly approaches or policies that are 
a result of operating for 45 years under one regime.  We have to come to grips with that.”285  Yet 
the training event allowed the US, NATO, and partner militaries to practice for potential UN or 
NATO peacekeeping operations; for instance, humanitarian assistance was present in soldiers 
who escorted food convoys to hungry civilians, while a respect for human rights and 
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international law was apparent in managing refugees escaping conflict and using checkpoints to 
monitor violence against civilians. 
    The first PfP exercise on US soil, termed “Cooperative Nugget”, took place in August 1995 at 
Fort Polk, Louisiana.  This exercise included the US, United Kingdom, Canada, and 14 former 
communist and Soviet states (including former Soviet republics Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan).  
Each country sent 40 soldiers, roughly a platoon-sized element, to the exercise and NATO 
planners divided the units into six companies (four commanded by American captains, one by a 
British captain, and one a Canadian). A British officer who chaired the NATO military 
committee responsible for the exercise said the goal of the exercise was, “to foster co-operation 
and understanding among the multinational units, as well as to learn more effective methods of 
conducting humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks.”286  Cooperative Nugget focused primarily on 
peacekeeping drills, such as protecting civilians in mock villages from violence while under fire 
from snipers and car bombs.  The scenario was built around a ceasefire agreement that NATO 
was given mandate to enforce between ethnic rivalries in a fictitious country.   
    When asked about how NATO planners determined which peacekeeping tasks to train and 
evaluate at the exercise, the commander of the training center at Fort Polk, Brigadier General 
(BG) Michael Sherfield, admitted: “We went to many sources to develop the tasks for 
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Right now, NATO does not have a [sic] approved 
doctrine for peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, so we used the model based partly on the 
United Nations and our own Army's experiences in peacekeeping operations over the last couple 
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of years.”287  In addition to traditional peacekeeping tasks, an emphasis on democratic practices 
were apparent in Cooperative Nugget.  For instance, the exercise rehearsed interagency support 
from non-governmental organizations (NGOs): soldiers swapped prisoners under the supervision 
of the American Red Cross.  Additionally, a Slovak platoon provided protection to a dignitary 
addressing a crowd at a political rally; when he was “shot” by a simulated sniper, the medics 
addressed his injury and led him to safety.288  As a means to prepare partner militaries for 
potential membership, Brigadier General Sherfield noted: “…I would assess it as a success if 
we're able to expose the partnership nations to the twin objectives of basic peacekeeping skills 
and U.S. Army training methodology. This will help them go back and put together their training 
programs in their own countries as their military forces develop. If we do all that, we will have a 
truly successful exercise.”289  Speaking to reporters about the success of the exercise, Marine 
Major General John Sheehan noted the symbolic importance of joining NATO and former 
communist states in a joint exercise: “From a political level, (success is) the ability to bring these 
nations together for the first time in the United States, to enhance interoperability from a political 
perspective.”290 
    In 1997 and 1998, the US conducted PfP-inspired MMEs in Central Asia with the newly 
formed Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, known as “CENTRAZBAT”.291  The unit, 
comprised of approximately 500 Central Asian soldiers, was established by Kazakhstan, 
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Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in 1995.  These exercises, also entitled “CENTRAZBAT” (’97 and 
’98), were conducted with former Soviet republics with the intent of improving the capacity of 
the joint peacekeeping unit if called upon by the UN to deploy.  CENTRAZBAT ’97 was an 
airborne operation that began at Fort Bragg, NC and ended in separate phases in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan.  In addition to the US and the three signatories of the peacekeeping battalion, 
Turkey and Russia joined the exercise.  For the Central Asian states, this exercise served to help 
their militaries address ethnic strife and separatism from the remnants of Soviet collapse.  
Colonel Alexey Riskin of the Kazak military, said the goal of the exercise was to develop a 
"ready force . . . against aggressors. It will allow us to liquidate any conflict situation in its very 
beginning, and not allow it to grow into a major conflict."292  Once the airborne troops hit the 
ground and completed initial objectives, they began practicing peacekeeping tasks such as 
controlling checkpoints, providing humanitarian assistance, and maintaining separation zones to 
protect non-combatants affected by civil war.  After this first phase, the exercise moved to 
Uzbekistan and included more soldiers from Latvia and Georgia.   
    Interestingly, though a small contingent of Russian soldiers joined the training, the Russian 
Duma officially condemned the MME, claiming: “Under the guise of statements on the 
peacekeeping nature of such maneuvers, the US Armed Forces are intensively developing new 
potential theaters of military actions in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s frontiers. It cannot be 
ruled out that in the course of such long-range troop landings, a possible landing of US Army 
units on Russian territory is also being developed.”293  Despite this objection by Russia, the US-
planned exercise focused on humanitarian assistance and protecting civilians in safe zones under 
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the mandate of the UN.  In 1998, US CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni remarked 
about the future of PfP exercises like CENTRAZBAT, “I think we’re going to find military 
organizations—and not just from the United States—becoming more and more involved in 
peacekeeping,” and, “The role of the military is going to change,” toward peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions.294  The region’s concern with Islamic terrorism was most pronounced in 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group that sought to establish an Islamic caliphate 
in the Ferghana Valley and allegedly attempted to assassinate Uzbek President Islam Karimov.  
As part of the plot, the IMU detonated explosives in the capital of Tashkent in February 1999; 
the insurgent group also invaded the Batken Valley in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000.295  These 
incursions convinced US planners to change the scenario of CENTRAZBAT 2000 to focus on 
countering insurgency rather than peacekeeping.  Given the growing threat from the IMU, one 
Kazakh reporter asked: “The question arises of what the real significance of the CENTRASBAT 
exercises is for strengthening security.”296  Despite this new exercise focus and the threat from 
the IMU in multiple nations, the CENTRAZBAT was never deployed in any operations.  The 
exercises for 2002 and 2003 were cancelled due to US engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
respectively.297 
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NATO Partnership Exercises to Recruit Potential Allies 
    NATO’s PfP exercise program was intended to recruit both potential alliance members and 
partners for multinational peacekeeping missions; the mechanisms by which major powers 
sought to achieve these goals were building interoperability between partner forces and 
developing positive military relations.  Recruitment targeted not only the partner militaries 
themselves but also to convince their governments and publics that participation with NATO was 
desirable.  Democracy promotion was largely encouraged at the diplomatic and defense ministry-
level, but to a lesser extent during exercises to prepare certain partners for alliance membership.  
By recruiting allies and partners, the US and other major powers within NATO hoped to reduce 
threats—by brining states into NATO and providing peacekeeping in the Balkans—by enlisting 
the support of all Eurasian states. 
    The focus on interoperability is present in the PfP Framework document as well as during the 
execution of training events, which identified areas in which NATO members and partner 
countries diverged in technology or doctrine.  Interviews with NATO and US officials also 
revealed the emphasis on interoperability for potential operations.298  However, the first few 
exercises, in particular, were largely symbolic:  
At the outset, at the very outset, they were, to put it bluntly, public relations exercises and 
photo-op’s.  The first big PfP “exercise” in Poland was, I mean, you lined all the flags up, 
you had a photo-op, and then people stood around and said ‘oh well that’s the way the 
magazine goes in your rifle, well this is how the magazine goes in my rifle.’ ‘Is that guy a 
sergeant?  Well no, he’s a [Polish rank] or something else.’  And there was no real 
substance to them; there were two big ones, one in Poland and one in the Netherlands.  It 
was all sort of acclimating the public to the notion that you could get all these disparate 
folks in one place at one time and they didn’t perceive each other as enemies.  They 
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perceived themselves as doing something in common.  That was the early view of 
exercises.299   
As the program developed, partner nations would ask NATO to practice certain tasks during 
training, such as small-unit tactics, to prepare them for potential membership or multilateral 
missions.300  Preparation for NATO ascension and recruitment for multilateral operations were 
major objectives.  As retired Danish Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen, former defense 
attaché to the Baltic states from 1994-1998 explains: “To a large extent, [the exercises] were 
meant to prepare these former Soviet and Eastern European armies for ‘PP’ operations: crisis 
management, peace support operations.  So it was a matter of introducing these forces to NATO 
standards, NATO procedures, so during the 1990’s it was very much an educational purpose.”301  
Moreover, he argues that the political goal of recruitment exercises is to ensure “That a 
maximum number of states send contributions to mark solidarity in a symbolic way (in NATO 
events, regional partner states are most welcome), all well turned out as for a formal parade.”302  
Building personal friendly ties is evident during the MMEs, especially in between exercises in 
which officers and soldiers have an opportunity to get know one another.  Moreover, the focus 
on building “common practices and understanding” also implies the goal of building closer 
military relations. 
    NATO’s PfP is often viewed as simply a compromise to delay the important question of 
NATO enlargement.  Though PfP did help address the political question of NATO expansion, 
military cooperation was viewed as a separate aspect intended to develop interoperability and 
relations in preparation for multilateral deployments.  The invitation of all OSCE states, 
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including Central Asia and the “neutral’s”—Switzerland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden—
demonstrated the desire to recruit partners for multilateral peacekeeping, not just prospects for 
NATO membership.  Partner states were given a “menu” of options (e.g. exercise participation, 
seminar opportunities, defense sector reform), of which they were able to determine their own 
individual level of involvement.303  Moreover, Michael Rühle and Nicholas Williams, both 
senior officials in the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section, NATO Political Affairs 
division during early PfP development, argue against the assertion that PfP simply evaded hard 
questions of NATO expansion.  They point out that military cooperation was already underway 
in the NACC without regard for extending NATO membership to post-communist states.304  
Moreover, though some nations, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, clearly joined the 
program with future hopes for NATO ascension, other states joined without such ambitions.  In 
1994, Williams divided PfP member states into three categories: 1) those who want to join 
NATO quickly (Central Europeans), 2) those who associate with NATO, but want to remain 
neutral, and 3) those who merely wish to learn from NATO.305  Two of the three categories 
describe countries who wish to be a part of the program, but do not wish to join the alliance. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
    As opposed to recruitment, the two alternative explanations suggest different reasons for why 
these exercises were conducted.  First, as the traditional works in military doctrine imply, 
perhaps PfP MMEs were simply used to rehearse military forces for joint operations.  The focus 
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on interoperability implies that these forces imagined that they would one day deploy with one 
another and need to operate together as a combined unit.306  Though ensuring unit technology 
and doctrine were compatible, there is reason to suspect these training events were pure 
rehearsals.  First, the PfP program was developed in late 1993, two years before NATO forces 
were deployed to Bosnia after the Dayton accords were signed in Paris in late 1995.  Two of the 
exercises described above took place before NATO announced its first Implementation Force 
deployment on December 5, 1995.307  Thus, military cooperation and exercises took place 
months or years before NATO and non-NATO militaries understood the number and type of 
units that would deploy to Bosnia.  Moreover, the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion 
(CENTRAZBAT) has never deployed for any mission, let alone as a contributor to the NATO 
mission in Bosnia.  The standing peacekeeping unit, “would become more of a showcase unit 
and exercise rather than one preparing for potential combat or peacekeeping operations.”308  The 
unit would never deploy together for an operation, even though neighboring Tajikistan’s civil 
war with Islamic militants in 1999 and 2000 would seem to be a suitable scenario.  The battalion 
folded in late 1999, though the name ‘CENTRAZBAT’ was kept as an exercise name for several 
years thereafter.309  Second, as each MME only involved a couple hundred soldiers, the exercises 
were so small in scale that they could only be described as “educational” or “symbolic”.310  That 
is, if forces wished to rehearse for an actual operation, they would train with a similar-sized 
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force.  The initial IFOR size was estimated at 60,000 soldiers; an exercise consisting of several 
hundred soldiers would seem to be serve as a poor rehearsal. 
    The second alternative anticipates that militaries will choose certain doctrines to increase 
organizational size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy.  Thus, perhaps the PfP program was merely 
an attempt by the US military to increases its organizational and bureaucratic resources.  
Concerning size and wealth, however, not only were PfP exercises small-scale and involving few 
troops, they were relatively inexpensive: the total cost of PfP exercises and other programs from 
1994-2000 was roughly $755 million.311  For perspective, the total projected US defense budget 
for fiscal year 2000 alone was approximately $280 billion (in 1999 dollars), with total 
procurement at $53 billion and Army requests for new weapons and tracked vehicles at $1.4 
billion.312  Thus, PfP funding over seven years is comparable to about 54% of additional 
weapons and vehicles requested by the US Army in only one year.  Funding for the program was 
considered by the US Congress as “minor ticks someplace in the DoD budget.”313  Regarding 
prestige, there is reason to doubt that PfP exercises increased a ‘warrior spirit’ ethos in US or 
NATO soldiers.  As discussed above, most of these exercises were considered symbolic, simply 
a photo-opportunity for soldiers to be seen side-by-side and share personal experiences.  
Moreover, since the intent of these MMEs was to recruit for peacekeeping operations, militaries 
would not enjoy any deference from society for battlefield victory. 
    Finally, in terms of institutional autonomy and separation from civilian oversight, PfP 
exercises were closely planned and integrated with not only the larger political goals of the PfP 
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program, but also the grand strategy of enlargement and engagement delineated by the Clinton 
White House.  Understanding that NATO expansion was politically costly, General Shalikashvili 
worked with a DoD civilian (Charles Freeman) to develop the idea of a CJTF and joint military 
exercises.  This concept was briefed to Secretary of Defense Aspin, who worked with the State 
Department and White House to prepare Clinton’s announcement of the program in January 
1994.  The overlap between the military exercise goals and civilian-led foreign policy is 
significant.  After national guard unit were selected to supplement PfP exercises, even state 
governors and congressional representatives were supportive of the program.  Though some US 
officers may have had private reservations about these exercises, they generally went along with 
the program, as one of my interviewees noted: “Yes people [military officers] agreed these were 
necessary.  Why?  Because the President and Secretary of Defense said ‘we’re gonna do this’.  
Guys in uniform nod their head, salute, and move out.”314  Thus, if the US military sought 
freedom from civilian oversight, NATO’s PfP would not be a means to achieve organizational 
autonomy. 
  
4.5 Summary 
    This chapter sought to explain the purpose of recruitment exercises, describe the mechanisms 
by which major powers recruit potential allies, locate the sources of recruitment in US, British, 
and Indian military doctrine, and offer an illustrative case study to evaluate my argument against 
the two alternatives.  The purpose of recruitment exercises is to attract potential defense alliance 
members, generate support for multilateral missions, or simply to build stronger military ties.  
The mechanism by which these goals are achieved are through military interoperability and 
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relationship-building.  The sources of recruitment can be located in current US, British, and 
Indian doctrinal manuals.  The case of one of the most prominent recruitment exercise programs, 
NATO’s PfP, provided a means by which my argument could be assessed against the 
alternatives.  I argued that because PfP exercises were small, symbolic, inexpensive, and 
significantly integrated into civilian grand strategy, the alternatives were largely undermined.  
The following chapter discusses the second type of non-traditional MME: building partner 
capacity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CAPACITY-BUILDING EXERCISES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
    In February 2017, the US Army announced that it was creating six new brigades specifically 
tailored to one type of mission: advising and assisting foreign militaries.  These ‘Security Force 
Assistance’ brigades would become the first permanent US Army units with dedicated missions 
toward security cooperation activities.315  Though critics were quick to point out this mission has 
long been the domain of special forces, the creation of specialized advisory units signaled the 
acceptance by the US military of the permanent need for this capability, which was already in 
high demand for over a decade in the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Since major combat 
operations ended in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, and years of 
counterinsurgency were met with mixed results, the US Army employed a doctrine of ‘Building 
Partner Capacity’ to manage the insurgencies challenging state control in these post-war, fragile 
countries.  When asked about the situation in Iraq in October 2015, US Army Chief of Staff 
Mark Milley responded, “Well, that means our job right now, and I think appropriately, is to 
continue to build partner capacity, to continue to train, advise and assist the Iraqi government.  
We cannot, and I do not think we should, do it for them because that will not be sustainable over 
time.”316   
    The US Army’s force structure change reflects the growing importance of capacity-building 
for major powers in the current threat environment.  The purpose of this chapter is to explain 
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why major powers conduct capacity-building training and how these activities reduce strategic 
uncertainty.  Major powers use capacity-building exercises to strengthen the ability for other 
weaker militaries to provide for their own security in the long-term, primarily against insurgents 
and rebels, or to participate in other multilateral missions.  Major powers hope that by delegating 
this responsibility for security, their own forces will not be required to intervene or serve as 
peacekeepers in the future.  The mechanism by which major powers delegate this security 
responsibility is through training local forces to become sustainable and professional units, often 
in the image of the major power military organization.  By both combatting non-state threats and 
also obviating the need to deploy their own forces, major powers seek to reduce another source 
of uncertainty in their strategic environments.  Though the term ‘Building Partner Capacity’ 
(BPC) is often applied to US military activities, the British and French armies have also 
extensively engaged in programs designed to reinforce fledgling partners.  This chapter will 
apply an illustrative case study of British military training programs in Sierra Leone from 2000-
2016 to evaluate my argument against the two alternative theories.317 
   
5.2 Capacity-Building Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty 
The Purpose of Capacity-Building Training 
    Major powers use capacity-building exercises to train local forces to provide for their own 
national or regional security, which precludes the need for major power military support in the 
future.  Capacity-building is usually initiated after the conclusion of interstate or intrastate war 
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when the threat of insurgency is still present; major powers also train failed states that are 
continuously struggling to combat rebels or terrorists.  Major powers are primarily concerned 
with supporting states that fail to adequately defeat or contain threats to the major powers’ 
interests, such as possible terrorist attacks on the homeland, movement of contraband or 
pandemics across borders, spillover of ethnic violence into allied or partnered territory, or even 
humanitarian concerns such as regional instability, the breakdown of democratic governance, or 
the persecution of minorities.  The means by which major powers use BPC training to pursue 
these goals is through the creation of a professional and sustainable force.  That is, major powers 
deploy small or large teams of military trainers and advisors to develop individual soldiers and 
units to become professional—competent to protect the population and, at least in the case of 
democracies, deferential to civilian control—and sustainable—able to not only tactically defeat 
adversaries but also institutionally and logistically support themselves in the future.318  By 
training soldiers and units to be both professional and sustainable, major powers hope that these 
partner forces can protect their own citizens or participate in security cooperation in regional 
peacekeeping or humanitarian missions.  Since major power militaries view themselves as 
professional organizations, the ‘rubric’ for creating and evaluating partner forces is often in their 
own image.  For instance, major powers will often guide partner forces to develop rank 
structures and organizational hierarchies similar to their own; moreover, they commonly evaluate 
partner forces based on their own standards for training.   
    Although the term ‘Building Partner Capacity’ (BPC) has often been applied ambiguously, 
BPC can be generally understood as military efforts employed for “enhancing the security 
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capabilities of partners in less capable, weak, and/or failing states” in order to advance national 
security interests.319  Though BPC involves many types of activities, my use of the concept is 
focused specifically on the training, advising, and assisting of partner military forces rather than 
broader, ministerial attempts to reform entire public institutions, such as Public Sector Reform 
(PSR) or Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs.320  The term BPC was first formally used in 
the 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which highlighted the need for US forces to 
develop the means to assist fragile states in defeating insurgencies and terrorist cells.  The 
terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001 provided the impetus for the US 
expansion of BPC activities across the world.  Although the US consistently employed BPC 
activities to strengthen weaker Cold War allies against communist influence—Greece and South 
Korea, for instance—after 9/11 US forces began targeting weak non-allies in regions in which 
terrorist units could plan and operate without fear of interference from local governments.321  
The 2010 QDR delineated a distinction between traditional security cooperation (conducted with 
allies) and this newer concept of BPC (with non-allies): “Rather than using ‘traditional’ security 
cooperation programs exclusively to help its allies, the United States would help weaker states, 
thereby preventing conflicts stemming from non-state actors from becoming serious or even 
beginning in the first place. This approach could be seen as using BPC as a state-building tool for 
partner countries.”322  Thus, BPC efforts are aimed primarily at strengthening the ability for 
weak or failing non-allies to combat violent non-state actors and prevent the onset of conflict. 
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    Although training local forces was historically the purview of special forces, the need for 
greater resources for these activities grew after the US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan 
throughout the 2000’s and 2010’s.  Though these wars began with conventional military 
operations to overthrow standing regimes, they persisted as insurgent forces continually 
challenged US presence.  In May 2010, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote an opinion 
essay in Foreign Affairs entitled “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. 
Security Assistance.”  Gates argues that the contemporary threat environment is far more 
uncertain than during the Cold War: “The global security environment has changed radically 
since [the Cold War], and today is more complex, more unpredictable, and even without a 
superpower adversary, in many ways more dangerous.”323  Gates was concerned about the threat 
of non-state actors with the ability to target the US homeland from the sanctuary of weak states; 
he argued that in the coming decades, “the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and 
security—a city poisoned or reduce to rubble by a terrorist attack—are likely to emanate from 
states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory.  Dealing with such 
fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.”324  He notes 
that organizational strain caused by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required that the 
US move to a strategy that forced local partners to take up the burden of war and security with 
US assistance.  He continued, “Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security 
forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the 
province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole.”325  The 
US Secretary of Defense’ fear of another major terrorist attack as well as his desire to lessen the 
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US ‘burden’ of security responsibility for other states led him to promote BPC as a viable 
strategy. 
 
Building Partner Capacity and the Management of Uncertainty 
    Major powers hope that by enabling local partners, they are able to combat non-state threats 
through proxies and obviate the need for major power intervention, either directly in a civil war 
or as a multinational peacekeeping force.  Thus, capacity-building exercises help major powers 
reduce both sources of uncertainty: threats and assistance.  As reflected by Secretary Gates, the 
US views BPC as not only a means to prevent the ability for non-state actors to launch attacks 
the US homeland or to dampen conflict in general, but also to preclude the necessity for US 
forces to be deployed in pursuit of these goals.  In this sense, BPC can be viewed as a strategy of 
‘sponsorship’ in which major powers delegate security responsibility to local armies in order to 
preclude the need to deploy their own forces.  Conceptualized by Dombrowski and Reich, 
sponsorship strategies allow major powers to “bolster and subsidize allies who share America’s 
interests and are motivated to implement them.”326  They argue, “Sponsorship strategies have the 
advantage of conserving both blood and treasure while clearly supporting American friends and 
allies.”  Moreover, “proponents of sponsorship strategies recognise that they are likely to achieve 
acceptable results at a lower cost and with a great long-term legitimacy to the policy being 
implemented.”327  The authors cite recent US actions, such as supporting the Iraqi government 
against ISIS or the Kenyan military against the Lord’s Resistance Army, as prime examples of 
sponsorship.  Though providing trainers and material to troubled states do carry risks, the 
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benefits of sponsorship include conservation in blood and treasure, ability to support allies with 
limited resources, and the retention of exit-strategy options.  This concern for delegating security 
responsibility to partner states is also present in the 2010 QDR: “The future strategic landscape 
will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully 
peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may 
reduce risk to U.S. forces and extends security to areas we cannot reach alone.”328  By building 
the capacity of others to address ‘ambiguous’ threats that belie the traditional war/peace 
distinction, the US hopes to minimize the requirement to expose its own troops to these types of 
threats. 
 
5.3 The US, UK, and France Build Partner Capacity 
    In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, as of 2015, the US Army had military trainers operating in 
thirteen African countries.329  Sponsorship communities are not restricted to the US; in fact, 
France and the UK have been exercising sponsorship in Africa for decades.  In the mid-1990’s 
France’s Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities (RECAMP) program trained 
African soldiers for peacekeeping missions, to which “Some 30 African countries have sent 
military contingents to participate in these training events.”330  As of mid-2014, the French army 
stationed approximately 7,500 soldiers in Senegal, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, and the 
Central African Republic in addition to the 3,500 troops deployed in 2015-2016 to Mauritania, 
Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso to fight the growing threat of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel.  
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Some of these troops protect the 240,000 French nationals living in Africa or engage in direct 
combat, while others serve as trainers for local forces.331   
    The UK has engaged in extensive BPC activities, most notably in Africa after the end of the 
Cold War.  The British have deployed military trainers to Sierra Leone, Ghana, South Africa, 
and Nigeria and have four permanently stationed advisor teams in Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, 
and Ethiopia. The British also help staff the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training 
Centre in Ghana, which trained 2,500 personnel in about 70 courses in its first year (2004).332  As 
one British military officer who served on several training teams remarks: “Ultimately, if you 
wish to have an influence as a nation, there are different ways of doing it…Training teams—
going into a country with a small footprint—and sending what we nowadays might call a Short 
Term Training Team (or a Training Team) to capacity-build is something which the British 
military have been involved in for years and continue to be.  If you target it right, you get a lot of 
positive outcomes for an, arguably, small footprint.”333  In 2013, British Chief of the General 
Staff General Peter Wall explained the benefits of ‘Defence Engagement’: “In concept, upstream 
engagement and overseas capacity building, if properly targeted and resourced, should deliver 
benefits to us and they should help our role in global stability by reducing - but probably not 
removing - the need for us to deploy in future on much more costly intervention and prevention 
operations.”334  The use of BPC programs by the US, France, and especially the UK provides a 
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means for these major powers to reduce one source of uncertainty without the need for large-
scale intervention and combat. 
 
Capacity-Building in Military Doctrine 
    US BPC activities are supported in the Joint Operations Manual, JP 3-0.  The doctrine 
acknowledges that delegating security responsibilities to partners is necessary in order to protect 
national interests:  
Acting alone in the strategic environment, the USG cannot resolve all crises or achieve all 
national objectives with just US resources.  Under an umbrella of security cooperation, 
DOD supports USG strategic objectives by developing security relationships, building 
partner capacity and capability, and assuring access with selected PNs [Partner Nations] 
that enable them to act alongside, in support of, or in lieu of US forces around the globe. 
These strategic initiatives help advance national security objectives, promote stability, 
prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of employing US military forces in a conflict.335 
 
The US military Security Cooperation manual, JP 3-20, notes that the goal of this type of 
training is for the partner countries to support US interests: “Building partner capacity requires a 
long-term, mutual commitment to improve capacity, interoperability, and when necessary, the 
employment of that PN [Partner Nation] capacity in support of USG strategic objectives.”336  
Some of these interests include accepting security sector reform internally, sharing expenses, 
supporting efforts to dispose of weapons in neighboring countries, and developing effective 
counterterror forces.  The manual also notes the importance of building sustainable forces over 
time by drawing a distinction between ‘capability’ and ‘capacity’: “Capability refers to the PN’s 
                                                                   
335 Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0, I-5. 
336 Security Cooperation, US Joint Publication 3-20, II-2 through II-3. 
166 
 
ability to execute a given task while capacity refers to the PN’s ability to self-sustain and self-
replicate a given capability.”337   
    In the UK’s defense doctrine (JDP 0-01), capacity-building is one of the main tasks of 
‘Defence Engagement’, viewed as a means to obviate the need to deploy forces in the future: 
“Early Defence engagement can reduce the likelihood of prolonged instability and reduce 
military intervention.  In addition, conflict prevention activities aim to reduce the possibility of 
escalation and promote sustainable post-conflict peace.  This may reduce, or negate, the need for 
military intervention to deal with emerging crises, contribute to an understanding of emerging 
threats, or provide broader humanitarian assistance.”338  The 2013 French Defense White Paper 
includes prevention as one of the military’s five core strategies (in addition to protection of the 
homeland and territories, knowledge/anticipation, deterrence, and intervention).  The White 
Paper argues that prevention is a cost-effective means to avoid intervention and the possibility of 
prolonging conflict: “[Prevention] is generally less costly and, ultimately, less difficult to 
consolidate the stability of a country that has not tipped over into civil war, than to restore peace 
in a country that has experienced it.  Furthermore, any external intervention in a situation of open 
conflict is inevitably exposed to unpredictable developments, including the risk of exacerbating 
the conflict hat one sought to remedy.  France therefore considers it a priority to assist fragile 
States located in regions likely to affect its security.”339  Thus, both French and British doctrine 
emphasize the importance of assisting weak partners in order to prevent the onset of conflict and 
preclude the requirement to deploy national forces. 
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5.4 Case Study: UK and Sierra Leone, 2000-2016 
    As mentioned above, although American BPC efforts are most publicized in the news, the 
British military has also invested heavily in developing partners—especially its former colonies.  
The 2000 British intervention in the Sierra Leonean civil war is one of the most prominent 
European-led military interventions in the post-Cold War environment.  What is less known is 
the British army’s commitment to developing the Sierra Leonean forces both before and after 
major fighting commenced and ended (May 2000 - July 2002).  The UK and Sierra Leone share 
a long colonial history, dating back to 1787 when the capital Freetown was established as a 
British settlement.340  The country served as a port for British anti-slavery naval patrols until the 
1860’s and continued to serve as a regional base for the British-led West Africa Regiment 
(WAR) and West Africa Frontier Forces (WAFF) until independence in 1961.341  A military 
coup in 1967 resulted in decades of political turmoil, culminating in civil war in 1991.  When 
British troops intervened on behalf of the Sierra Leonean government in the country’s civil war 
in May 2000, the Economist noted that the country’s capital symbolized “failure and despair” 
and manifested “all the continent’s worst characteristics.”342  After a decade of intrastate war, as 
well ranking last on the United Nation’s Human Development Index, Sierra Leone appeared to 
be on the brink of collapse.343 
    Yet after British intervention, the end of civil war in 2002, and a 17,000-strong UN 
peacekeeping mission until 2006, Sierra Leone’s stability began to materialize.  In 2012, the 
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country conducted its third peaceful democratic transfer of power and, impressively, deployed 
850 peacekeepers to the UN mission in Somalia.344  In the background of this turnaround was the 
role of the British military trainers, as part of the International Military Advisory & Training 
Team (IMATT), who still conduct joint military exercises with Sierra Leonean forces under the 
International Security Assistance Team (ISAT) mission.345  The following study illustrates a 
successful case of how a major power used capacity-building training to develop a sustainable, 
professional local force intended provide for its own security, contribute to regional 
peacekeeping operations, and to obviate the need for future major power intervention.  My 
explanation of this type of exercise will then be compared to the alternative theories to determine 
whether these efforts are more concerned with the traditional motivations (rehearsal and 
organizational interests) rather than developing a sustainable local force.  Evidence that would 
support my theory are government statements and military behavior which indicate that UK-led 
MMEs were intended to train Sierra Leonean forces in order to obviate the need for future 
intervention.  On the other hand, evidence that would undermine my argument are statements 
and behaviors that point to the possibility that these training events were intended for rehearsals, 
deterrence, or parochial military interests. 
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The Sierra Leonean Civil War and the Origins of British Military Assistance 
    After decades of patrimonialism and perceived corruption in the Sierra Leonean government, a 
rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by Liberia under Charles 
Taylor, crossed into Sierra Leone and began waging an insurgency in March 1991.  Instability 
and dissatisfaction with the government’s response led to military coups in 1992, 1996, and 
1997; after the last takeover, the leader of the military junta invited the RUF to join the 
government to engage in combat against ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group) forces, led by Nigeria.  The two warring factions signed a ceasefire 
agreement known as the Lomé Accord in July 1999 to freeze the civil war, whereby ousted 
president Ahmad Kabbah was restored to power.  The agreement also struck a power-sharing 
arrangement between Kabbah’s government and the RUF, the latter given control of the 
government’s natural resources as well as immunity from prosecution.346   
    The Sierra Leonean government under Kabbah maintained a consistent relationship with the 
British government, which struggled to determine the best way to aid its former colony.  The 
growing instability leading up to the Lomé accord set into motion two initiatives that would 
come out of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID): the Sierra Leone 
Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) and the International Military Advisory and 
Training Team (IMATT).  These two programs were joint initiatives planned and executed by 
military and civilian planners in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), and DfID.347  SILSEP was developed first in June 1999 as a ‘whole-of-
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government’ approach to reforming Sierra Leone’s security sector.  During initial planning for 
this approach to improving security, a military officer within DfID identified the need for 
military trainers as “key to the sustainable implementation of SILSEP reforms.”348  Peter 
Albrecht and Paul Jackson, academic- practitioners with practical involvement in Sierra Leone’s 
reform process, note: “It was the MoD [Ministry of Defence] Advisory Team within SILSEP—
Colonel Mike Dent and Robert Foot, a UK civil servant—that identified the need for a British 
Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT).”349  In June 1999, the MODAT (comprised of 
one active military officer, one contracted retired officer, and a civil servant) deployed to 
Freetown to assess the rising instability in the country and to determine the best means for the 
British to assist the fledgling government.  The team determined that the rule of law had broken 
down, there were only three personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defence, and “In essence there 
was no proper functioning RSLAF [Republic of Sierra Leonean Armed Forces”]”.350  The 
MODAT completed a mini Strategic Defense Review (SDR) in October 1999 which determined 
the need for a complete restructuring of both the Sierra Leonean MoD and armed forces.  
Concurrently, the British government agreed to send a small number of military trainers and 
equipment for new SLA recruits under the program Operation Basilica.351 
    After this dire assessment, the MODAT determined the need for more military trainers and 
advisors.  Other UK government officials noticed that not only would the British military advise, 
assist, and train the Sierra Leonean Army, but would also be engaged in broader institution-
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building in the failed state.  Due to the greater political role the British military would serve, as 
well as the potentially negative impression that the UK was unilaterally involved in its former 
colony, the British MoD and DfID decided to extend the mission to include multinational 
partners by creating an international advisory team (‘IMATT’).  Officials from the British MoD 
hosted a conference in London in January 2000 to encourage military officers from the 
Commonwealth to participate in the mission: officers from Australia, Canada, and the US agreed 
to join.  After military officers volunteered to fill command and staff positions for the advisory 
mission, one senior British officer remarked “we are now stable, let’s think longer term.”352  In 
February 2000, the MODAT consolidated a defense white paper and developed an “ORBAT” 
(Order for Battle) delineating the type of units and appropriate ranks for the SLAF based on the 
findings of the mini-Strategic Defence Review.  With the help of additional British Army, Navy, 
and Air Force advisors, the envisioned ORBAT consisted of land, maritime, and air components 
as the future organization of the Sierra Leonean armed forces.  Because Sierra Leone was once a 
British colony, much of their rank and command structure was already established on the British 
model.  Planners decided to keep a similar structure for the future SLAF but also split the major 
commands to prevent one command from dominating all soldiers and equipment (and thus, 
prevent a possible coup).353 
    The situation in Sierra Leone began to deteriorate after infighting within the power-sharing 
government reached new heights; consequently, the British government considered options about 
how to support its fledgling former colony.  After ECOMOG transitioned authority for 
peacekeeping to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in early 2000, RUF officers 
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refused to demobilize, abducted hundreds of UN peacekeepers, and threatened to take Freetown.  
The UK government accelerated its involvement by deploying a reconnaissance team on May 6, 
2000 under Brigadier David Richards to prepare to evacuate British citizens in a Noncombatant 
Evacuation Operation (NEO); two days later, British army units secured a vital airport and the 
capital of Freetown.  During this mission, known as Operation Palliser, the UK government 
afforded Brigadier Richards “‘full political and military decision-making powers’ concerning the 
NEO and any assistance given to UNAMSIL and the local government.”354  The British military 
then deployed the 1st Parachute Regiment (1 PARA), an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG 
from the Royal Marines 42 Commando), and other special units to repel RUF attacks on the 
capital and bolster the UN peacekeeping presence.  When British troops arrived to support the 
fledgling Sierra Leonean army, they immediately noticed a lack of professionalism in the local 
soldiers.  An intelligence officer from 42 Commando remarked about initial training efforts with 
Sierra Leonean troops:  
The main issue was a lack of confidence and lack of moral authority, and we were 
obviously trying to build that up at all times.  And a lot of it was their authority because 
of the nature of the operation effectively being sort of an insurgency in which they were 
dealing with.  It was the authority of the government troops in the eyes of the people who 
they were operating amongst that was at an all-time low.  So we were trying to build that 
up all the time: put them on a pedestal and make sure that they looked the part, they went 
into those contacts with the local population looking as though they were trained soldiers.  
And a clear differentiation between the rag-tag appearance of the multitude of rebel 
groups that were operating around there at the time.  Things like that: military discipline, 
bearing, was at the uppermost of what we were trying to do.355 
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    The increase in Britain’s military involvement raised political questions about the goals of the 
intervention.  By mid-May, the British media decried the lack of clear military objectives.356  
Members of Parliament (MPs) criticized Prime Minister Tony Blair’s administration for getting 
pulled into a conflict without well-defined tasks for the units on the ground, especially after 
troops remained in-country following the successful evacuation of British citizens.357  In 
response to these calls for clarity and an end-state for British forces, Secretary of State for 
Defence Geoffrey Hoon announced to MPs during a House of Commons debate on May 23rd that 
a “UK-led international military assistance training team” was arriving in Freetown to transition 
from major combat operations to a more sustainable solution: training and advising local forces.  
Secretary Hoon argued that, “Creating new, democratically accountable armed forces in Sierra 
Leone is vital to the long-term restoration of peace and security in that country.”358  After several 
politicians focused on British military achievements in Sierra Leone, one MP asked Secretary 
Hoon, “Is it not our duty not merely to pay tribute in the House to the skill at arms of our 
forces—the Paras and 42 Commando—but to ensure that their achievement is lasting so that they 
do not have to go back and do it again?”  Secretary Hoon agreed that a lasting solution was 
necessary to preclude the need for British troops in the future; thus, he responded, “That is why I 
consciously linked the timetable for withdrawal to the prospect of an effective training team.”359  
The Blair administration believed military training teams were the best hope for long-term 
stability without the need for future intervention. 
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Building the Capacity of the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces 
    On June 1st, the British military in Freetown announced that the reconnaissance team 
“‘identified a requirement’ for more urgent training by a company of between 100 and 150.”360  
After Operation Palliser came to end in mid-June 2000 and the UK Chief of Defence Staff, as 
well as the Foreign Secretary, visited President Kabbah in Freetown, the UK government 
pledged £21.27 million to re-equip the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) and deploy a British infantry 
battalion to serve as a ‘short-term training team package’.  In mid-June, the initial entry force 
was replaced with 250 officers and soldiers drawn primarily from the 2nd Royal Anglian 
Regiment as part of a Short-Term Training Team (STTT) led by Brigadier Gordon Hughes.  The 
team led six weeks of training and provided British-issued uniforms and rifles for 1,000 SLA 
recruits, producing two new battalions for the SLA.361  Commenting on the training, British 
Lieutenant Colonel Aladsair Wild remarked, “We did have some Sierra Leonian [sic] instructors 
turn up drunk and they were swiftly dealt with. Overall, the training has gone far better than one 
could expect. They are good soldiers. All they need is proper support, equipment and regular 
rations and payment.”362  Asked by a British reporter about being trained by the British, one SLA 
sergeant was confident in his army’s competence: “"We've learnt many things - tactics, 
fieldcraft. We've learnt how if we fall into an ambush, how to combat it and then how to 
counterattack. We know how to capture a base, now. We are ready to prove ourselves: we can 
finish this war in six months because we are now professional British soldiers."363  Despite the 
expediency of short-term training teams, the British military planned on a long-term need to 
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develop the SLA and eventually hand-off security responsibility to local forces: “According to 
the planners at the time, and it started off with the Royal Anglians, it wasn’t the case of ‘we’re 
going to do a six-month training team and we’re outta here.’  I think there was very much a long-
term view.  As we set sail to head back to the UK, our thoughts at the time were, ‘Well, they’re 
going to be there for at least five years.’”364 
    In November 2000, Operation Silkman launched a larger contingent of British commanders 
and advisors to assist the SLA in Sierra Leone.  The British military deployed three training 
teams as well as a joint brigade headquarters “to command the overall UK effort and to provide 
high-level operational advice” to the SLA.365  The British IMATT funded the training program 
and built training facilities, as well as a mentoring program for SLA soldiers and MoD 
officials.366  As UK advisors began aiding the SLA and MoD in restructuring their organizations, 
British Wing Commander Richard Woodward noted: 
 
I didn’t know what to expect…the only thing that was helpful was that the 
organisation and the structure [of Sierra Leone’s defense sector] was similar to the 
UK armed forces, in terms of having a MoD, a Joint Force Command – rank 
structures, organisation from section, to platoon to companies to platoons.  It was 
very much a British structure.367 
 
In order to restore stability during the chaos brought by the civil war, British advisors had shaped 
a Sierra Leonean military structure that resembled their own.  During an interview, the head of 
the Sierra Leone government’s Governance Reform Secretariat Emmanuel Coker looked back at 
British support during this period and noted, “the reform that was going on in [the] MoD was 
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dictated by the British – the entire reform process was.  The government at the time wanted SSR 
[security-sector reform], and the British were willing to do it.”368  Woodward emphasized the 
central decision-making role of the British military in rebuilding the Sierra Leonean armed 
forces during the civil war: “Following David Richards’ intervention we put a military 
organisation on top of it [IMATT], and threw resources, human and financial, into it, 
reintegrating the armed forces into society.”369  At first, British officers essentially took over the 
SLA, as former IMATT Commander Barry Le Grys notes: “In 2001 the SLA was effectively led 
by UK officers.  While there were some courageous and capable SLA officers at battalion level 
and below, they were in the minority.  UK officers were formally embedded in command 
positions…Without UK spine, the SLA would have continued to fall into chaos and 
disrepute.”370  Given the need for structure, British military advisors directed changes for the 
Sierra Leonean government, which was receptive to the support during the chaotic civil war. 
 
 
End of Civil War and the Continuation of Military Training 
   In January 2002, the British announced an official end to the civil war in Sierra Leone.  The 
SLA was re-named Republic of Sierra Leonean Armed Forces (RSLAF) after officials from UK 
DfID and MoD helped re-integrate roughly 2,000 fighters from outside the military, bringing the 
total armed forces to about 12,000.  Both joint headquarters (Joint Forces Command and Joint 
Support Command), the MoD, and the Chief of the Defence Staff were subordinated to the 
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command of the IMATT, “whose objective was to steer initial development and help to build 
capacity.”371  By March, the British had trained roughly 9,000 SLA soldiers, to include former 
rebels, at the Benguema training camp.  British trainers applied the UK model for SLA recruits, 
as former IMATT commander Colonel Mike Dent recalls: “Basically, the UK took over training 
and utilized the UK basic recruit training and infantry training programmes used in the UK 
system, but with a reduced course length the maximize throughput.”372  The training program 
had increased to nine weeks and included instruction not only on tactics, but also on appropriate 
behavior for professional soldiers, such as refusing to abduct children to serve as combatants.  
Overseeing the training, British Major Peter Hill told reporters: "We don't just train them to be 
deadly killers. A critical part of the training is the moral component of being a soldier...By the 
time they leave, they will be aware that some actions they have conducted previously are not 
acceptable." 373  One former RUF fighter admitted this transformation of his understanding of 
warfare: “In the jungle, I did not know the difference between soldiers and civilians." Though 
Major Hill’s training team sought to transform the SLA into a force that protected human rights, 
he was surprised to see how well the former rebels were able to integrate into the government’s 
military: “They get on fine. It is a real asset of these people that they have a capacity to ignore 
possible gripes on things that we in the West would consider quite major.”374   
    In March 2002, after a directive from the UK MoD, the IMATT conducted another defense 
review in anticipation of an imminent UK military drawdown.  The defense review noted that the 
UK’s “strategic end state” for IMATT’s presence and planning should be: “A self-sustaining, 
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democratically accountable and affordable armed forces, capable of meeting Sierra Leone’s 
defense missions and tasks, assisted as necessary by an appropriate regional peace support 
organization, but without a UK military presence.”375  The IMATT’s focus on building a 
sustainable, professional force that could provide its own national and regional security without 
the need for UK forces was present in the defense review’s ‘end state’. 
    The leading role by British military and civilian advisors was welcomed by the Sierra Leonean 
MoD’s director of policy, Al-Hassan Kondeh, yet at the same time, he feared too much 
involvement at the cost of domestic support by Sierra Leoneans who, “had not been involved or 
informed about reforms of Sierra Leone’s military structures.”  Thus, the British advisors agreed 
to allow Sierra Leonean officers and officials to lead the effort to develop a sustainable military 
structure that could, in the future, be run independent of British oversight, published in the 2003 
Defence White Paper.  Although this review process did not fundamentally alter the structure of 
the MoD and RSLAF, it was seen as a natural move away from the original British model.  
Albrecht and Jackson note: 
The UK blueprint that had been its original point of departure had never 
been fully implemented; it was also inappropriate in terms of the historical 
and cultural context in Sierra Leone…For example, in Sierra Leone there 
was no established culture of military and civilians working together, 
particularly given the historical attitude of the military towards civilians 
and the documented history of human-rights abuses.  For a civilian even to 
sit next to an officer required a degree of ‘cultural adjustment’, let alone 
for a civilian to disagree with or give instructions to military personnel.376 
  
One British officer who worked as a member of IMATT in 2003 recognized the pitfalls of this 
type of approach: 
You design an MoD on the basis that you’ve got fifty British officers 
running it, and then the next week there is going to be four British officers.  
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And you say: what? They haven’t got the capacity for that…So you have 
to be careful not to take the blueprint that was written in London, change 
the date and time and reproduce the model.  You’ve actually got to design 
the model for what they require, and we had an MoD where we made 
exactly that mistake.377 
 
Kondeh noted some of the frustrations in working with IMATT advisors, who he felt oftentimes 
disregarded the input by MoD civilians or used intimidating tactics to “prevent officers from 
making objective contributions that could lead to outcomes unexpected or unwanted by 
IMATT.”378   
 
    In 2004, the commander of IMATT Brigadier Simon Porter oversaw an initiative to develop a 
long-term plan to hand-off security and military responsibility to the Sierra Leoneans, called 
‘Plan 2010’.  This initiative envisioned UK assistance to help the RSLAF to eventually ‘run 
itself’ and build “the capacity of the force, individually, collectively, intellectually, and 
physically, to allow it to fulfill the missions and tasks asked of it by the government.”379  
Brigadier Porter also viewed increasing progress as an opportunity to turn training over to the 
RSLAF instead of relying on expensive British short-term training teams.  Capacity-building by 
British mentors became more structured in 2004 with unit-level (platoon- and company-level) 
training as well as senior-officer schooling.  IMATT officers conducted courses for senior 
RSLAF officers at the IMATT-funded Horton Academy, the ‘equivalent to the UK’s 
Shrivenham’, that is, the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.  Instruction for younger 
officers was conducted at the Armed Forces Training Centre (AFTC) which was modelled after 
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Catterick’s Infantry Training Centre and the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, the British 
officer training school.380  The AFTC was designed to “train officers and other service personnel 
in basic military skills and to generate understanding of concepts such as neutrality and 
democratic accountability.”381  These training centers, built in the image of British military 
schools and professional standards, were crucial in RSLAF officer and soldier development. 
 
Building RSLAF Capacity for Peacekeeping 
    During and in the immediate period following 2000 civil war, the SLA had been largely 
incapable, or unwilling, to protect the population against internal or external threats.  Thus, “The 
task following the war was therefore to construct an army that could be effective against any 
future rebellion, protect the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone and also, perhaps, act as 
peacekeepers elsewhere.”382  British advisors sought to separate the roles and responsibilities of 
the RSLAF from the Sierra Leonean Police (SLP) by granting a domestic (internal) focus to the 
latter and a national defense (external) focus to the former.  This model of separation of police 
from military, as well as civilian control over the military, is common to Western democracies 
but unfamiliar to Sierra Leone.  As former IMATT commander Barry Le Grys argues: “While 
this subordination of military forces to the police in internal security situations is not the norm 
for an army in West Africa, the SLP and RSLAF have overcome their traditional rivalry; their 
relationship is much improved.”383  In helping the RSLAF define its role vis-à-vis the national 
police force, the IMATT considered preparing the RSLAF to contribute to regional commands 
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such as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in addition to UN or African Union peacekeeping 
missions.  However, the IMATT understood the challenges of building a force not only with a 
national pride and sense of purpose in defending its own people, but now also willing to conduct 
peacekeeping abroad when it stated in a 2006 report: “Rather like the difficulty of conveying the 
concept of community policing to the SLP, a shift from conventional to PSO [peace support 
operations] activities will need much close involvement at the tactical level.”384  
    The British encouraged the RSLAF to adopt a peacekeeping role and in February 2007, the 
Sierra Leonean government committed to the ESF and signed an agreement with the UN to 
contribute peacekeeping forces.  This ‘external focus’ for the RSLAF was seen by both the 
British advisors and the Sierra Leonean soldiers as an important step in capacity-building: “Apart 
from providing the RSLAF with a positively defined role for the foreseeable future, this was also 
considered to reinforce the UK’s success in transforming Sierra Leone’s armed forces through 
IMATT…To the RSLAF and IMATT alike, this development was considered an unqualified 
indication of success and the reflection of an army coming of age.”385  In fulfilling this role, the 
RSLAF contributed observers and staff officers to UN peacekeeping missions beginning in 2007 
and deployed an entire reconnaissance company to Darfur, Sudan in 2009.  Before the RSLAF 
committed units to UN missions, British advisors ensured the troops met certain standards of 
readiness.  IMATT Commander Hugh Blackman (from August 2008 to February 2011) recalled: 
Over the years, we’d trained infantrymen in core combat skills (attack, 
defence, patrolling, etc.); also medics, intelligence, Military Police, 
logisticians, administration and mechanics.  All of these were trained and 
prepared to a standard that we would have considered an appropriate 
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‘start-state’ before launching on mission-specific training, i.e., for Darfur 
specifically.386 
As Blackman notes, British military advisors viewed their role in maintaining standards in 
RSLAF officers and soldiers as vital to their mission.  Le Grys noted in 2007: “However, 
battalion commanders are not confident enough of their standing to wish IMATT farewell yet.  
They still feel that without IMATT on hand to monitor standards, old habits in the chain of 
command might overwhelm their good deeds.”387  In this view, British military advisors feared 
that RSLAF officers would fail to adopt the standards and habits encouraged by their 
counterparts and slip back into their pre-transformation routines. 
 
Reduction of the British Role and Transition from IMATT to ISAT 
    In mid-2007, after the first peaceful change of power during a general election since the civil 
war, the UK government decided to terminate the DfID-funded SILSEP program and transferred 
some of its responsibilities to IMATT.  During this time IMATT began to relinquish some of his 
executive roles to Sierra Leonean military officers and officials and developed more of an 
advisory role.  IMATT commander Brigadier Powe recalled how he made decisions during the 
transitional period: 
The focus of funding had switched away from West Africa to East Africa, and the 
[UK MoD] had to a certain extent lost interest [in the former].  There were bigger 
fish to fry [in Afghanistan and Iraq].  So we were working it out on our own, 
based on the resources we had available.  We had a standard set of tasks that we 
were given [set out in Plan 2010].  I had a set of tasks, reasonably open, and after 
that it was up to me to decide, alongside the head of FCO and DFID [in-country], 
what the best way to use the resources was.388 
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By 2012, IMATT staff numbers went from 90 to 25 and began focusing more on training 
the RSLAF for peacekeeping operations and training senior leaders at the Horton 
academy.  The rank of the IMATT commander was reduced from brigadier general to 
colonel, a symbolic signal of British withdrawal that was not well received by the 
RSLAF and MoD.389  However, short-term training teams began taking more of a role in 
training the RSLAF, notably in the form of Brigade Advisory and Support Teams 
(BASTs).   
    The British Army published a story about the RSLAF’s progress in April 2011 after a 
reporter observed training and interviewed British advisors at one of the training camps.  
The reporter noted: “Dressed in British camouflage and speaking English, the future 
soldiers at Benguema’s Armed Forces Training Centre (AFTC) would not have looked 
out of place on a UK exercise ground.”  Colour Sergeant Mark Beaton highlighted the 
developing hands-off approach: 
We let Sierra Leonean instructors run things on their own and we speak to 
them at the end of the lesson to advise and mentor…For example rather 
than simply take over or tell a RSLAF instructor what to do, I might 
suggest that he projects his voice to the whole group and makes sure he 
wears his headdress, uniform and webbing correctly while teaching.390 
The reporter goes on to note how the “the troops train and operate in the same manner as 
their British tutors” and operate the same machine guns and rifles that the British used 
before the introduction of newer equipment.391  By 2011, RSLAF leaders had graduated 
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from understanding British tactics to embracing the proper appearance and conduct for 
professional soldiers, modelled on their British advisors. 
    In 2013, the British government transitioned authority for security reform from 
IMATT to an International Security Assistance Team (ISAT).  This new team was now 
led by a civil servant, not a military officer, that exercises a much broader view of 
security.  After receiving an invitation from the RSLAF, the British army conducted its 
first ‘joint’ exercise alongside Sierra Leonean army units in November 2016.  The 
exercise was conducted at the RSLAF’s Jungle Warfare School, intended in the future to 
be used for training Sierra Leonean as well as other soldiers.  From reports of the 
exercise, it appears that the British Army began to see the RSLAF as equal partners rather 
than trainees in need of advice and assistance: “The joint exercise, taking place in the 
Guma Valley, will improve both militaries in parallel as they will be learning from each 
other and forging enduring ties.”392  Major Ollie Braithwaite, commander of the 
participating British unit, noted: “This was the first time members of the RSLAF had 
been integrated into our force on an exercise rather than being taught by us. It was a 
significant step forward and is a clear demonstration of the strong defence relationship 
the regiment has with the RSLAF as a result of the military skills training we have been 
delivering.” One British soldier remarked about the experience: “I really enjoyed it. We 
learnt a lot from the RSLAF. It was an eye opener to see what they can do with the little 
equipment they have; quite remarkable really. How they survive off the land is 
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incredible.”393  After fifteen years of instruction by British advisors, RSLAF officers and 
soldiers had finally become the trainers. 
    Though the RSLAF is still developing as an effective national military and ISAT 
advisors remain in Freetown to this day, progress has been impressive.  In just over a 
decade, the British military advisory mission in Sierra Leone, in the form of BMATT, 
IMATT, ISAT, as well as other small training teams, helped the RSLAF develop from an 
organization in shambles into a force capable of deploying in support of UN operations.  
Albrecht and Jackson note: “In stark contrast to historical popular perception, by March 
2012 the RSLAF had become one of the better-respected organisations in Sierra Leone – 
a success largely attributed to UK support.”394  In an analysis of the British military 
reintegration program, Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs argues:  
There can be no doubt as to the importance of IMATT in all aspects of the reform 
process, from the training provided in the MRP [Military Reintegration 
Programme] to the strategic placement of advisers high up in the hierarchy of the 
completely reorganized MoD [Ministry of Defence].  The commitment of the 
British government to the Sierra Leonean peace process, particularly in the area of 
security-sector reform, has been both remarkably extensive and unusually long-
term.395 
 
    The British military invested immense resources, both in manpower and treasure, into building 
the capacity of the Sierra Leonean forces.  The means by which the British attempted to build 
RSLAF capacity were through the training of a sustainable, professional force to obviate the 
future need for British intervention.  As far as sustainability, IMATT advisors consistently noted 
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the importance of a building a future force that could provide for its own security and attempted 
to train and advise with this goal in mind.  The number of IMATT advisors diminished as the 
RSLAF became more competent over time.  Professionally, British advisors and trainers often 
applied their own understanding of military training and organization (the ‘British model’) to 
advise, assist, and train RSLAF soldiers.  For instance, the British military supplied the RSLAF 
with British uniforms and weapons, created units and command structures modelled after the 
British Army, trained new recruits based on British practices, and built training centers modelled 
on three of its own military training centers: the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, the 
Catterick Infantry Training Centre, and the Defence Academy at Shrivenham.  Moreover, 
RSLAF’s progress was consistently assessed by how it compared to the British army: officers 
and reporters were satisfied when they observed RSLAF soldiers appearing and maneuvering 
like British troops.  British army advisors also developed Sierra Leonean soldiers to adopt their 
values: RSLAF soldiers were instructed not only on uniform and appearance, but also on 
democratic accountability and protection of human rights.  Moreover, the training and 
deployment of RSLAF to the peacekeeping mission in Somalia reveals the changing focus of the 
military from internal to regional multilateralism, viewed as a positive step toward a well-
respected and internationally legitimate force. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
    Instead of using training exercises as a means to build the capacity of Sierra Leonean forces to 
provide for their own security, perhaps the British Army harbored other motivations.  The 
traditional literature in military doctrine anticipate that militaries prefer certain types of policies 
in order to rehearse for war or serve narrow parochial interests.  First, perhaps British training 
187 
 
was intended more to rehearse the interoperability between British and RSLAF soldiers for 
future missions (either during interventions or regional peacekeeping) than as a one-way training 
event for local forces.  Although by 2016 British and Sierra Leonean soldiers began conducting 
‘joint’ exercises in which the former was learning tactics from the latter, IMATT planning in the 
early 2000’s focused on the need to train a local force in order to preclude the need for future 
British military interventions.  Moreover, no British troops would deploy to the UN mission in 
Somalia until May 2016 and were only announced in September 2015, three years after the 
British trained RSLAF peacekeepers to participate in the multilateral mission.396  Thus, the 
evidence suggests that the UK was more interested in training the RSLAF to defend itself and 
participate in regional multilateral missions without the need for British troops. 
    Concerning whether the British military sought this building-capacity program for 
organizational interests, one would question how much these operations in Sierra Leone helped 
the military pursue these goals.  In terms of organizational size and wealth, not only were small 
teams of advisors and trainers—merely several hundred troops—deployed for these short-term 
training missions, the price tag of these programs was relatively inexpensive.  For instance, 
Albrecht and Jackson estimate that between 2005 and 2008, the cost of British military 
assistance and training through IMATT to the RSLAF was approximately £10 million per 
year.397  Conversely, in the fiscal year 2006-2007, the British military budgeted roughly £2.4 
billion on equipment procurement and £534 million on science, innovation, and technology.398  
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Thus, military training in Sierra Leone is comparable to .5% of equipment spending and 1.8% of 
research into future technology.   
    With regards to prestige, although the British military has accumulated years of experience 
and takes pride in training successful local forces, building partner capacity is a mission in which 
soldiers train others to fight instead of engaging in combat themselves.  After the conclusion of 
Operation Palliser, British troops served largely as advisors and trainers away from the front 
lines of fighting, essentially delegating fighting to the RSLAF.  Thus, there is little evidence to 
support the notion that British training efforts in Sierra Leone offered either a strong esprit de 
corps amongst its soldiers or any public recognition for combat success.  Finally, although there 
is evidence of disagreement and multiple reporting channels between the British IMATT and 
other UK ministries399, in general military policy aligned with civilian-led grand strategy.  Not 
only was the idea for military training a joint initiative between a military officer and a civil 
servant, the ‘whole-of-government’ security sector reform approach actually brought the military 
and civilian government officials from the foreign and development offices closer together.  If 
the British army sought independence from political oversight, engaging in interagency reform 
along with diplomats and development experts in a failed state seems to belie this goal. 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
    Building the capacity of weak militaries has emerged as a consistent major power tool to 
reduce strategic uncertainty without the need to deploy and expose its own troops in combat.  
This chapter described how major powers strengthen fledgling militaries by developing 
                                                                   
399 Pablo Yanguas, “The Anatomy of State Building Assistance: Aid Promises and Donor Politics in War-Torn 
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professional and sustainable forces that are competent enough to provide security for their own 
citizens and contribute to peacekeeping in the region.  This chapter also explained why major 
powers view BPC activities as a means to reduce strategic uncertainty; that is, through the 
development of a local force that is able to combat violent non-state actors in failed states 
without the need for future major power intervention.  Although the term BPC is commonly 
attributed to the US military, France and the UK also have invested in these types of programs in 
Africa and the Middle East.  Capacity-building exercises were illustrated using the British 
military’s experience in Sierra Leone from 2000-2016.  Apply the case study, my argument was 
contrasted with the expectations of the traditional works in military doctrine.  The following 
chapter explores the third non-traditional exercise function: role-forming.  Similar to capacity-
building, major powers employ these types of training events in order to influence the character 
of partner armies in order to manage the uncertainty associated with unpredictable threats. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ROLE-FORMING EXERCISES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
    Speaking to journalists about an ongoing Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)-
sponsored military exercise called ‘Tsentr’ (“Center”), Russian Chief of the General Staff 
General Nikolai Makarov told reporters that the training event would test the ability of the 
organization to react to mass uprisings, “like in North Africa and the Middle East.”400  The 
exercise was taking place in September 2011 and the Russian chief of staff was referring to the 
nascent Arab Spring, which began as a massive protest against authoritarian rule in Tunisia and 
quickly spread to Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain.  Long-standing autocrats in Tunisia 
and Egypt were quickly ousted, while the other rulers were facing imminent threats of 
overthrow.401  The CSTO, consisting mostly of authoritarian former Soviet states—Russia, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and formerly, Uzbekistan—felt the 
pressure of potential revolution: the security organization even publicly announced that its 
member states agreed to control social media in order to avoid repeats of the Arab revolutions.402  
Referring again to the Arab Spring, General Makarov told reporters that "Russia's military 
organization has to be prepared for the worst scenarios of the development of the situation" in 
Central Asia.403 The possibility of democratic revolution along Russia’s frontiers was 
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unacceptable: Russia, through the CSTO, would ensure its contiguous former republics were 
capable of resisting rebellion. 
        This chapter explores the third type of non-traditional MME: role-forming.  Major powers 
use role-forming exercises to influence what type of ‘role’ partner militaries will adopt, such as 
external defense, regime-support, or expeditionary peacekeeping.  Role-forming MMEs are 
similar to capacity-building programs in that major powers use these exercises to somehow 
change the character of partner militaries; however, since the partners that participate in these 
types of training events are more advanced than fragile militaries, major powers hope to 
encourage certain types of characteristics instead of building armies ‘from the ground up’.  The 
mechanism by which major powers use role-forming to reduce strategic uncertainty is by 
developing partner forces that better serve the major power’s national interests.  For some major 
powers, encouraging democratic practices increases the probability of more trustworthy partners 
abroad; for others, regime stability insures against overthrow and volatility in a major power’s 
region.  If major powers are successful, they develop partner militaries that are either more 
trustworthy in liberal sense or more competent to prevent revolutions that generate regional 
instability.  This chapter further explores the concept of role-forming exercises, how they are 
expected to reduce strategic uncertainty, and which states and organizations usually employ 
these types of MMEs.  The case of CSTO exercise programs from 2003-2012 provides an 
illustration of how Russia used role-forming to shape its environment; my argument and the two 
alternatives will be assessed before moving to a summary as preparation for the final non-
traditional MME type in the subsequent chapter. 
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6.2 Role-Forming Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty 
The Purpose of Role-Forming Exercises 
    Major powers seek partners that are benign or serve their national interests; they often look for 
opportunities to shape the character of partner regimes to reduce uncertainty in their 
environments.  For instance, democratic states may be viewed as more trustworthy or 
authoritarian states may be considered more stable.  Role-forming MMEs provide a means by 
which major powers can influence what type of function partner militaries assume for their 
countries.  Edmunds, Forster, and Cottey argue that militaries serve various ‘roles’ or ‘functions’ 
for their societies: in addition to providing national security, they may also offer an opportunity 
to inculcate national values in citizens (‘Nation Builder’), uphold the power of a particular set of 
political or party interests (‘Regime Defense’), offer support to address internal emergencies 
(‘Domestic Military Assistance’), or provide an instrument to promote values and build 
relationships abroad ('Military Diplomacy’).404  Major powers often encourage partners to adopt 
one or more of these roles during training.  Within the role of national security-provider, major 
powers may train tasks that focus purely on national defense against an external aggressor; 
conversely, they sometimes emphasize a broadened definition of security through the training of 
peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks.  Although democracies often encourage democratic 
practices during training—such as focusing externally (and not internally) on threats, upholding 
international law, and defending human rights—they may also seek to strengthen an 
authoritarian regime against an uprising.  For instance, during the Cold War the US supported 
                                                                   
404 Edmunds, Timothy Anthony Forster, and Andrew Cottey, “Armed Forces and Society: A Framework for 
Analysis,” in Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe, eds. Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, and 
Andrew Cottey (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 8-15. 
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oppressive Central and South American militaries with training and military aid in order to 
prevent left-wing revolutions.405 
    As previously mentioned, role-forming exercises differ from capacity-building exercises in 
that the partner military is often strong enough to operate independently; training events usually 
focus on more advanced tactics than novice individual weapons-handling or small-unit 
operations.  Moreover, major powers often send more soldiers and units to role-forming MMEs 
rather than the small contingent of trainers and advisors used for capacity-training; thus, there is 
greater symmetry between participating major power and partner forces.  The targets of these 
programs are usually transitioning or consolidating states; that is, states that already enjoy a 
functioning military but are either (1) experiencing a transition away from a particular regime-
type or (2) states which are still maturing as a certain regime-type (for simplicity, either 
democratic or authoritarian).  Thus, these types of exercises are initiated by major power military 
planners or government officials in response to problems associated with state transition or 
consolidation.  As states move from one regime-type to another, military exercises serve as an 
opportunity to socialize certain norms.  For instance, although NATO’s PfP military exercises 
were primarily geared toward recruitment (for NATO membership and multilateral peacekeeping 
operations), the explicit teaching of democratic norms—such as transparent budgets and civilian 
control of the military—took place at the ministerial level and the exercising of democratic 
practices during military training events served to prepare members for NATO membership and 
                                                                   
405 See Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas 
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to encourage post-communist states to adopt acceptable peacekeeping practices.406  Moreover, as 
states seek to consolidate their administrative capacity and develop mature regimes, major 
powers use role-forming MMEs to strengthen central rule.  Especially if a certain regime is 
struggling to resist political or social revolution—for instance democratic or communist—major 
powers may train that partner military to protect its regime’s challenged grip on power. 
 
Role-Forming and the Management of Uncertainty 
    Role-forming MMEs primarily target the threat source of uncertainty: that is, whether a 
partner state will be friendly or adversarial.  The mechanism by which major powers affect the 
character of other state militaries through MMEs is by encouraging certain practices that 
influence the role in which soldiers serve for the partner society.  Major powers hope that 
through role-forming MMEs, partner states will either be more trustworthy or capable of 
preventing revolution, thus removing a source of uncertainty in their strategic environments.  
There are two specific roles that major powers seek to encourage in partner militaries: regime 
defense and what I label democracy defense.  Similar to regime defense, this role requires 
militaries to embody and defend democratic principles, such as establishing civilian control of 
the military, respecting political rights internally, and defending international law externally.  
Democratic major powers promote both types of roles (depending on the nature of threat), while 
authoritarian powers largely promote regime defense; both role-forming efforts are explored 
below. 
                                                                   
406 For NATO PfP socialization at the ministerial level, see Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of 
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    First, major powers may shape a partner military to adopt the role of regime defense to protect 
the ruling party or leadership from internal revolution.  Not only do the consequences of 
revolution include instability, lack of capacity to prevent transnational crime, inability to secure 
borders, and often massive migration, overthrow may result in the installation of an unfriendly 
political system in a major power’s environment.  If a major power feels threatened by the 
possibility of overthrow in its neighboring states, it often provides various types of support to 
‘consolidate’ rule in the partner country.  Thomas Ambrosio argues that Russia actively 
encourages “authoritarian consolidation”, or the solidification of autocratic rule in order to 
prevent democratic transition, in the former Soviet Union.407  Nicole Jackson notes that Russia 
supports autocratic Central Asian regimes by “actively countering democratization efforts, by 
providing legitimacy and political support, and by diversifying relations.  This, in turn, at least in 
the short term, may increase regime stability and durability.”408  As previously mentioned, the 
US supported Central American regimes with military aid and training in order to prevent left-
wing revolutions throughout the 1980’s.  By ensuring that a partner military is able to suppress 
rebellion, major powers that feel threatened by political revolution—either democratic or 
communist—often help train and influence partner militaries to defend the ruling regime. 
    Second, major powers may encourage the role of democracy defense in transitioning partners 
in order to build more trustworthy states.  War between democracies is remarkable rare in world 
politics.  Although there are numerous theories about what causes the democratic peace409, John 
                                                                   
407 Thomas Ambrosio, “Beyond the Transition Paradigm: A Research Agenda for Authoritarian Consolidation,” 
Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Summer 2014): 471-494. 
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Owen argues that liberal states share the idea that self-preservation and freedom from 
government oppression can only be achieved through peace.  Because democracies express the 
collective interests of freedom-seeking individuals, liberals trust that other democracies share 
this desire for peace, prosperity, and liberty.  Even if illiberal leaders are elected in a democracy, 
their ability to use force will be constrained through structural checks and balances.  Conversely, 
non-democracies do not share this aspiration for liberty; thus, they often seek conquest and are 
considered more untrustworthy in the eyes of democracies.410  If major powers are able to build 
transitioning armies that protect political rights internally and respect international law 
externally, then major powers will more easily trust these emerging democracies.  That is, as 
militaries in transition refrain from domestic oppression, avoid coups against their own 
government, and participate in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions, then democratic major 
powers will become more certain that they pose little threat.  John Pevehouse argues that NATO 
membership helped guide Spain’s transition to democracy after the death of authoritarian leader 
Francisco Franco.  Following an attempted military coup in the emerging democracy in 1981, 
“the belief surfaced in government circles that entry to NATO would help secure the new 
democracy as it would modernize the Army through growing international contacts and direct its 
attention away from domestic politics.”411  He notes that a training focus on external security 
helped guide the Spanish military away from internal concerns: “Through joint maneuvers, 
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modernization, and improvements in military technology, the Spanish military became oriented 
away from domestic politics.”412  The US Clinton Administration strongly believed in the 
democratic peace and viewed both NATO expansion and the PfP program as means to promote 
democracy; as shown in Chapter 4, a secondary function of NATO’s PfP exercises was to 
encourage democratic practices in post-communist European states.  More trustworthy partners 
results in fewer security threats in a democratic major power’s strategic environment. 
 
6.3 Russia, China, and Regional Security Organizations 
    Although not explicitly stated in national military doctrine, regional security organizations 
offer major powers an opportunity to influence the role of partner militaries.  NATO, for 
instance, has long provided the US and the European major powers with a means to influence the 
roles of transitioning states.  Despite its Cold War military mission to contain Soviet aggression, 
NATO’s original political goal was to consolidate and protect the liberal democratic community, 
enshrined in the 1949 Washington Treaty: “The Parties to this Treaty… are determined to 
safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the 
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”  NATO’s oft-referenced Article 
5 commitment to defend allies in the case of an attack overshadows the other thirteen articles, 
including commitments to resolve conflicts peacefully (Art. 1), strengthen free institutions (Art. 
2), and adhere to UN principles (Arts. 1, 7).413  Although NATO has not published specific 
criteria for membership, an internal study in 1995 argued that enlargement would lure post-
communist states to adopt democratic reforms, which in turn would provide European 
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stability.414  Since the early 2000’s, Russia and China have also leveraged two regional security 
organizations to shape partner militaries in Central Asia; both institutions are described below.  
 
Role-Forming in Eurasian Security Organizations 
    Two Eurasian security organizations established in the early 2000’s—the CSTO led by Russia 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) initiated by China—have sponsored multiple 
role-forming exercises almost every year.415  Although the roots of both organizations are located 
in diplomatic agreements to create stability and prevent conventional war between Russia, China, 
and the former Soviet Republics after the collapse of the USSR, the CSTO and SCO in their 
contemporary forms were both launched largely in response to the growing threat posed by 
violent non-state actors.416  Specifically, both security organizations grew and developed out of 
the fear of both Islamic terrorism and political revolution: religious extremism beginning in the 
1990’s and the possibility of Western-sponsored democratic revolution throughout the 2000’s.  
Militant religious groups, such as Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Chechen rebels threatened to overthrow local governments 
and establish caliphates throughout China, Russia, and Central Asia.417  Political uprisings in the 
form of ‘Color Revolutions’ threatened to replace autocratic regimes with democratic or pro-
Western governments.  Both types of non-state actors threaten to replace existing regimes or 
capture territory and secede from national control; China and Russia fear that states along their 
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borders will not be able to defend their regimes or territory, resulting in unfriendly or unstable 
neighbors.  These non-state threats are often expressed as the “three evils” of “terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism,” codified in the SCO’s June 2001 founding document.418  Despite 
these security concerns about transnational threats, both organizations emphasize non-
interference in each member’s internal affairs, which creates obstacles for major power military 
intervention during crises and even complicates efforts to produce joint operations.419  Both 
security organizations refrained from military intervention in Kyrgyzstan’s political revolution in 
2010 to save the incumbent regime, which was one of their own members.420  In fact, although 
government officials and military officers within both the SCO and CSTO consult and exercise 
regularly, neither security organization has publicly deployed joint units for any military 
mission—counterterrorism, peacekeeping, or humanitarian relief—either regional or UN-
sponsored.  Thus, both CSTO and SCO exercises over the last fifteen years have trained forces 
that rarely (if ever) deploy together for actual operations. 
     The SCO originated in 1996 when five countries—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan—met in Shanghai, China to negotiate their ambiguous shared borders, as well as 
develop confidence-building measures to reduce military forces and mutual mistrust between 
members.  The breakup of the USSR not only had ramifications for border disputes, but also the 
capacity for the emergent Central Asian states to exercise sovereignty over their new countries.  
Tajikistan collapsed into civil war from 1992-1994, with continued instability until 1997; war 
broke out again in 1998 when a former commander from the Tajik civil war attempted to 
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establish his own government in the northern part of the country.  In February 1999, the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) detonated a bomb in the capital of Uzbekistan, nearly killing the 
president; the IMU also declared its intentions of taking control of the government.  The IMU 
then waged an insurgency in the Fergana Valley later that summer with the intention of 
overthrowing Central Asian governments and establishing an Islamic caliphate stretching from 
Muslim-majority Chechnya, Russia to Xinjiang, China.421  Against the backdrop of increased 
terrorism in Central Asia, the “Shanghai Five” (along with Uzbekistan) met again in June 2001 
to announce the creation of the SCO as a means to address the growing problem of non-state 
threats in the region.   
    The SCO charter was signed in St. Petersburg, Russia in June 2002 and entered force in 
September 2003.  The June 2001 declaration noted that the purpose of the organization was not 
to serve as a defense alliance, but instead “attaches priority to regional security” in the realms of 
terrorism, separatism, and extremism, calling for the creating of a regional anti-terrorist structure 
with a headquarters in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.”422  Moreover, the group simultaneously released a 
joint document on the “The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and 
Extremism” which further elucidated these threats to regional security, as well proscribed 
consultative measures in case of a crisis.423  Three days after the September 11, 2001 attacks by 
Al Qaeda on the US, the organization released a document which expressed empathy for the 
victims of the attacks, as well as measures to “accelerate the establishment of a regional anti-
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terrorist structure.”424  The CSTO (explored in detail in the case study below), was also 
established in 2002 largely in response to growth of non-state threats, accelerated by US 
operations in Afghanistan. 
 
SCO and CSTO Military Exercises 
    The first SCO and CSTO MMEs took place in 2002 and 2003, respectively.  The first SCO 
exercise—which also happened to be China’s first-ever ground-based multinational exercise—
occurred in October 2002 between China and Kyrgyzstan.  The event kicked off with little media 
attention despite the fact that China had long preferred unilateral to multilateral training.  Dennis 
Blasko argues that although, “Little also is known about the national-level decisionmaking [sic] 
process that led to the reversal of the decades-old policy of not training with foreign militaries,” 
Chinese officials’ concern about terrorism most likely had a profound influence: “While the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, (9/11), probably added impetus to this decision, the 
Chinese government previously had been concerned about the threat of terrorism and other non-
traditional security challenges.”425  The SCO hosts about one or two major MMEs per year and 
focuses mainly on transnational terrorism, ensuring partner forces are able to protect their 
countries’ political and territorial sovereignty.  Roughly half of SCO exercises include all 
members and consist of about 300-1300 troops, while the annual ‘Peace Mission’ exercises are 
                                                                   
424 Shanghai Cooperation Organization. “Statement by the Heads of Government of the Member States of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” September 14, 2001, http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/. 
425 Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign 
Forces, 2002-2009,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 
eds. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (US Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 
381-382. 
202 
 
much larger in scale—from 2,000 to 10,000 total soldiers—and have on several occasions 
involved only Russia and China.   
    Although Russia conducted intermittent MMEs with CIS states throughout the 1990’s, the first 
CSTO training events were held in 2003, both of which simulated rapid reaction forces 
intervening in insurgent takeovers of Central Asian territory.426  The CSTO conducts multiple 
MMEs per year, usually focusing on threats of terrorism or separatism (often portrayed to be 
sponsored by the West), and rotates the location through different member states.  Most members 
are willing to hold exercises on their territory, while others—in particular, Belarus and (former 
member) Uzbekistan—resist Russian presence in their countries.427  Exercises “Frontier” and 
“Interaction” are the most consistent counterterror exercise programs, consisting of troop levels 
between 600 and 12,000, while “Indestructible Brotherhood” was launched in 2012 as a training 
event for about 600-700 CSTO peacekeepers.428  Each training event with former Soviet states 
provides an opportunity for Russia and China to influence the role that partner militaries serve 
for their societies; namely, regime-defense.  By shaping these partners through regional security 
organizations, Russia and China hope to eliminate the possibility of unstable or unfriendly 
governments along their borders. 
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6.4 Case Study: Russia and the CSTO, 2003-2012 
    As described above, China and Russia have expanded their use of role-forming MMEs 
throughout the 2000’s and 2010’s through two regional security organizations.  As both 
institutions attempt to combat violent non-state threats, yet also emphasize non-interference in 
members’ domestic politics, MMEs serve as an opportunity for Russia and China to influence 
the roles of Eurasian states without direct military intervention or multilateral deployments.  
Through training, both China and Russia encourage the role of regime-defense in consolidating 
post-Soviet states.  By strengthening the ability of these partner militaries to defend their 
regimes, China and Russia hope to reduce the risk of Islamic or democratic revolution along their 
borders.  The case study below illustrates how Russia uses the CSTO as a tool to encourage the 
role of regime-defense in Caucasian and Central Asian states.  My argument about role-shaping 
will be contrasted with the two alternative explanations drawn from the traditional literature in 
military doctrine; that is, whether these exercises were conducted instead as preparation for 
multinational deployment, deterrence against state or non-state actors, or to serve narrow 
organizational interests.  Evidence that would support my argument include statements, 
documents, and military exercise scenarios which indicate that MMEs are intended to address 
non-state threats (both from terrorism and political revolution).  Conversely, evidence that would 
challenge my argument are military behaviors and statements indicating that these exercise 
programs were conducted for rehearsals, deterrence, or organizational interests. 
 
Russia, the Former Soviet Union, and the Origins of the CSTO 
    From the remnants of the precipitously dissolved USSR in December 1991 arose fifteen newly 
independent states.  Russia, the most powerful country and successor to the Soviet Union, was 
204 
 
now surrounded by troubled nations attempting to secure sovereignty and improve security.  
Russia itself was in need of order: by May 1992, the defense ministry and armed forces were not 
yet established though the Russian Federation was already in existence for five months.429  Most 
of the countries that comprised Russia’s ‘near abroad’ signed an agreement that officially 
recognized their sovereign equality with Russia and formed a regional organization, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).430  Additionally, nine members of the CIS signed 
the Collective Security Treaty, known as the “Tashkent Treaty”, between 1992 and 1993 to re-
affirm individual sovereignty and ability for each state to develop its own military, while also 
committing to peaceful resolution of conflicts between members.431  The treaty prohibited 
members from joining other alliances, engaging in treaties counter to the Tashkent agreement, 
and required that the use of force outside members’ territory be “carried out only in the interests 
of the [sic] international security according to the UN Charter.”432   
    Roy Allison argues that Russia continued to exhibit primacy among the CIS in the 1990’s, 
despite the loss of control with the end of the USSR.  For instance, Russian leaders viewed the 
country’s relationship with CIS members as largely hierarchical; President Boris Yeltsin claimed 
that Russia should be ‘first among equals’ among the former Soviet Republics.433  In addition to 
security, ethnic Russians also inhabited the former Soviet republics, which provided an “ethno-
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nationalist” justification for Russian interest in its near-abroad.434  This leadership role was 
confirmed in Russia’s multiple unilateral interventions—which Russia deemed ‘peacekeeping’—
in CIS states’ internal conflicts, such as in Moldova, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, and Abkhazia in 
1992.435  Russia’s faith in its own leadership was further supported in its foreign policy concept 
of December 1992 and Yeltsin’s February 1993 speech when he claimed that international 
organizations should, “grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the 
former regions of the USSR.”436  Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia viewed a 
special role for itself in its near-abroad, especially in regards to maintaining stability through 
unilateral peacekeeping. 
    Russian regional leadership was deemed even more vital in the shadow of US unipolarity.  A 
senior Russian military officer warned in summer 1992 that growing conflict in the CIS could 
lead to direct intervention by NATO and the CIS Joint Forces Commander-in-Chief, Marshal 
Shaposhnikov, claimed that NATO had no right under the CSCE framework to use armed force 
to settle disputes in the CIS. Suspicions were confirmed when a leaked US State Department 
draft memo in August 1993 rejected a greater role for Russia to conduct peacekeeping in the CIS 
and that the US should be ready to support UN operations in the troubled region, even in the face 
of Russian opposition.437  Russia struggled to gain UN support for its unilateral peacekeeping 
missions in the former republics.  Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev asked for a UN 
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mandate for its operations in the CIS, arguing that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter could be 
interpreted to allow the peacekeeping responsibility to be delegated to a regional organization 
with external monitors attached.  UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali largely opposed 
this idea, yet by 1994 he was willing to allow the CIS to conduct peacekeeping in its own region, 
but required that the force be comprised of only 20-30% of Russian troops and solely under UN 
command.  Given these restrictions, Moscow declared that its extra-territorial operations were 
fully legal and did not require a UN mandate.  However, Russia finally conceded to UN 
monitoring in Abkhazia and Tajikistan to oversee ceasefires in mid-to-late 1994.438  Russia’s 
concern for stability in its near-abroad was codified in its 2000 national security concept, in 
which the “outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation 
and the external borders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States” are 
mentioned as major threats.439 Additionally, Russia’s suspicion of Western meddling is also 
apparent in the document, which cites NATO’s eastward expansion, the appearance of foreign 
military bases by Russia’s borders, and the striving of “particular states and intergovernmental 
organizations” to belittle the international security role of the UN and OSCE as other main 
threats to the country’s security.440 
 
                                                                   
438 Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, 130. 
439 Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko argue that during the 1990’s and early 2000’s, Russia attempted to 
join the “Western Club” to be accepted as a great power and point to Russia’s desire to join NATO in 1992 as well 
as other international organizations.  Only after the US refused to recognize their great power status, as well as 
encourage the color revolutions, did Russia turn to other creative strategies to re-assert its status.  Though I agree 
that Russia was interested in joining these organizations in the 1990’s, I argue that Russia still sought primacy in the 
former Soviet Union without Western interference.  See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status 
Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010): 63-
95. 
440 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” January 10, 
2000, accessed January 9, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768. 
207 
 
The CSTO Develops from Threats of Terrorism and Western Interests in Central Asia 
    Russian attempts to maintain stability and primacy in the former Soviet Union were 
complicated by three factors in the early 2000’s: the threat of Islamic terrorism, US strategic 
interest in Central Asia, and Western support for democratization through ‘Colored Revolutions’.  
Islamic terrorism posed threats to Russia and Central Asia throughout the 1990s: Russia brutally 
repressed Chechen rebels in 1996 and 1999, while the IMU seized territory between Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in 1999.  Moreover, after the attacks on American soil by Al Qaeda 
in September 2001, the US responded with NATO operations in Afghanistan to remove the 
Taliban regime and eliminate safe havens for Al Qaeda.  In order to logistically support missions 
in the traditionally austere region, the US required access to Central Asia and consequently 
secured airbases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan during 2001-2002.  The US also 
increased its security cooperation with Uzbekistan when US Secretary of State Colin Powell and 
Uzbekistani foreign minister Adulaziz Kamilov signed a Strategic Partnership and Cooperation 
Framework in 2002.441  Intensified US involvement in Central Asia ran into existing Russian 
presence in the region, as Russia not only views these former Soviet republics as a “buffer” 
against terrorism and narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan, but the major power also attempts 
to retain control of the region.442  In 2001, Russia already had roughly 18,000 troops stationed in 
Tajikistan and in late 2002, developed a joint airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.  The purpose of the 
joint Kyrgyz-Russian airfield was ostensibly to provide a base to support the recently assembled 
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Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF), one of the first major initiatives to emerge from 
the newly created Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).443 
    The CSTO, a security organization that was built on the principles of the Tashkent Treaty, was 
established in May 2002 by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan.444  In addition to guarantees for mutual defense against external aggression, the 
CSTO’s charter focuses on the threat of violent non-state actors while respecting the sovereignty 
of each member state.  The preamble establishes members’ commitment to “…continue and 
increase the close and all-round allied relations in foreign policy, military and technical areas, as 
well as in the sphere of counteraction to the transnational challenges and menaces to the safety of 
states and peoples.” 445 Article 5 of the charter spells out the organization’s insistence on 
respecting each participating country’s independence, sovereignty, and equal rights, as well as 
asserting non-interference in member states.  This emphasis on sovereign inviolability was 
important for the former Soviet republics as they often feared Russian intervention in their 
internal affairs.446   
     In addition to combatting transnational threats, military cooperation within the CSTO allows 
Russia to maintain a clientelist relationship with former Soviet republics.447  Former CSTO 
General Sectary Nikolai Bordyuzha noted in 2012 that the organization’s two initial tasks were: 
1) national security from external enemies and 2) the maintenance of peace in member states.  
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Regarding the first task, he argued that member states such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan were afraid of spillover Islamic extremism from Afghanistan since the US invasion 
in 2001.  Concerning the second, Bordyuzha states the, “Interests of Russia were confined to a 
wish not to lose influence in the former Soviet republics using historic, political and economic 
relations.  Really it was planned to create a kind of post-Soviet counterpart of NATO in the best 
case and to preserve military bases on the territories of the neighboring republics in the worst 
case.”448  The CSTO thus provides Russia with a means to combat transnational threats, maintain 
a hegemonic or clientelist relationship with parts of the former Soviet Union, while adhering to 
principles of non-intervention within the organization. 
    Currently, the CSTO is comprised of four types of collective forces: regional group 
commands, peacekeepers, Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (for Central Asia), and the 
Collective Prompt Reaction Forces.  Regional groups are joint commands signed through 
bilateral treaties and broken down into three regions: Eastern Europe (Belarus and Russia), 
Caucasus (Armenia and Russia), and Central Asia (not yet signed, though responsibility is 
delegated to the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces).  ‘Collective Rapid Deployment Forces 
for Central Asia’ were created in 2001 to address scenarios similar to the IMU’s infiltration into 
Batken, Kyrgyzstan and are comprised of about 4,000 soldiers, special forces, and police units.  
‘Collective Rapid Deployment Forces’ were developed in 2009, are comprised of about 20,000 
military and special forces, and conducted exercises in 2009 and 2011.  Some of the tasks 
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assigned to the rapid deployment forces are settling local and boundary conflicts, prevent drug 
trafficking, and countering terrorism.449 
 
The CSTO and Threats of Democratic Revolution 
    Beginning in 2003, the most salient threat to autocratic leadership that emerged in the former 
Soviet Union was democratic revolution.  The region had seen three regimes overthrown by 
democracy supporters in ‘Color Revolutions’ by 2005: the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005).  In the 
aftermath of the revolutions, the newly elected Ukrainian and Georgian presidents were 
unambiguously pro-West, while the Kyrgyzstani government would continue to be plagued with 
internal strife and draw closer to Moscow.  Despite the lack of direct military involvement by 
either the US or Russia during the political turmoil, Russia under President Vladimir Putin 
believed that these revolutions were fomented by the West, particularly the US, presenting a 
direct threat to Russian interests.450  One Russian official believed, “The ‘revolutions’ 
themselves are a combination of peaceful and violent methods designed to topple regimes 
disagreeable to the United States” and “…Washington maintains that ‘color revolutions’ cost less 
than the toppling of regimes through military intervention,” citing the US overthrow of the Iraq’s 
Saddam Hussein autocratic government in 2003 as an example.  For this official, US diplomats 
stationed inside the country and organizations such as the Soros Foundations develop and fund 
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networks of opposition leaders to plan an overthrow of the existing regime.451  Russian Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov asserted that Russia would react harshly “to exports of revolution to the 
CIS states, no matter [where] and what colour- pink, blue, you name it.”452  Russia’s suspicions 
of US efforts to promote democratization were confirmed when US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice visited Belarusian opposition leaders in April 2005 and urged them to oppose 
the autocratic government.  Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded to the visit: “We think the 
democratic process, the process of reform cannot be imposed from outside.”453 
    Even during the 1990’s, former Soviet states within the CSTO felt the force of democratic 
revolution and attempted used their security forces to quell rebellion.  As early as 1996, 
Armenia’s presidential election faced demonstrations from protestors who claimed that the 
election was rigged.  The military and police suppressed the protests by sealing off the capital, 
shutting down the offices of opposition parties, and arresting 250 opposition leaders.  After the 
2003 presidential and parliamentary elections were also alleged to be marred with intimidation, 
media bias, and ballot-box stuffing, thousands of protestors mobilized in the streets to oppose the 
unfair elections.  Armenian security forces (including the military) quelled the protest movement 
and arrested hundreds of opposition leaders.454  The protests were re-ignited in 2004 when 
opposition forces organized demonstrations of over 25,000, seeking to re-produce the results of 
Georgia’s Rose Revolution.  During this protest, security forces were able to prevent 
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demonstrators from entering the capital, ransacked opposition headquarters, and arrested 
hundreds of activists across the country.455  In May 2005, the Uzbek government used security 
and military forces to violently repress protests in Andijan, Uzbekistan.  Thousands of 
demonstrators gathered in Bobur square to protest the unfair detention and trial of 23 
businessmen accused of being Islamic extremists; however, a group of armed opposition 
supporters stormed military and police barracks, stole weapons, freed the businessmen, and took 
hostages in government offices.  The protestors hoped that President Islam Karimov would 
address the perceived injustice and calm tensions; instead, he sent police, as well as military 
troops, who fired on the protestors.  Human Rights Watch claims that the military sealed off 
streets, prevented people from leaving, and, in cooperation with internal security forces, killed 
hundreds in the massacre.456   
    In the wake of the Orange Revolution and in preparation for Belarus’ 2006 presidential 
election, President Alexander Lukashenko began taking pre-emptive measures against 
democratization efforts.  In addition to arresting opposition leaders for organizing protests, the 
regime began amending laws to allow security forces to fight demonstrators with firearms or “in 
other cases determined by the president.”457  After an uprising in Osh, Kyrgyzstan in 2011, the 
Kyrgyz Defense Minister Abibilla Kudayberdiyev was asked about the Kyrgyz constitution’s 
ban on the military’s involvement in internal conflicts.  Kudayberdiyev responded: 
Indeed, Article 14 of the constitution bans the use of armed forces for internal 
political goals.  But Article 18 of the constitutional law on emergency situations 
says that ‘military units can be used for handling the aftermath of emergency 
situations and ensuring citizens’ security…Article 22 of the same law defines 
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what extraordinary measures can be taken in case of an emergency and says that 
military units can be used to ensure public order and protect various facilities.458 
 
He goes on to note, “And I disagree with statements that during the June unrest the army 
failed.  On the contrary it played a big role in stabilizing the situation.  The military 
patrolled the streets and manned check points around the clock for five months.”459  
Throughout the decades since Soviet collapse, CSTO member leaders needed the ability 
to counter democratic revolution; security forces, including the military, often served as 
the best option. 
    As the CSTO evolved against the backdrop of democratic revolutions throughout the former 
Soviet space in the mid-2000’s, Russian officials began formulating policies to counteract these 
non-state threats.  In 2006, during President Vladimir Putin’s second term, Russian officials 
began promoting a concept known as “sovereign democracy”, an idea that resonated with post-
Soviet authoritarian leaders who feared foreign meddling in their internal affairs. The term 
“sovereign democracy” was first used publicly by Vladislov Surkov, deputy chief of the Russian 
presidential administration, at a speech in June 2006.  He later spoke to American reporters to 
clarify the term and downplayed its significance: “And we want to be a free nation among other 
free nations and to cooperate with them proceeding from fair principles, we don't want to be 
managed from abroad. That's it.”  As opposed to “managed democracy”, in which a state is 
directed by an external regime, Russia promoted sovereign democracy: an attempt to implement 
policies independent of foreign interference.460   
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    Fearing the consequences of democratic revolution in its near-abroad for its influence in the 
CIS, let alone the possibility of revolution inside its own borders, Russia began taking concrete 
steps toward preventing western interference and democratic revolt.  Allison argues that Central 
Asian leaders engaged in opposition to democratic reform through a regional system of 
‘protective integration’ with Russia and fellow authoritarian states.  Regime security, he argues, 
is the top priority for these leaders and the only way to prevent mutual suspicion of external 
sponsoring of domestic overthrow is to commit to a regional security organization with Russia 
and former Soviet republics.461  When Russia was concerned about the increasing westernization 
of neighboring states, it sometimes intervened militarily (as in the case of non-CSTO members 
Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014).  However, given the Putin administration’s public faith in 
“sovereign democracy”, as well as the statutory assurances of non-interference in fellow CSTO 
states, Russia needed a means to prevent democratic revolution short of intervention.  The 
CSTO, as a security organization, would serve as Russia’s instrument to oppose democratization 
by bolstering autocratic regimes in the former Soviet Union.  
  
CSTO Military Exercises to Consolidate Authoritarian Rule 
    One practical means by which Russia is able to support CSTO member states to consolidate 
rule is through role-forming MMEs.  Exercises “Frontier” and “Indestructible Brotherhood” were 
designed to train CSTO soldiers how to combat the threat of violent non-state actors; the former 
trained counterterrorism tasks while the latter emphasized peacekeeping.  The exercises were 
developed around scenarios in which an insurgent group—either politically or religiously 
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motivated and sometimes funded by an outside source—would attempt to overthrow the regime 
or seize territory and create a secessionist government.  Individual CSTO member units and 
collective reaction forces would then practice intervention to expel the terrorists from sovereign 
territory.  Sometimes CSTO planners designed the exercise adversary to be explicitly an 
extremist Islamic insurgent group; however, the same exercise ‘enemy’ also resembled the 
armed democratic protestors that seized government buildings during Color Revolutions.  Below 
are explorations of three of these MMEs: two Frontier and one Indestructible Brotherhood 
training events. 
    In March 2005, the CSTO planned to conduct an anti-terror exercise in Kyrgyzstan known as 
“Rubezh”, or in English, “Frontier”.  However, following democratic protests against alleged 
unfair parliamentary elections and the seizure of public buildings by the opposition during the 
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the exercises were urgently moved to Tajikistan in order to 
avoid the impression of intervention by external actors.462  During the revolution, Kyrgyz 
President Askar Akayev was ousted by armed insurgents, who captured government buildings 
unopposed by weak state security forces. The CSTO exercise was moved to early April, one 
week after the initial stages of the democratic revolt, and involved roughly 1,000 troops from all 
CSTO states.463  The scenario of the training event was strikingly similar to the situation in 
Kyrgyzstan: one group, wearing blue shirts, was tasked with attempting to overthrow the local 
government due to discontent with the previous election, while the other team, wearing red 
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shirts, protected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the regime.464  Erica Marat argues, 
“The implication of this division into red and blue camps during the drills emphasizes the blue 
team’s ties with destructive foreign powers, be they terrorist organizations… or international 
NGOs, as in Kyrgyzstan’s regime change.”465 
    “Rubezh 2006”, this time held in Aktau, Kazakhstan along the Caspian coastline, exercised a 
similar scenario to its 2005 predecessor, though this exercise involved more troops (over 2,500) 
and integrated the recently created Collective Rapid Deployment Forces.466  Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan participated in this exercise, while Armenia and Belarus did not 
(Uzbekistan sent observers). The exercise was divided into three phases, the last of which 
involved joint maneuvers with land, air, and naval forces.467  Also joining the training were 
elements from Kyrgyzstan’s special forces unit, known as the “scorpion brigade,” a unit that is 
alleged to have taken part in countering protests in the 2005 Tulip Revolution.468  The tactical 
portion of this iteration also focused on terrorists objecting to the results of an election and 
attempting to overthrow the government, though the adversary to the regime was an Islamic 
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movement striving to establish a caliphate.  One news story reported that a goal of the exercise 
was to practice, “a joint operation for stabilization of the situation in the aforementioned region 
of Kazakhstan.”469  The scenario again incorporated “red” (CSTO members) vs. “blue” (armed 
Islamic terrorists) combat, but included a third “brown” team which represented: “countries that 
wish to exploit the situation so as to strengthen their influence in this part of the world.”470  
Another story, entitled, “The ‘Red’ Will Suppress the Mutiny of the ‘Blue’; Russia and its Allies 
Learn to Defend Central Asian Regimes,” reported the Russian Defense Ministry’s confirmation 
that “the scenario of the exercise is based on a conflict in Central Asia.”  The reporters go on to 
speculate that the “brown” team was, “not ODKB [CSTO] members in which it is easy to guess 
Afghanistan and the contingent of NATO and US forces staying there.”471  Russian TV showed 
images of the exercise and an anchor reported, “The Blues are operating with the clear sympathy 
of, and secret assistance from, the Browns - the countries interested in destabilizing the situation 
in the region.”472  The plan also called for a simulated mobilization of larger multinational 
military units in the case of external actors seeking to intervene militarily.473   
    The concern about Islamic terrorism was ostensibly to address the Andijan massacre in May 
2005, when Uzbek soldiers fired on a crowd of protestors who supported 23 men on trial accused 
of being Islamic extremists.474  By construing the MME scenario as a fight against Islamic 
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terrorism (as in Andijan), CSTO planners painted Uzbekistan’s actions as “anti-terror” as 
opposed to repressive against democratic demonstrators.475  However, given the exercise 
scenario’s focus on combating the ability of external supporters to influence the conflict or 
conduct independent attacks, Islamic terrorism seemed a lesser concern than the threat posed by 
democratization backed by the US.  Moreover, during the exercise there was speculation that the 
maneuvers were conducted to prepare for Tajikistan’s upcoming presidential election in 
November 2006 or potential instability created by Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional reform efforts.476  
Regardless, it is clear that in both Frontier exercises, Russia, through the CSTO, hoped to train 
former Soviet militaries to fulfill the role of regime defense. 
    In addition to annual Rubezh exercises, the CSTO conducted “Nerushimoye Bratstvo” 
(“Indestructible Brotherhood”) MMEs to train its standing peacekeeping force.  In the first of 
such exercises conducted in October 2012, also held in Kazakhstan, the training involved all 
member states of the CSTO.  According to official statements, the exercise was intended to 
prepare for the conduct of peacekeeping operations within the CSTO region, as well as possible 
operations with a mandate from the UN.  One news report suggested that peacekeepers may be 
used in scenarios similar to the ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, even though the CSTO 
denied this request and provided no forces.  The report also cautions that CSTO states cannot 
rule out “the probability of appearance of big-scale uncontrolled conflicts similar to those that 
have happened recently in some Arab countries.”477  Familiar peacekeeping tasks such as 
separating conflicting parties, escorting humanitarian cargoes, and guarding vital facilities were 
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present in the plan.  However, there was a larger focus on protecting vital facilities and 
“preventing mass disorders”.478  Journalist Joshua Kucera reports that, “According to the 
scenario, a crisis situation arises connected with the activity of international extremists and 
terrorist organizations and conflict between ethnic groups living in the country.”479  The concern 
about revolution, whether democratic or Islamic, was seen in other CSTO exercises as well.  
Though not historically a peacekeeping-style or anti-terror exercise, the CSTO’s “Center” 
exercise in 2011 was created to address situations similar to the Arab Spring revolutions.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, Russian General Makarov told journalists that the Center exercise 
tests the ability of the CSTO to react to mass uprisings similar to those taking place during the in 
the Middle East.  MMEs such as Center and Indestructible Brotherhood were geared toward 
managing protests and revolts after autocratic Arab regimes began falling to democratic 
revolutions in 2011 and 2012. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
    Were the CSTO exercises explored above intended as a means for Russia to influence the role 
of regime defense for Central Asian states, or were other motivations driving these training 
events?  The traditional works in military doctrine expect that major powers focus of offensive, 
defensive, and deterrent operations; moreover, they explain most military behavior as products of 
narrow organizational interests.  Role-forming exercises, in general, do appear to support the first 
explanation concerning traditional operations: perhaps Russia used CSTO MMEs as an 
opportunity to practice rehearsal for operations or deterrence.  The exercises do include major 
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units (battalions and brigades), involve heavy equipment—such as tanks, artillery, and air 
support—and the tactical tasks seem appropriate for real-world operations.  Rehearsal for 
multilateral missions, however, seems implausible: despite limited cooperation to counter 
narcotics and arms trafficking (in cooperation with the US and European Union)480, the CSTO 
has never deployed military units for any operation internal or external to the security 
organization despite several notable opportunities.  As previously noted, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip 
Revolution in 2005 and uprising in 2010 were appropriate scenarios for the use of CSTO force: 
one of the organization’s own members was twice threatened by overthrow, officially requested 
CSTO support in 2010, but was denied any military assistance.481   Moreover, the CSTO has also 
resisted opportunities for peacekeeping in the region, such as in eastern Ukraine after the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in 2014.482  Given the statutory emphasis on respect for member 
sovereignty, actual CSTO military operations are difficult to execute and justify.  Concerning 
deterrence, although these exercises may be able showcase capabilities against potential terrorists 
or protestors, each exercise is held at most once a year and are rotated through different member 
states annually or biannually.  Thus, if deterrence was the main driver, the CSTO would most 
likely plan more training events in the same area to serve as a credible deterrent signal. 
    The second traditional theory predicts that militaries pursue parochial interests in order to 
increase organizational size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy.  Concerning organizational 
resources, these exercises did consist of units and equipment (roughly 2,000 - 3,000 total soldiers 
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from all participating members) above the level of ‘symbolic’-type MMEs such as those used for 
recruitment; moreover, these MMEs took place against the backdrop of civilian-led efforts to 
reduce the number of soldiers in the Russian military.483  However, there is reason to question 
whether CSTO MMEs provide the Russian military with more resources.  As opposed to 
smaller-scale MMEs, Russia conducts several massive unilateral ‘snap’ (unannounced) exercises 
multiple times a year that test unit readiness and fitness; these training events involve anywhere 
between 7,000 to 160,000 soldiers.484  The scale of the planning, logistics, and execution of these 
exercises vastly outweighs those of CSTO-sponsored MMEs485; thus, if the Russian military 
sought more resources, large-scale unilateral snap exercises to identify shortfalls in equipment 
and training would be more appropriate than smaller MMEs with Central Asian partners.  
Moreover, there is little reason to believe the Russian military’s wealth was in threat during the 
2000’s and early 2010’s, given President Vladimir Putin’s support for the defense establishment 
even when the Russian economy was struggling and other government agencies’ budgets were 
reduced.486 
    Regarding prestige, although these training events involve simulated combat, the fact that the 
training never leads to actual deployments calls into question the usefulness of CSTO MMEs as 
a source of societal deference for battlefield success.  In fact, Russia’s most recent military 
interventions, in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, were unilateral; Russia’s participation 
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and performance in combat has had little to do with multilateralism.487  Moreover, if Russian 
military officers were concerned about building a warrior ethos in its soldiers, large-scale 
conventional exercises would be more appropriate.  Finally, there is little reason to believe that 
CSTO exercises provide the Russian military with greater autonomy from civilian oversight.  
The CSTO is both a political and security organization.  All member presidents agreed to 
upgrade the Tashkent Treaty into a security organization in May 2002; the first chairman of the 
organization’s Council of Heads of State was Russian President Vladimir Putin.488  The 
organization regularly hosts meetings with its collective civilian Parliamentary Assembly and 
between member presidents.489  Furthermore, military exercises are often attended by civilian 
leaders and in 2012, CSTO planners even invited staff of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross to observe its maneuvers.490  Given the overlap of civilian and military interests in the 
collective security institution, the notion that CSTO MMEs provides the Russian military with 
greater autonomy is questionable. 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
    The purpose of this chapter was to elucidate the goals and mechanisms of role-forming 
multinational exercises.  Major powers use these types of MMEs to influence the ‘role’ or 
‘function’ that partner militaries serve for their societies.  Two specific military roles are most 
encouraged: democracy defense and regime defense.  Major powers hope that by training partner 
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militaries to be ‘democracy defenders’—and thus more trustworthy in liberal sense—or ‘regime 
defenders’—more stable and competent to prevent overthrow—these partners will be more 
benign to the powers’ national interests.  MMEs provide an opportunity for major powers to train 
certain tasks that better enable transitioning or consolidating states to serve these roles.  By 
shaping these partners, major powers seek to eliminate sources of threats in their strategic 
environments.  This chapter also highlighted the role of regional security organizations, such as 
NATO, SCO, and CSTO, as opportunities for role-shaping MMEs.  The study of Russian-CSTO 
relations and exercises provided an illustration of how major powers use role-forming MMEs to 
shape their environments.  The two alternative explanations were also assessed against my 
argument.  The following chapter describes the final non-traditional MME function: trust-
developing between rivals. 
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CHAPTER 7 
TRUST-DEVELOPING EXERCISES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
    After China announced that its military would participate for the first time in the world’s 
largest maritime exercise—the US-led “Rim of the Pacific 2014” (RIMPAC ‘14)—the 
Washington Post published a story with a title that appropriately gauged the tensions surrounding 
the historic event: “U.S. Prepares for Awkward Military Engagement with China in Hawaii.”491  
The US invitation to China surprised many, especially after the country’s unilateral 
establishment of a controversial air defense identification zone over the East China Sea.  Within 
the year preceding the RIMPAC exercise, other controversies involving China rattled the region: 
Asian leaders argued over a close encounter in which Chinese jets almost collided with Japanese 
aircraft, while Vietnamese leaders condemned the building of Chinese oil rigs near the disputed 
Paracel islands.  Despite these tense disagreements between Asian leaders, both American and 
Chinese military officers publicly professed their hope that the joint training would lead to 
increased trust, transparency, and open communication between rivals.  In the exercise’s opening 
ceremony, US Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris noted, “Mutual trust and open lines of 
communication are critical, but are very challenging to build. That's why multilateral exercises 
like RIMPAC are so important.”492  Chinese leaders signaled similar encouragement.  Why 
would major power rivals be willing to cooperatively conduct maneuvers and expose their force 
structure, technology, and doctrine to their adversaries?   
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    This chapter explores the final category of non-traditional shaping MME: trust-developing.  
These types of exercises are designed to reduce tensions between major power rivals; the two 
means by which training achieves this goal are by transitioning the ‘threat’ to a common third-
party and building camaraderie between otherwise hostile soldiers.  By changing perceptions of 
soldier attitudes towards each other, major powers expect that their troops are able to overcome 
the assumption that all military behavior from a rival is hostile; by not assuming the worst, 
officers and soldiers may be able to manage small crises and prevent escalation into open war.  
Major powers hope that by ameliorating the threat of inadvertent war with a rival, they can 
reduce one source of uncertainty in their strategic environments.  Thus, trust-developing training 
targets the threat source of strategic uncertainty.  The chapter will proceed in four parts.  First, I 
explore in greater detail the purpose of trust-developing exercises and how they are expected to 
reduce uncertainty.  Second, I discuss how major power rivals approach military exercises as a 
means to reduce mistrust: either by agreeing to limit their scope or conducting cooperative 
training events as partners.  Third, I provide an illustrative case study of a prominent trust-
developing military relationship between India and China between 2006 and 2016.  I then assess 
the two alternatives and conclude with a summary as a transition to the statistical chapter to 
follow. 
 
7.2 Trust-Developing Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty 
The Purpose of Trust-Developing Exercises 
    The purpose of trust-developing MMEs is to reduce tensions between major power rivals and 
prevent the onset of inadvertent war.  Major power rivals sometimes initiate trust-developing 
exercises after de-escalating a former crisis both powers wish to avoid in the future.  Other times, 
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the decision to conduct MMEs is concurrent with other diplomatic agreements to forge closer 
ties between competitive powers.  The means by which major powers attempt to build trust 
during MMEs is through two mechanisms: demonstrating a focus on third-party (usually non-
state) threats and creating opportunities for soldiers from rival armies to view each other as 
comrades (and thus, more human).  First, by emphasizing a common interest in defeating a third-
party threat—such as terrorism or transnational crime—major powers seek to demonstrate to 
each other that they both share a mutual concern in combating an enemy that is beyond their 
rivalry.  Since all military exercise scenarios require an ‘enemy’ to fight, planners create a third-
party adversary, such as insurgents or even natural disasters, that is focus of the soldiers’ 
training.  Second, by providing opportunities for rival soldiers to view each other as fellow 
troops, major powers hope that as these soldiers advance throughout their careers, they will 
develop a more benign view of their rivals’ intentions.   
    Both of these mechanisms are intended to change perceptions between rival militaries to 
prevent future small crises from conflagrating into open conflict.  For instance, when rival troops 
come in contact in the ocean, along a border, or in the skies, these soldiers may better understand 
each other’s complex environment and need for security and, thus, not assume these military 
actions are necessarily hostile.  Instead, this military behavior would be viewed as largely 
defensive in nature, allowing lower-level units to reduce the risk of large-scale war.  For 
example, when surface ships pass each other in the ocean, a crisis may ensue if actions appear 
threatening.  If troops and their superiors automatically assume the rival action is hostile, the 
crisis may escalate; troops and their superiors may decide to conduct threatening maneuvers, 
mass more units, or even fire weapons as a warning to their rivals.  Military leaders fear that this 
scenario is possible especially in the South China Sea, where both China and the US—along with 
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Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—conduct consistent patrols.493  Rivals 
that share a border (or whose allies share a border) also experience troop interactions that may 
result in stand-offs, as is common between China and India.  Even if two rivals do not share a 
common border (such as the US and Russia), trust-developing MMEs are seen as an opportunity 
to reveal that both powers are primarily concerned with protecting their nations as opposed to 
expansionist ambitions.  As more units and soldiers are exposed to rival troops during training 
exercises over time, the number of soldiers that experience these human-to-human contacts 
increases.  Major powers hope that if a crisis occurs between units at the small-unit (platoon, 
company) level, the soldiers, or their superiors, are able to de-escalate the crisis because they 
better understand each other as humans who desire to provide security for their country.  During 
diplomatic or military crises, officers hope the crisis can be de-escalated through an 
understanding of each other’s security concerns. 
    Trust-developing exercises are most likely to occur within a strategic rivalry that is absent of 
open hostility, either directly between military forces or their proxies.  These types of rivalries lie 
below the threshold of violence but their existence generates suspicion and mistrust between 
competitive powers.  Strategic competitive rivals such as India and China in the post-Cold War 
environment are the most salient example of this type of rivalry.  Both China and India compete 
for security along their ambiguous (un-demarcated) border and often experience non-violent 
stand-offs between small military units.  Although post-Cold War US-Russian relations before 
2014 could be considered in this category, Russia’s invasion of Crimea in Ukraine was 
considered open hostility toward US interests in Europe.  In response, the US cut off all military 
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cooperation with Russia to signal its dissatisfaction, increasing the rivalry to a level in which no 
cooperative activities were possible.494  Because of ongoing combat operations and violence in 
Jammu and Kashmir, India and Pakistan are also considered to be in open hostility.495  Thus, we 
would not expect rivals engaged in open or proxy violence to conduct cooperative trust-
developing exercises.  Moreover, trust-developing exercises are not expected to alter the 
fundamental international politics between major powers: if one state decides that war is 
necessary, no trust-developing training will overcome these fundamental conflicting interests.  
Nevertheless, the fact that major power rivals, who otherwise would attempt to conceal sensitive 
technology and doctrine from each other, believe that military cooperation could somehow 
reduce mistrust is significant and in need of explanation. 
 
Rivals and the Management of Uncertainty 
    Major power rivals engaged in open hostility often assume their adversary seeks opportunities 
for aggression, assign probabilities to locations in which they expect attack, and deploy units 
appropriately.  For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, during the Cold War NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact stationed units along opposing sides of Germany and other European states in 
anticipation of invasion.  Although no violence occurred between NATO and Warsaw Pact units 
in Europe, Soviet invasions of Eastern Europe, major ideological disparities, and military support 
to combative proxies in Africa, Asia, and Central America forced planners to assume their 
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adversaries harbored aggressive intentions.496  Even more recently in 2016, NATO deployed four 
multinational battlegroups (approximately 4,500 soldiers total) to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland to serve as a deterrent against potential Russian aggression against the Baltics.497  
Russia’s 2014 invasion and continuing support to proxies in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 
increased US assumptions that Russia was prepared for aggression against the Eastern flank of 
NATO.498   
    If major power rivals are engaged in competitive behavior that lies below the level of open 
hostility, however, opportunities for cooperation exist.  Although these rivals may not inherently 
assume aggressive intentions by the other, however, the risk of inadvertent war is always present.  
That is, even if major powers do not presume their rivals will conduct offensive operations in 
pursuit of aggressive foreign policy goals, uncertainty about intentions remains and the addition 
of security measures by one may reduce the security of the other.499  For instance, especially 
along shared borders or in the open commons (air and sea), misunderstanding about intentions 
could lead to a security dilemma in which actions originally intended to increase security are 
viewed as hostile.  Small-unit patrols to ensure other state militaries or non-state actors are 
refraining from infringing on home territory could be viewed as offensive operations by another.  
Especially if these soldiers and officers view the other as an “enemy” (and assume the worst of 
intentions), crisis escalation is likely to ensue.  In order to address this uncertainty, rivals seek 
opportunities to allow soldiers to view each other on a more personal-level.  These experiences 
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are expected to reveal that troops are simply human, desiring to defend their country against 
security threats.  Major powers hope that over time, as these soldiers advance throughout their 
careers, they are able to prevent small crises from escalating into open conflict.  If troops view 
each other as human and largely security-seeking in nature, small crises generated by 
misunderstanding may be possible to manage and de-escalate.  By preventing the onset of 
inadvertent war, major powers hope to reduce the source of one type of threat in their strategic 
environment. 
 
7.3 Rivals, Exercises, and Confidence and Security Building Measures 
The Restriction of Traditional Exercise Functions 
Rivals have traditionally sought to decrease mistrust with their opponents through the 
building of security regimes, which are understood as, “those principles, rules, and norms that 
permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.”500  
During the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw pact diplomats developed one type of security regime 
known as Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).  CSBMs, in general, are 
agreements designed to help states overcome psychological and political barriers of mutual 
distrust and suspicion in order to realize a shared goal.501  Large-scale conventional military 
exercises were located as a source of mistrust that needed to be restrained, since traditional 
exercise functions—those use to rehearse for or deter war—often appear threatening to an 
                                                                   
500 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1982): 357, 360-362.  
Jervis situates his definition with Krasner’s general definition of international regimes within the same issue of 
International Organization: “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area.”  Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1982): 185. 
501 Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, “Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1997): 143-171. 
231 
 
opponent.  For instance, if one state (or alliance) conducts an exercise intended to deter a rival, 
that exercise may appear to be a rehearsal for invasion, especially a surprise attack.  Thus, the 
opponent may conduct an exercise in response that is intended to signal deterrence but may be 
perceived by the alliance as a counter-rehearsal, initiating a spiral of mistrust.502  Janice Gross 
Stein argues that limited security regimes are one type of ‘strategy of reassurance’ intended to 
reduce the probability of war by providing reliable information, clarifying intentions, minimizing 
uncertainty, and reducing the likelihood of miscalculation.503   
    At two international conferences during the Cold War, diplomats from NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact negotiated two agreements to provide transparency and reassurance by restraining the 
ability for one alliance to use a military exercise as a launching pad for surprise attack.  At the 
Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, both alliances 
committed to announcing military exercises involving 25,000 or more troops 21 days in advance 
and inviting observers from the other alliance to view the training in person.  At Stockholm in 
1986, the two superpowers agreed to more restrictive CSBMs: exercise notification extended to 
42 days in advance for maneuvers involving 13,000 or more troops, the two competing alliances 
were required to release annual training calendars and two-year forecasts, and each alliance was 
required to accept at least one ‘challenge inspection’ by the other each year. 504  Though the 
CSBMs did not reduce either sides’ military capabilities (as would arms control agreements), the 
measures were intended to reduce uncertainty by creating obstacles for surprise attack and 
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developing long-term expectations of permissible military activities.  CSBMs to restrain the size 
and scope of exercises are still in effect today.505 
 
Cooperative Exercises to Limit Mistrust 
    In addition to limiting the potential for major exercises to be used as a cover for surprise 
attack, major powers have increasingly sought opportunities to reduce mistrust through 
cooperative training events.  The rise in prominence of non-state threats, such as ethnic war and 
terrorism, has provided an opportunity for rivals to conduct partnered MMEs that focus efforts 
on combating these third-party threats.  Since the end of the Cold War, the two former rivals US 
and Russia attempted to improve military relations through MMEs beginning in the mid-1990’s.  
In 1994, Russia hosted US Army soldiers for the first time at a military base near the Ural 
Mountains.  The exercises were small in scale, focused on peacekeeping tasks, and were 
generally symbolic (not an actual rehearsal) to signal a turn to a cooperative relationship between 
the two countries. In the run up to the exercise, however, anti-Western sentiment from 
ultranationalists in the Russian parliament grew to such an extent that US Senators proposed 
moving the exercise to the US as a means to ‘rescue’ the joint training event.506  Despite the 
protests, the exercise was still held in Russia in October 1994 and was repeated again in 1995 at 
Fort Riley, Kansas, which marked the first time that Russian soldiers were invited to train in the 
US.  The only public objection to this exercise came from a local US Congressman, who 
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bemoaned the price tag of the exercise at $1.2 million of taxpayer money.507  The two militaries 
continued small-scale cooperation in European multinational exercises throughout the 1990’s 
and 2000’s and repeated a bilateral training event in May 2012.  This exercise, focused mainly 
on counterterrorism, was also small in scale: only 22 Russian paratroopers attended the training 
held in Fort Carson, Colorado.  A public affairs officer for the US Army unit hosting the training 
acknowledged some public backlash against the exercise, commenting that “Conspiracy theorists 
are alive and well,” but, “This is the shake-hands, get-to-know-you kind of thing.  What this is 
not is a massive counterterrorism exercise."508  Military exercises between the US and Russia 
ended in 2014, when the US canceled all plans for military cooperation after Russia invaded the 
Ukrainian province of Crimea.509 
 
7.4. Illustrative Case Study: Indo-Chinese Military MMEs, 2006-2016 
    Though trust-developing exercises are rare (there are only a few contemporary major power 
strategic rivalries), they are important in understanding opportunities for rivals to prevent the 
incidence of accidental war.  One of the most prominent trust-developing exercise programs is 
‘Hand-in-Hand’ between India and China.  These two major powers fought a short war over their 
shared border in 1962 and tensions rose again in 1967 and 1987.  There is no agreed upon 
boundary between the countries, referred to as the ‘Line of Actual Control” (LAC) in bilateral 
documents, which has resulted in each side claiming hundreds of border incursions by the 
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other.510  From 2006 to 2016, these states conducted eight ground-based cooperative MMEs, six 
of which were part of the ‘Hand-in-Hand’ program, two between border guards along the LAC.  
Indo-Chinese military relations and each cooperative MME will be used to illustrate my 
argument about why and how major power rivals are able to reduce mistrust and one source of 
threat in their strategic environments.  The alternative explanations will also be evaluated against 
my argument.  Evidence that would support my argument are statements (both public and from 
interviews) which indicate that the purpose of these training events was to reduce mistrust 
between rivals through soldier-to-soldier interactions and exercise scenarios dedicated to 
defeating non-state threats.  Evidence that would undermine my argument are indicators that 
point to the alternative explanations; that is, that these training events were rehearsals for 
combined missions or they were simply a means for the Indian and Chinese armies to increase 
their organizational size, wealth, prestige, or autonomy from civilian control. 
 
Indo-Chinese Relations during the Cold War 
    India and China—the two largest countries by population with large and fast-growing 
economies—are emerging as major powers in world politics.  The relationship between the two 
nuclear powers has experienced periods of cooperation but also intense competition, especially 
since the Sino-Indian War of 1962.  In a 2014 Pew Research Center poll, only 30-31% of Indians 
and Chinese held favorable views of each other, while 72 percent of Indians were concerned 
about a territorial dispute with China.511  The two countries’ shared border spans the vast 
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Himalayan mountains and comprise over 130,000 square kilometers of disputed territory, 
primarily involving Ladakh in the west and Arunachal Pradesh in the east.  This immense border 
presents both rising powers with an intense security dilemma.512  India claims land within 
borders drawn primarily by British colonists—known as the McMahon Line—while China 
asserts that it owns territory far south of this ‘obsolete’ colonial boundary.  Moreover, Tibet, a 
largely autonomous region until Chinese occupation in 1950, serves as a point of contention 
among the two powers.  Though officially annexed by China in 1951, Tibet holds strong cultural 
and economic ties to India, which, since 1959, has hosted the religious leader Dalai Lama’s 
government-in-exile.  Tensions came to a head in 1962 when a “multidimensional security 
dilemma coalesced in the eastern Himalayas”: both states sent troops to a deteriorating situation 
along the border after the Chinese repressed a rebellion in Tibet.  In October of 1962, the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded and defeated the Indian army at Arunachal 
(formerly the Northeast Frontier Agency, or NEFA) and Ladakh within a month.513  After peace 
negotiations failed in November, China ordered a unilateral ceasefire in December and withdrew 
20 kilometers behind the LAC—the de facto territory occupied by both armies at the time.  A 
decade-long diplomatic freeze ensued over differing interpretations of the boundary.514  Though 
both states offered diplomatic overtures over the next forty years, progress was disrupted by 
border stand-offs in 1967 and 1987. 
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 Indo-Chinese Confidence-Building Measures since the End of the Cold War 
    After a number of smaller crises were settled during the Cold War, India and China signed an 
agreement in 1993 as a commitment to preventing military incursions over the 1962 LAC.  
Despite the ostensible goodwill, the document did not settle the border question and 
disagreements about the actual shape of the border remained.515  In 1996, both countries re-
affirmed their commitment to refrain from the use of military force against each other in a shared 
confidence-building document, even though the agreement recognized there was still no 
acceptable settlement to the ‘boundary question’.  The agreement included provisions to limit 
exercises along the LAC to 15,000 troops and required advanced notice of exercises involving 
more than 5,000 soldiers.516  Despite the progress on CSBMs to improve relations on the border, 
India’s second nuclear test in May 1998 drew sharp condemnation from the Chinese government, 
especially after Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes claimed, “China is potential threat 
number one,” in the same month as the test.517   
    Two confidence-building agreements in the 2000’s signaled a turn away from traditional 
restraints on military exercises toward using training to build relationships.  The 2003 
Declaration on Principles for Relations attempted to transition from restrictions on purely 
military activities to an acknowledgement of more common political and economic interests, 
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such as the shared goals of promoting trade, protecting the environment, eliminating poverty, and 
strengthening the UN.  Both states also committed to working together toward countering 
terrorism, a growing threat after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US and December 2001 
attacks on the Indian Parliament.518  Indian and Chinese government officials announced that 
2006 would mark a “Year of Friendship” in which the two sides would attempt new ways to 
forge closer ties and find a solution to the border dispute.519  In May 2006, the defense ministers 
of both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding that served as the first formal 
agreement between the two rivals to institutionalize multinational military exercises.520  The 
document committed both countries to hold military officer exchanges, annual defense 
dialogues, and joint military training in the fields of “search and rescue, anti-piracy, 
counterterrorism, and other areas of mutual interest.”521 
 
The Planning and Execution of Indo-Chinese Bilateral Exercises 
    Pursuant to the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding, India and China conducted eight land-
based MMEs from 2006 – 2016.  Six exercises entitled ‘Hand-in-Hand’ occurred in 2007, 2008, 
2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, and two humanitarian and disaster-relief exercises amongst border 
guards were conducted in 2016.  ‘Hand-in-Hand’ exercises usually included 100-150 troops from 
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each side and focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism; these exercises were intended 
to be conducted annually but were interrupted between 2009-2012 through a series of crises 
between the two countries.  Though the decision to hold exercises is made by political leaders, 
the actual planning is conducted months in advance by Indian and Chinese military officers; the 
execution of tasks is conducted at the lowest tactical levels (junior officer, non-commissioned 
officers, and enlisted soldiers).  In general, the military attaché teams from both countries meet 
together to choose the specific location and determine the training tasks, with the host country 
ultimately responsible for the general format and sequence.  The planners (usually mid-grade 
officers) discuss possible objectives, such as hostage-rescue or counterterrorism, and choose an 
agreed-upon scenario.  Multiple phases are planned into the exercise, such as familiarization of 
equipment (e.g. weapons or helicopters), discussion of each other’s doctrine, and execution of 
tasks in units mixed with soldiers from both countries.522  In the case of India, military officers 
coordinate with their Chinese counterparts, keeping Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
External Affairs officials abreast of developments.  One of my interviewees noted this military-
to-military interaction is known as “military diplomacy”.523  Different units are chosen for each 
exercise based on operational requirements, which provides various units throughout both armies 
with exposure to their rival counterparts. 
    During training, soldiers from different countries maneuver together in basic tactics, which 
“don’t need language” because they are considered standard to all armies.524  Additionally, since 
China and India do not share a common conventional enemy, planners create a third-party threat 
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that consists of insurgency and terrorism in their ‘Hand-in-Hand’ scenarios; as Former Indian 
Director General of the Infantry, Lieutenant General JS Bajwa notes,  
When you are doing military exercises for conventional operations, then you have to 
identify an enemy.  China and India don’t have a common enemy, so there is no point in 
having exercises in conventional operations, because we are not going to be fighting 
together against an enemy; however, we wanted to continue to have military-to-military 
cooperation, more to understand their military and not to take the Chinese as some ‘ten-
foot-tall soldiers’.525   
 
In between training events, soldiers are encouraged “to live together, eat together, play games 
together” for several weeks in order to develop relationships and build camaraderie, though 
relationships are only maintained throughout the duration of exercises.  During these 
interactions, officers hope that soldiers learn that the other side is “represented by human beings” 
and not “animals”, which is a common myth that soldiers acquire throughout their careers.  
Senior military officers believe personal contact with rival soldiers is viewed as a means to 
dispel these myths.526  LTG Bajwa argues that since Indian units are deployed along the LAC, 
military cooperation such as exercises ensure that the situation “doesn’t flare up” and both 
countries can “avoid hostilities”; he notes, “When two armies have been operating in this sense, 
like this, generally you do not intend to become very hostile and there is an element of restraint 
on both sides, particularly along the Line of Actual Control.”527 
    The two countries conducted their first MME in the Chinese city of Kunming, a town near 
Arunachal Pradesh, in December 2007.  The exercise named “Hand-in-Hand 2007” involved 100 
troops from both countries and focused on counterterrorism to provide opportunities for the 
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armies to share lessons learned from past experience.528  An anonymous Indian defense official 
noted: “This indicates that India's growing military ties with the US will not affect the process of 
confidence building with China - we can achieve a lot together…It’s time to bury the ghosts of 
1962.”529  Despite the exercise’s military focus on counter-terrorism, military officers 
encouraged their troops to socialize and get to know one another: in between training, the 
soldiers would conduct trust-building activities and play sports such as tug-of-war, basketball, 
martial arts, and yoga.  The soldiers would also intermix to dine and live side-by-side in the same 
building, learn phrases in each other’s languages, and enjoy sightseeing in their off-time 
together.  One reporter remarked about the exercise: 
Although some military and diplomatic observers said that the joint training is 
more symbolic than substantial, many acknowledged that the point is not the scale 
of the joint training or what specific anti-terrorism skills are involved.  The point 
is that the soldiers on both sides are moving toward each other in a friendly 
way.530 
 
The two armies repeated the counter-terror exercise in December 2008, this time held for the first 
time on Indian soil in the Belgaum District in Karnataka.  The exercise opened with a ceremony 
that displayed performances of Chinese tai chi and Indian martial arts, as well as remarks by the 
Chinese officer in charge who explained that the aim of the exercise was to develop friendship, 
promote mutual understanding, and build trust.531  Retired Indian Army Major General Dipankar 
Banerjee argues that these exercises are conducted so that, “soldiers get to know each other, 
build trust and confidence in one another,” by providing a “human face” that “removes a sense of 
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enmity and remoteness”.  Moreover, he notes that these exercises are intended to humanize and 
prevent soldiers from “demonizing” one another.532  About 137 Chinese PLA troops joined a 
similar number of Indian infantry soldiers to conduct attacks against a simulated enemy assisted 
by helicopters, supervised by a joint command post occupied by officers from both countries.533  
Despite the success of these two exercises, the relationship became strained once again in 2009 
when border incursions resumed and China protested the official visit of the Dalai Lama to 
Arunachal Pradesh in November 2009.534  Additionally, India cancelled military officer 
exchanges in August 2010 after China refused to grant a visa to a Kashmir-stationed Indian 
general.535  Though it is unclear whether exercises were cancelled or never planned in the first 
place, no joint training occurred between 2009 and 2013.   
    Tensions culminated in a crisis in April 2013—known as the ‘Depsang incident’—when a 
Chinese army platoon established an outpost in Ladakh (located in Jammu and Kashmir), ten 
kilometers into an area occupied and claimed by India.536  The Indian army responded by moving 
a platoon of its own to about 500 meters from the Chinese position, waving flags to signal to the 
Chinese troops that they were intruding on Indian territory.  During the standoff, the Indian 
media reported that China had engaged in over 600 incursions into Indian territory since 2010 
and that meetings by high ranking military officials were going nowhere.537  A group of Indian 
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students at Jammu University protested the Chinese intrusion, carrying banners and shouting 
anti-Chinese rhetoric.538  The three-week standoff did not escalate to war, but both countries’ 
foreign ministers were forced to intervene and agreed to remove troops from the contested 
area.539 
 
India and China Re-Start Joint Exercises in 2013 
    Despite the numerous attempts to build confidence through high-level agreements since 1988, 
as well as two MMEs in 2007 and 2008, the two nuclear major powers still engaged in a military 
stand-off that took three weeks to resolve.  The ambiguous LAC and unwillingness by the two 
governments to clearly delineate boundaries is often cited as the cause of strained relations.  
Given the systematic disagreement over the shape of the border that dates back to 1962, as well 
as the fact that the two countries are some of the largest and most powerful in the world, the 
Sino-Indian relationship appeared bleak.  However, in 2013 the two rivals made substantial 
progress toward cooperation.  First, in July 2013 India and China agreed to establish Border 
Meeting Points (BMPs) along the LAC in order for local army commanders to meet in times of 
crises.  The Indian Defence minister highlighted the practical role for local soldiers in diffusing 
cross-border tensions concurrently with high-level diplomatic talks: “The special representative-
level talks will continue.  But everybody knows it will take time.  You cannot wait for it to solve 
immediate border problems.”540   
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    In October 2013, Chinese and Indian national leaders signed the Border Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (BDCA), which reiterated each side’s commitment to the non-use of force, proposed 
meetings and a hotline between local military officers across the border, committed the countries 
to re-start joint military exercises, and promised to combat non-state threats such as arms 
smuggling, natural disasters, and infectious disease.541  The agreement was both lauded and 
derided by Chinese and Indian analysts, some arguing the measures were useless, others that 
represented India’s weak surrender to China.542  Commenting on the resolution of 2013 Depsang 
incident, one retired Indian army officer who worked on Chinese relations during his military 
career noted: “on most occasions, such incursions into each other's territory are settled at the 
local level and there is a mechanism of making announcements over microphone whenever such 
incursions are noticed.”  He continued that if these minor disputes cannot be settled by army 
units locally, sometimes they are handled at general/flag officer meetings or the diplomatic 
level.543 
     The first MME since 2008 took place in China’s Sichuan province in November 2013, though 
the decision to hold the exercise resulted from meetings between Indian and Chinese military 
officials several months before the official signing of the BDCA.544  During Indian Defence 
Minister AK Antony’s visit to China in early July, the two sides agreed to re-start the exercises 
as a means to prevent a ‘Despang-like’ incident from occurring in the future.545  The exercise 
                                                                   
541 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office, “Border Defense Cooperation 
Agreement between India and China,” October 23, 2013, accessed March 25, 2017, 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=100178. 
542 “Managing the Border,” Indian Express, October 24, 2013. 
543 “Settling Border Disputes with China to Take Time,” Assam Tribune, September 21, 2014, LexisNexis 
Academic. 
544 “India, China to Resume Military Drills After 5 Yrs,” Free Press Journal, August 13, 2013, LexisNexis 
Academic. 
545 Rajat Pandit, “India, China to Hold Military Exercises from November 4 After Five Years,” The Times of 
India, August 24, 2013, LexisNexis Academic. 
244 
 
‘Hand-in-Hand 2013’ involved 144 soldiers from both countries and incorporated similar tactical 
training to the exercises in 2007 and 2008.546  This exercise included a focus on interoperability, 
with soldiers from both sides learning hand signals and each other’s doctrines on hostage rescue 
and detainee operations.  To facilitate socialization, the officers organized troops into “mixed 
companies” which ensured interaction amongst unfamiliar soldiers (despite the language barrier).  
Indian Lieutenant General Ainil Jumar Ahuja told reporters: “This understanding at the level of 
the troops, at the level of the commanding officers, the company commanders, and the 
interaction that we have had at the level of generals, will definitely promote better understanding 
and a better appreciation of each other’s concerns…”547 
    In February 2014, military officers and government officials from India and China agreed to 
conduct the fourth iteration of ‘Hand-in-Hand’ in November 2014, this time at the Aundh 
military camp in Pune, India.548 The exercise again focused on counter-terrorism, with 139 
soldiers from each country practicing rappelling from helicopters, establishing a cordon and 
search, and attacking insurgent positions.549  Military officers shared a joint command post to 
track the training and improve interoperability.  Senior officers from both countries emphasized 
the importance of cooperating to defeat terrorism in all its forms.  Additionally, Chinese PLA 
Lieutenant General Shi Xiangyuan remarked about the exercise:  
The demonstration by both sides shows how similar our nations and our 
civilizations are. This is the most convincing evidence that China and India have 
great similarities and we are among the oldest civilizations of the world. The joint 
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training is a very important step towards a more conducive and complementary 
atmosphere between the two great armies.550 
 
Despite the officer’s remarks, not too far from the exercise location a stand-off between the PLA 
and Indian border guards was underway.  A few months prior to the start of the exercise, the 
Indian Border Security Force (BSF) reported that over 1,000 Chinese troops crossed the LAC in 
Ladakh; in Arunachal Pradesh, Indian Jawan border guards prevented Chinese troops from 
building roads through Indian-claimed land.551  According to a reporter covering the exercise, an 
anonymous Indian army officer said, “We knew the exact situation at the LAC and we are aware 
of the BSF intelligence report as well.  However, we have received special instructions from 
seniors regarding this exercise.  Hence, we are ignoring these recent developments and are taking 
special care of the guests.”552  From the officer’s comments, it appears that although the two 
countries were once again claiming border incursions by the other, senior military officers 
wanted the exercises to continue. 
    In September 2015, senior Chinese and Indian army officers met at a BMP in Chushul, 
Ladakh along the LAC to discuss border incursions.  According to a news report, the Chinese 
officers were asked about a watch tower that had allegedly been built 1.5 kilometers into Indian 
territory.  Military officers from both sides resolved the issue and agreed to cease defense 
construction along the border.553  A few weeks later, Chinese military officers invited the Indian 
army to participate in another iteration of ‘Hand-in-Hand’ at the Kunming Military Academy in 
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Yunnan Province, China in October 2015.  One news agency reported an anonymous source as 
noting: "The fact that Burtse standoff in Ladakh sector between the two countries was resolved 
in less than a week by the two Armies without any intervention by the [sic] Governments of the 
two countries early this month was an indicative of improving relations, which could further go 
up after 12 days long joint military exercises."554   
    The opening ceremony of ‘Hand-in-Hand 2015’ involved performances from both nations, 
including demonstrations of traditional dance and martial arts.  The Indian army selected its 
Naga army regiment to participate, including army officers from different states across the 
country, including Jammu and Kashmir along the LAC.  In addition to counter-terrorism tactics, 
the two armies also trained on tasks involving humanitarian aid and disaster relief.  The exercise 
planners included events for the soldiers in between training, such as physical competitions, 
martial arts, mountain climbing, and tug-of-war organized into mixed-country teams.555  
According to a news report, Chinese Lieutenant General Zhou Xiaozhou asserted that, “the joint 
exercise will play [sic] important role in deepening mutual cooperation and forging a closer 
development partnership.”556  An Indian military officer told reporters that the nations shared a 
common challenge in terrorism and may be forced to operate together in the future; for instance, 
as part of a UN-led force.557 
   In November 2016, China and India conducted their sixth iteration of ‘Hand-in-Hand’, again 
held in Pune, India.  A month before the beginning of the exercise, tensions rose when China 
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blocked India’s effort to obtain membership in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) and India’s 
attempt to declare a Jaish-e-Mohammed chief a terrorist by the UN.  Despite these tensions, the 
exercise went according to plan, with about 170 troops from each country participating.558  A 
reporter covering the exercise for India Today observed, “This exercise has seen [the soldiers] 
coming closer than ever before.  We’ve seen that different companies have Indian elements as 
well as Chinese operating together, so they’re not essentially operating as two different armies, 
they’re in fact operating as one composite force.”  An Indian colonel he interviewed noted, 
“there has been interaction at all levels: from soldier-to-soldier, from NCOs-to-NCOs, and 
officers to officers.” After the end of the training day, soldiers from both sides enjoyed “laughter 
and camaraderie” together, practicing phrases in each other’s languages.  One Indian battalion 
was proud to report it underwent three months of training in Chinese prior to the start of the 
exercise.559   
    In addition to the ‘Hand-in-Hand’ exercise, the two countries held two humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief training events in 2016 alongside the LAC, involving the actual border guards that 
patrolled along the un-demarcated boundary.  The first iteration in February 2016 was held in 
Ladakh (in Jammu and Kashmir) near the Chushul BMP and involved only 30 troops from both 
sides.  An Indian Defense spokesman told reporters the humanitarian relief exercise, “is part of 
the ongoing initiatives being taken by India and China to ensure greater interaction between 
troops stationed along the Line of Actual Control, and thereby ensure peace and tranquility on 
                                                                   
558 “India, China to Hold Joint Military Exercises,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, October 14, 2016, LexisNexis 
Academic. 
559 An NCO is a Non-Commissioned (or enlisted) Officer.  “A Closer Look at India-China Army Exercise,” 
India Today Television, December 3, 2016, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/video/a-closer-look-at-india-china-army-
exercise/1/825969.html. 
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the border.”560  In October, a sequel to the February exercise was again conducted with border 
troops in Chandigarh, Ladakh.  This exercise simulated an earthquake along the LAC that 
required rescue operations and medical assistance by both sets of troops.561 
    At the beginning of this chapter, I offered two trust-building mechanisms that military officers 
use to build trust with their counterparts.  Using the first mechanism of creating a third-party 
threat, in each exercise military planners and commanders from both sides developed scenarios 
that involved counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or humanitarian disasters as mutual threats to 
both countries.  This common military practice of developing enemies and scenarios in training 
events was implemented as a means to remove the focus of hostility off of each other and onto 
another separate objective.  This transition of the hostile threat from each other to a third party 
allowed the two armies plan and train against a common enemy.  The second mechanism 
involved the use of training to develop habits of cooperation among rival soldiers to view each 
other as comrades instead of foes.  The interviews revealed that soldiers often demonize their 
adversaries through stories told by fellow soldiers; thus, planners mix soldiers in units to operate 
shoulder-to-soldier in intense physical training in order to build the camaraderie essential to 
military readiness.  Through these exercises, planners seek to expose soldiers to their rival 
counterparts to see each other as humans and not as animals or mythical creatures.  Moreover, 
officers hope that through annual exercises with different units across both armies, more soldiers 
will gain exposure to their rivals and see them as friends rather than foes. 
 
                                                                   
560 “Indian, Chinese Armies Hold Joint Tactical Exercises in Ladakh,” Central Asian News Service, February 8, 
2016, LexisNexis Academic. 
561 “Joint Indo-China Army Exercise Held,” The Times of India, October 21, 2016, LexisNexis Academic. 
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The Effectiveness of Trust-Developing MMEs 
    Some commentators question the usefulness of these exercises and whether they are effective 
in reducing tensions during crises along the border.562   Major standoffs along the LAC—such as 
the 2013 Depsang incident and, more recently, a crisis in the disputed region of Doklam in June 
2017—cast doubt on the ability of military cooperation to change perceptions about a rival’s 
intentions.  Yet, in addition to my interviews, other senior military officers from both sides of the 
rivalry agree that these trust-developing exercises are having a positive impact on Indo-Chinese 
relations.  As one retired Indian general argues: “There can be no doubt that military CBMs have 
resulted in graduated and reciprocated reduction of tensions along the LAC with practically no 
incidents of cross-border firing in recent times.  This has resulted in lowering of tensions despite 
periodic reports of intrusions and patrols straying across the Line of Actual Control.”563  Chinese 
Senior Colonel Wang Guifang argues in addition to increasing trust at higher diplomatic levels 
and developing mechanisms to prevent crises at the border, India and China should deepen 
military cooperation: “Joint military exercises at the tactical level of the army mark a good start, 
and should develop in the future.”564  
    Despite the tensions that arise during border crises—which sometimes result in soldiers 
throwing rocks at each other—both armies are eventually able to peacefully resolve every 
dispute.  Indian Army General K.T. Parnaik, Chief of Northern Command, noted that the 
                                                                   
562 Jagannath P. Panda, “China-India Joint Military Drill: Time for a Review,” Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses Comment, September 2, 2013, accessed April 23, 2017, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinaIndiaJointMilitaryDrill_jppanda_020913. 
563 Brigadier (ret.) Arun Sahgal, “Sino-Indian Military CBMs—Reducing Tensions, Building Confidence,” in 
Military Confidence-Building and India-China Relations: Fighting Distrust, eds. Dipankar Banerjee and Jabin T. 
Jacob (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2013), 48. 
564 Senior Colonel Wang Guifang, “Viewpoints on Enhancing Military CBMs Along the China-India Border,” 
in Military Confidence-Building and India-China Relations: Fighting Distrust, eds. Dipankar Banerjee and Jabin T. 
Jacob (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2013), 59. 
250 
 
Depsang incident was settled between military units on the border along with higher-level 
diplomacy: “There was a simultaneous effort on the ground, at the tactical level by our 
formations, as well as the dialogue between the two countries at the foreign office level.”565  
General Parnaik noted that because there is no mutually-agreed upon border, both armies patrol 
what they believe to be their territory and sometimes come in contact.  When these standoffs take 
place, soldiers and leaders attempt to de-escalate at their level: “"The entire process is peaceful. 
Whenever there is a face-off, we show manners to each other. We convince each other to de-
escalate the situation. They go to their side and we return to our side.”566  After the incident, 
Chinese PLA officers claimed that the incursion was an “accidental incident” and should not be 
considered an act of aggression or even a crisis; Chinese Major General Chen Zhou, head of the 
PLA Academy of Military Sciences noted, “Emergent incidents, if not addressed in a proper way 
can increase to a crisis, conflict or even war but these incidents themselves cannot be depicted as 
war.  Since the end of the Cold War, China and India have made efforts to prevent such 
accidental incidents with a lot of measure of confidence building.”567  Another 16-day standoff in 
2014 ended through negotiations between Chinese and Indian senior military officers who agreed 
to withdraw their troops and take further measures—such as disassembling observation towers—
to reduce mistrust.568  Given the ambiguous LAC, the fact that the two bordering major powers 
have not fought a war since 1962 or exchanged gunfire in decades is remarkable; CSBMS such 
as military exercises appear to be having an impact.  However, until Indian and Chinese 
                                                                   
565 “India Army Officer Says No Compromise Was Made to End Border ‘Standoff’ with China,” BBC 
Monitoring South Asia, June 17, 2013, LexisNexis Academic. 
566 Ibid. 
567 Quoted in Manu Pubby, “Top China Army Body Says Ladakh Intrusion Was Accidental,” Indian Express, 
July 16, 2013, LexisNexis Academic. 
568 Rajat Pandit, “India, China Set to End 16-Day Chumar Stand-Off by Saturday,” The Times of India, 
September 27, 2014, LexisNexis Academic. 
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government officials agree on a clearly demarcated border, standoffs and crises are likely to 
continue. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
    Though official statements, news reports, and interviews with senior military officers highlight 
the emphasis on building trust to reduce the risk of inadvertent war, are there other motivations 
underlying these efforts that the traditional works in military doctrine would anticipate?  First, 
the traditional approach would expect that major powers conduct exercises for rehearsal or 
deterrence.  In the post-Cold War environment, one could imagine major powers (even rivals) 
cooperating to address natural disasters and terrorism, which are problems for both India and 
China—especially in Ladakh for the former and Xinjiang for the latter.  After all, the exercise 
training tasks were devoted to counterterrorism and disaster response and military officers 
frequently commented on the need to develop joint doctrine to address these types of threats.  
One of my interviewees noted that the secondary objective of these exercises is to prepare for 
actual operations, such as the military response by the US and India to the 2004 tsunami that 
struck multiple Southeast Asian countries.569  However, there is reason to suspect that readiness 
for future missions was more important than building trust between soldiers for several reasons.  
First, though India and China sent responders to Nepal’s earthquake in 2015, I found no evidence 
that the two countries have conducted any joint operations to combat terrorism since the BDCA 
was signed in 2006.570  Some Indian defense analysts doubt the usefulness of counterterrorism 
training between the two countries, especially since, “None of the terrorist groups that threaten 
                                                                   
569 Major General (Indian Army, retired) Dipankar Banerjee, former infantry Division Commander in Jammu 
and Kashmir, phone interview by author, June 19, 2017. 
570 Ibid. 
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India operate from China or vice-versa.”571  Moreover, if Indian and Chinese military leaders 
were preparing for possible UN peacekeeping missions (as some officers implied), then 
traditional peacekeeping tasks such as separating belligerents, protecting citizens, and creating 
safe zones would be more appropriate than attacking insurgent positions, which would violate 
principles of impartiality and neutrality that are critical to UN peacekeeping missions.572   
    Second, the number of troops participating in the exercises are generally too small to be of any 
real operational value.  As a reporter for the India Times noted, “Though largely symbolic with 
just around 100 to 150 soldiers from each side undertaking the counter-terror drills, the exercise 
is seen as a major confidence-building measure between the world’s largest and second-largest 
armies ranged against each other along the 4,057km LAC.”573  Another news agency reported in 
July 2014:  
According to military experts, such joint trainings are more symbolic than 
substantial. The counter terrorism drills are nowhere near as comprehensive as a 
full-fledged exercise between two armies. The larger objective is to expand 
confidence and trust between two militaries, which are often grappling with 
tensions along the border.574   
 
If the two armies were genuinely preparing for potential operations to combat terrorism, the 
exercises would have been larger in scale and refrain from mixing soldiers at the lowest tactical 
level (given the language barrier, operating a small unit with different languages would be nearly 
impossible).  Third, the consistent focus on cultural exchange, friendly competition, and after-
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military-exercises-from-November-4-after-five-years/articleshow/22007225.cms. 
574 Ajay Sura, “India-China Joint Military Exercise on ‘Counter Terror’ on Pakistan Border in November,” The 
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hours socializing point to the exercises’ value in soldier-to-soldier trust-building interactions, not 
on tactical preparedness. 
    The second alternative explanation would expect that these exercises were simply 
opportunities for the Indian and Chinese armies to increase their organizational resources and 
independence.  As with most small-scale MMEs, however, these exercises are generally 
inexpensive and viewed as a low-cost means to build confidence between rivals, as Indian Major 
General (retired) Depankar Banerjee explains: “So both governments, the public as such, in India 
particularly, see these exercises as a good thing, and want to see them continued.  They don’t 
cost a lot of money.  The military can get do some training, they help develop relations, build 
confidence, avoid tensions; they are altogether welcome.  That is the general attitude both among 
the people and between the governments as well.”575  Moreover, as these exercises are intended 
to build goodwill between otherwise adversarial soldiers, a concern for prestige through the 
development of an aggressive offensive spirit also seems inappropriate.   
    Finally, concerning the armies’ desire to increase autonomy from civilian oversight, we would 
expect to observe that military actions are disintegrated from civilian foreign policy or there 
exists some level of contestation between government officials and the military about the value 
and necessity of these programs.  However, these shaping activities are fully integrated with both 
governments’ foreign policy toward one another.  In fact, civilian leaders from both countries 
agreed to these exercises and codified the initiatives into the 2006 Memorandum of 
Understanding and again in the 2013 BDCA, both during visits by either the Indian prime 
                                                                   
575 Major General (Indian Army, retired) Dipankar Banerjee, former infantry Division Commander in Jammu 
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minister or Chinese premier.576  Though the Chinese defense minister is also a military officer, 
the Chinese foreign ministry also supported the 2003 agreement.577  In the case of India, my 
interviews reveal that the coordination for these exercises was a combination of civilian and 
military efforts; for China, the central control of the PLA by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) implies that any major international initiative by the military would be supported by the 
party leadership.578  As Major General Banerjee explains, “Generally both governments support 
this and is seen as a good-will gesture cooperation attempts between potentially hostile 
neighbors.  And so these are therefore well-liked by the respective governments.”579  Lieutenant 
Bajwa agrees: “to take partake in joint exercises between two countries the respective 
governments take a considered decision to do so.  The level and scope of these exercises is also 
approved by the Government.”580  Thus, it appears that these shaping operations are supported by 
civilian officials and military leaders alike.   
 
7.5.  Summary 
When rivals who compete below the threshold of open violence seek to reduce the chance of 
inadvertent war, trust-developing exercises offer a means by which to achieve this goal.  This 
chapter described the purpose of trust-developing exercises, explained why and how major 
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580 Lieutenant General (Indian Army, retired) J.S. Bajwa, former Director General of the Infantry, email 
correspondence with author, August 8, 2017. 
255 
 
powers employ them to reduce strategic uncertainty, and provided an illustrative case study to 
evaluate my argument against the alternative theories.  Major power rivals agree to conduct trust-
developing training events in order to reduce mistrust and the potential for accidental war.  The 
two mechanisms by which these types of MMEs pursue these objectives are by demonstrating 
that third-party threats are the focus of each other’s military efforts and that soldiers from these 
competitive states seek security instead of aggression.  Major powers hope that as more soldiers 
from various units experience training and friendly opportunities with rival troops, they will 
develop a better understanding of each other’s security concerns and view each other as more 
‘human’.  When a crisis does ensue, major powers hope their low-level troops and officers can 
work through the problem and develop a solution. 
    The case of Indo-Chinese military relations from 2006 to 2016 was used to illustrate trust-
developing exercises.  The interviews revealed that Indian soldiers often develop a ‘myth’ that 
Chinese soldiers harbor inherently aggressive intentions; this demonization impacts their views 
of Chinese troops throughout their careers.  By forcing Indian and Chinese soldiers to fraternize 
and train as comrades to fight against non-state threats during ‘Hand-in-Hand’ MMEs, planners 
hope that these soldiers will develop more benign views of their rivals over time.  If troops do 
not presume that soldiers from the other country are fundamentally hostile, they may be able to 
resolve crises along the LAC before the misunderstanding escalates to open, violent conflict.  
The alternative expectations from the traditional works in military doctrine were also considered; 
however, as there have been no actual combined operations between India and China against 
terrorists, the exercise function of rehearsal does not seem to fit.  Moreover, as these training 
events are inexpensive, unrealistic, and supported by each government’s foreign policy, the 
expectations of organization theory are also undermined.  Trust-developing represented the final 
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type of non-traditional MME intended to shape the environment by reducing one source of 
threat.  The following chapter tests the predictions of my argument as well as one of the 
alternatives in the full universe of major power MMEs from 1980 to 2016. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DATA AND LARGE-N REGRESSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
    The previous chapters provided illustrative case studies of the four non-traditional exercise 
types.  The purpose of these studies was to provide partial tests of my two arguments: why major 
powers conduct exercises with non-allies and why these exercises have increased since the end 
of the Cold War.  The case studies evaluated whether major non-traditional MME programs were 
intended to reduce strategic uncertainty or for other purposes; they also revealed that these 
programs were initiated as a response to the uncertainty driven by the rise in violent non-state 
actors (except the trust-developing case, which was intended to reduce the risk of inadvertent 
war between major power rivals).  This chapter provides the second part of my mixed-method 
research design: statistical models.  These quantitative tests are intended to assess several 
predictions of my argument.  These tests include binomial and multinomial logit regressions with 
specifications for random- and conditional fixed-effects using a Time-Series Cross-Sectional 
(TSCS) dataset that I generated from the EUGene software, developed by Scott Bennett and 
Allan Stam.581  This dataset is comprised of over 40,000 ‘partner-years’ (dyads) between each 
major power and every other state in the international system from 1980 to 2016.  I created these 
partner-years from another dataset that I developed using over 1,000 MMEs from news reports, 
military public affairs offices, and another dataset compiled by Vito D’Orazio.582   
    I use statistical models to test four hypotheses that represent my two arguments: two 
hypotheses for each argument.  For the first argument, I test whether non-allied partners are more 
                                                                   
581 Scott D. Bennett and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” International Interactions, Vol. 26 
(2000): 179-204. Version 3.212.  EUGene software can be accessed at http://www.eugenesoftware.la.psu.edu/. 
582 D’Orazio, JME Data v.3, http://www.vitodorazio.com/data.html. 
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likely to conduct shaping or traditional exercises and whether major powers are more likely to 
train with non-allies within their strategic environment (or not).  Regarding the second argument, 
I test whether the uncertainty of the post-Cold War environment is correlated with an increase in 
the likelihood of conducting shaping MMEs, as well as whether exercise relations become 
‘sticky’ or habitual over time.  This chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I explain in detail how I 
developed my two datasets and describe my indicators, variables, and coding methodology for 
my research design.  Second, I describe my hypotheses and models for each of the three groups 
of major powers: the US, the Western Powers, and the Eastern Powers.  Third, I discuss the 
results.  Finally, I summarize the findings of the statistical tests in order to fully evaluate my 
argument and discuss implications in the following chapter—the conclusion. 
 
8.2 Data, Indicators, and Variables 
Describing the Two Datasets  
    The first dataset I compiled includes 1,024 land-based multinational military exercises 
involving at least one major power from 1980-2016.  Each MME includes a specific identifier, 
exercise year, exercise name, location, exercise tasks, start and end dates, length of training event 
(in days), approximate number of troops involved, relevant defense agreement or alliance, 
exercise program/series, exercise program start date, exercise function, region in which exercise 
took place, and state participants.  I compiled most of my observations from a dataset developed 
by Vito D’Orazio—whose set includes all MMEs (not just with major powers)—from 1970-
2010, but added additional exercises, as well as more specific information regarding each 
exercise (namely, exercise task, number of troops, defense agreement/alliance, exercise program 
and start date, as well as function).   
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    I used news reports (e.g. New York Times, Associated Press, or Xinhua General News) and 
military public affairs official statements to determine the observations for each exercise.  
Though most news report were published during or after the training event, a few noted that 
exercises were planned for a future date.  I only included exercises in which I was reasonably 
confident the event took place, such as a regularly scheduled annual event.  I include only land-
based exercises, which I conceptualize as units of soldiers maneuvering on the ground ‘in the 
field’.  This definition does not include seminars, workshops, or military officer exchanges, 
which are not field exercises.  Land-based exercises include amphibious (‘beach landing’) 
training, but exclude strictly computer-simulated, command and staff, naval, air, and air-defense 
exercises (although these may play a supporting role in ground maneuvers).  The reason I 
excluded these other types of exercises is two-fold.  First, I argue that land-based exercises are 
more ‘costly’ than computer-based or staff exercises, which are often attended over the internet 
from a participating country’s home location.  The ease of entry to these types of exercises not 
only makes determining each participant country more difficult, but also questions whether there 
are any costs (economic or political) or trade-offs for attendance.  Without the financial and 
domestic costs of physically sending troops abroad, computer-assisted military training between 
partners seems less puzzling.  Second, I exclude naval or air exercises because not only do they 
serve other functions, they are often difficult to separate from standard patrols; for instance, joint 
naval activity in the Pacific Ocean between the US and India could be considered both an 
operation and an exercise.  Conversely, land exercises are usually (but not always) easier to 
separate from warfare.  Moreover, air and naval exercises are often conducted in the ‘global 
commons’; thus, interoperability and coordination to prevent collisions seem to play a greater 
role in what functions these training events serve.  Exercises must also be truly multinational, 
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meaning participation by at least two countries and not just the use of foreign land by one 
country; for instance, the UK often borrows Kenyan training areas to conduct unilateral 
maneuvers.  There is one exception, however: on a few occasions the Soviet Union would 
conduct a major exercise on its own territory without the participation of other national forces.  I 
include these training events due to the federal nature of the Soviet Union (which separated into 
15 separate states after its collapse) as well as the immensity of the exercises.  
    The second dataset includes over 40,000 partner-years (dyads) of each major power and every 
other state in the international system from 1980-2016.  These partner-years are directed-dyads 
that include a major power and a partner (such as China-Bangladesh); two major powers may 
also comprise a dyad, though I only direct one way (e.g. US-UK, but not the reverse).  Although 
the use of dyads in political science has come under recent scrutiny, I argue that my use of 
‘partner-years’ is valid for two reasons.583  First, because I only include directed dyads between 
seven major powers and the other states in the international system, I avoid issues concerned 
with interdependence between states commonly found in regular dyad datasets.  In other words, 
the variation is largely with the partner, not the entire major power-partner dyad.  Although I 
group all major powers together for most of my tests in this chapter, Appendix C provides 
robustness checks for each individual major power.  Second, although splitting multilateral 
events into bilateral events could be problematic, I argue that MMEs are different from other 
major multinational events, such as wars or treaties.  That is, I believe there is little difference 
between bilateral and multilateral exercises: an exercise between the US and Ghana or one 
between the US, Ghana, and other Asian and European partners are largely similar.  If there is a 
                                                                   
583 For a major critique of the use of dyads (which guides my two points in defense), see Paul Poast, “Dyads Are 
Dead, Long Live Dyads!  The Limits of Dyadic Designs in International Relations Research,” International Studies 
Quarterly, 60 (2016): 369-374. 
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difference, the variation is captured in the MME function, which is included in one of the 
models.  Moreover, these exercises are not as costly as war or treaties: militaries look forward to 
opportunities to send troops for training, even among rival countries.  More importantly, without 
the use of partner-years, I would be consciously selecting on the dependent variable (MMEs that 
actually occur) and unable to observe the variation between partners that are chosen for exercises 
and those that are not; thus, I would not be able to capture the counterfactual ‘non-MME’ and 
would consequently lose leverage over my argument.  Therefore, I argue that partner-years are 
the most optimal method for exploiting variation in MME partners and functions. 
    In order to be included as a partner, a state’s military must comprise at least 1,000 troops, 
which I argue is the least amount of total national troops possible for a state to be considered a 
potential exercise-partner.  Less than 1,000 national troops would call into a question a state’s 
ability to manage military tasks both at home and send soldiers to international exercises.584  
Each partner-year includes standard dyad information, which I generated using the EUgene 
software: country codes, country abbreviations, partners’ regions, whether the partners are 
located in the same region, land contiguity, and distance between capitals (in miles).  However, I 
also individually coded each partner’s ‘fragility’, type of partner, whether the partners were 
allies, whether the partners shared colonial or sovereign history, whether an MME between the 
partners occurred in the year, what function the MME served, and the number of MMEs between 
the dyad-partners.  These partners-years allow me to explore which partners major powers 
choose to exercise with in any given year, which is useful in understanding whether non-allies 
within a major power’s ‘strategic environment’ are chosen over others.  Each indicator and 
variable is explained below. 
                                                                   
584 I gleaned troop-level data from the Correlates of War Project, "National Military Capabilities, v5.0." 
263 
 
Indicators 
     There are several indicators that inform my variables; a comprehensive codebook is listed in 
Appendix A.585  In the first dataset, for exercise name I used the title provided in the report; 
because regular exercises within a program often contain a time-designator (such as ’01 for 
2001), I wrote the entire year in order to avoid confusion with exercises listed in a sequence 
(such as ‘-02 for the second exercise to take place within a program).  I coded exercise tasks 
(conventional-maneuver, peacekeeping-stability, counterinsurgency-counterterror, humanitarian-
disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operation) based on several indicators: 1) specific 
language of news reports, (2) simulated enemy, (3) types of equipment used (infantry soldiers, 
planes, armored tanks, etc.), (4) and political context.  Conventional exercises describe 
traditional military operations and usually include heavy equipment, such as artillery and 
armored vehicles.  Counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism usually listed a “terrorist” or “guerrilla 
threat”, or “special operations”, unless force is so large it would not make sense to fight terrorism 
(e.g. Russian exercises).  Peacekeeping, disaster-relief, and noncombatant evacuation tasks are 
usually specified in the report.  Exercise dates were recorded as accurately as possible; if a report 
clearly stated the start date but only included that the training was a ‘two-week exercise’, I added 
fourteen training days to determine the end date.  Number of Troops were included only if 
specified in the report; I also did not include troop numbers if the report only indicated the 
contribution for one participant.   
    Defense Agreement/Alliance indicate which alliance, security organization, or defense 
agreement was involved with the exercise.  Though funding may derive from one participant 
state (such as the US) as opposed to the exercise organization (e.g. NATO), I include the 
                                                                   
585 A more detailed account of how the indicators inform the variables is available in Chapter 2. 
264 
 
organization because it gives meaning and context to the exercise relationship.  Exercise 
program indicates whether the training is part of a larger exercise relationship (such as annual 
‘Cobra Gold’ exercises), though militaries sometimes use various names for exercise programs; 
for instance, those NATO exercises that serve to deter Russia under the European Reassurance 
Initiative.  However, even within an annual training program, I include individual exercises only 
if they fulfill the ‘land-based’ criteria above; for instance, an amphibious exercise may have been 
maritime-only in past years, while originally land-based field exercises may have evolved into 
computer-based exercises in later years.  There are six regions in which an exercise may take 
place: the Western Hemisphere, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa/Middle East, Asia, 
and Oceania.  This regional coding follows the Correlates of War Codebook for Intrastate Wars 
(version 4.0), with the exception of adding North Africa to the Middle East.586  Rarely, exercises 
will extend over multiple regions (such as Russian-led exercises into both Europe and Asia) and 
are coded as including both regions.  Participants include those state militaries that provided 
soldiers to conduct maneuvers in the exercise; if the report specified, I excluded ‘observers’ or 
‘monitors’ that did not directly take part in the training event. 
    For the second dataset, I coded other variables in addition to those included with the EUGene 
software.587  The variable allies is determined by whether the partners constitute ‘allies’ 
according to my definition described in Chapter 1: formal defense pact alliance or coalition 
partners.  Partners are considered allies if they are both signatories to a “Type I Defense Pact” 
delineated by Douglas Gibler’s coding for the Correlates of War project; however, these defense 
pacts must be exercised as an active alliance either through deployments or deterrence against 
                                                                   
586 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Codebook for the Instate State Wars v. 4.0: Definitions and Variables,” Correlates 
of War Project. 2017. Online, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war. 
587 Note- the only exception is ‘regions’.  Because I use six regions (to include Oceania) in the first dataset but 
only five in the second (without Oceania), I include states within Oceania in the Asian region. 
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another state.588  Thus, I do not consider the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to 
be an alliance, despite the formal defense-pact document signed by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in 1992 (and again in 2003).  I argue the CSTO 
represents more of a security organization intended to regulate member behavior and respond to 
non-state threats, since there have been no CSTO deployments since its inception and the Central 
Asian states are of little use for deterrence against NATO.589  However, I include Belarus as a 
defense-ally of Russia due to its strong military capabilities and additional defense agreements 
with Russia.  I also exclude the Organization of American States (OAS) and the US-Pakistan 
alliance after 1991, despite the Type I Defense Pact coding by Gibler: these military 
relationships have not conducted any major deployments and has not been useful for deterrence 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  However, I include the US alliance with Japan, South 
Korea, and the Philippines as useful for deterrence against China or North Korea since 1991.  
Coalition partners that contribute troops to a major-power led multinational mission are also 
included as allies; thus, general UN-missions without a major power-lead are not included as 
‘coalition partners’.  A list of coalition partners per multinational mission is listed in Appendix 
B. 
    Partner Type is determined by (1) whether the partners are allies, (2) whether partners are 
rivals, and if not in the category of the first two: (3) level of state fragility.  I coded state fragility 
using the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index from 1995 to 2015, all the years 
available from the organization.  Because there was no data for 2016, I used each state’s fragility 
                                                                   
588 Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648-2008, Volume 2, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2009). 
589 Regarding the CSTO as a collective security organization intended to regulate behavior among member 
states and jointly respond to non-state threats (rather than collective defense against an external state threat), see 
Gregory Gleason and Marat E. Shaihutdinov, “Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia,” International 
Studies Perspectives Vol. 6 (2005): 274-284. 
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score from 2015 for the following year.590  To include an indicator for state fragility for the years 
before 1995 (the years in which scores are not available), I used GNI per capita as a proxy, 
provided by the World Bank.591  Rivals represent states with a history of intense security 
competition and are viewed as substantial threats to each other’s security.  To define rivals, I use 
those major powers delineated as ‘strategic rivals’ by William R. Thompson.  He determines 
rivalries based on qualitative measures of state leaders’ perceptions of state threats and defines 
strategic rivals as: “The actors in question must regard each other as (a) competitors, (b) the 
source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and (c) 
enemies.”592   However, as his list only covers the international system until 1999, I extend and 
add to his list in order to cover the years through 2016.  Specifically, I include China and Russia 
as US rivals (and vice-versa) from 2014-2016; in March 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine (and the 
US cancelled military exercises), while China became more assertive in the East and South 
China seas.  Both China and Russia were included as current or potential threats in the US 2015 
National Security Strategy, with stronger language than in years past.593  The following rivalries 
include only the dates for which I am concerned (1980-2016).  For the US, strategic rivals are 
China (2014-2016), Russia (1980-1989, 2014-2016) and Cuba (1980-2015); for Russia, rivals are 
China (1980-1989), the US (1980-1989, 2014-2016), Georgia (2008-2016), and Ukraine, Latvia, 
                                                                   
590 Monty G. Marshall, “Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946-2016,” Center for Systemic Peace, June 15, 
2017, accessed June 21, 2017, http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm.   For time series data of state 
fragility, see “State Fragility Index and Matrix, Time Series Data, 1995-2015,” Center for Systemic Peace, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
591 “GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (Current US$),” The World Bank, Online Database, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD. 
592 Rivals are generally roughly symmetric in capabilities and maintain a history of strategic competition.  
William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
45, No. 4 (Dec. 2001): 560, 570-573. 
593 The White House, National Security Strategy, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 
2015), 2, 4, 10, 13, 24.  See also Nathan J. Lucas and Kathleen J. McInnis, “The 2015 National Security Strategy: 
Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (April 5, 2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44023.pdf. 
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Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland (2014-2016); for China, Russia (1980-1989), Taiwan (1980-
2016), Vietnam (1980-2016), India (1980-2016), and the US (2014-2016).  For India, rivals are 
China and Pakistan (1980-2016).  For Britain, the only current rival is Argentina, while France 
and Germany maintain no contemporary rivals. 
    Fragile states are those countries that are considered to have ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ fragility 
based on the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index.  Specifically, fragile states 
received a score of 16-25 between the years 1995-2016; from 1980-1994, I assumed $1,000 (in 
2016 US dollars) or below represented a ‘fragile’ state, based on the 1995 conversion of Papua 
New Guinea, the highest GNI per capita with state fragility score of 16.  
Transitioning/consolidating states are those which were considered to have ‘serious’, 
‘moderate’, or ‘low fragility’, receiving a fragility score of 3-15; for the years before 1995, I 
assume these states’ GNI per capita was between $1,001 and $3,180, which was based on 
Poland’s state fragility score of 3 in 1995.  Potential allies have fragility scores between 0 and 2, 
or GNI/capita of $3,181 and above.  For the NATO major powers, I also include as potential 
allies those states within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 
1994-2000, as those states were all invited to join NATO’s PfP program and assist in 
peacekeeping starting in 1994.  For all categories, if neither the fragility score nor the GNI per 
capita data were available, I assumed the ‘closest’ status: either in the previous or next years.  If 
there was no closest year, I used GNI per capita.  For states that were later unified or split (such 
as Yemen and Czechoslovakia), I used the former part of country in which the data was available 
in to determine partner type.  Exercise Type details what function the exercise served.  If there 
were more than one MME between a dyad in a given year, I listed the function that was most 
common (for instance, two rehearsals and one building-capacity would be coded as ‘rehearsal’).  
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If there were equal number of different exercise functions, I chose the function that worked 
against my theory.  For instance, if a non-ally conducts one deterrence and one recruitment 
exercise in a given year, I chose ‘deterrence’ because it works against my argument that non-
allies mostly conduct non-traditional exercise functions.  For coding purposes, I included ‘role-
forming’ and ‘building capacity’ in the same category because they are often difficult to 
distinguish in news reports.  MME Frequency lists the number of exercises between a dyad 
partnership in the given year.  Below are descriptions of dependent, explanatory, and control 
variables.  Descriptive statistics are provided in Figure 8.1. 
Dependent Variables 
    Below is a list of the dependent variables; Shaping MME and MME Type serve as outcomes 
for both parts of my first hypothesis, while MME is the dependent variable for Hypotheses 2, 3, 
and 4.   
1. Shaping MME (H1a): whether the partner-dyad conducted a non-traditional (‘shaping’) 
exercise or a traditional exercise in a given year (“1” if the exercise function is non-
traditional, “0” if traditional).   
2. MME Type (H1a): what function the exercise served (“1” for deterrence/rehearsal, “2” for 
rehearsal, “3” for trust-developing, “4” for role-forming/capacity-building, “5” for 
recruitment). 
3. MME (H2, H3, and H4): a binary (“dummy”) variable describing whether the dyad conducted 
an MME during the year (“1” if yes, “0” if no). 
 
 
 
269 
 
Explanatory Variables 
    Below are the explanatory variables; Non-ally and Partner Type represent my argument for 
Hypothesis 1, the geographic variables (Same Region) and Colonial/Sovereign History are tested 
in Hypothesis 2, Post-Cold War is used to explain my argument to be tested in Hypothesis 3, and 
Past MME is intended test my argument in Hypothesis 4. 
1. Non-Ally (H1b): whether the major power’s partner was a non-ally or ally (“1” for non-ally, 
“0” for ally). 
2. Partner Type (H1b): type of partner with whom the major power conducted an MME (“1” for 
ally, “2” for rival, “3” for fragile state, “4” for transitioning/consolidating state, “5” for 
potential ally). 
3. Geographic Variables: Same Region and Contiguity (H2): Same region is whether the major 
power is located in the same region as the partner, or not (“1” if same region, “0” if not).  
Contiguity is whether the partners shared a territorial border, or not (“1” if shared border, “0” 
if not). 
4. Colonial/Sovereign History (H2): partners may have once been a colony of a major power or 
formerly under the sovereign rule of the major power (such as the Soviet republics).  Using 
the Correlates of War Project’s typology, any state that was coded as a ‘colony’, ‘mandated 
to’, ‘protectorate’ or ‘part of’ a major power in the past is considered to have former colonial 
or sovereign history with the major power.594  This variable reveals whether the partners 
shared colonial history, or not (“1” if shared history, “0” if not). 
                                                                   
594 Colonial and sovereign history was determined using the Correlates of War Project’s Colonial/Dependency 
Contiguity dataset.  See Correlates of War Project. 2017, "Colonial Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.1.” 
Online, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/colonial-dependency-contiguity. 
270 
 
5. Post-Cold War (H3): a binary variable indicating either “1” for the post-Cold War period 
(1992-2016), or “0” for Cold War period (1980-1991).  I chose 1991-1992 as the transition 
because the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, creating more uncertainty for military 
planning thereafter. 
6. Past MME (H4): whether the partner-dyad conducted an MME in the past, or not (“1” if yes, 
“0” if no), with the following timeframes: Past MME, 1 Year (previous year), Past MME, 2 
Years (two years ago), Past MME, 4 Years (four years ago). 
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8.3 Hypotheses and Models 
    In order to statistically test my arguments, I develop four hypotheses: two for each argument.  
My models are binomial and multinomial logit regressions which use Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) to estimate the coefficients and marginal predictions to interpret the results.595  
My base models for each hypothesis are standard logit regressions with robust (dyad-clustered) 
standard errors; in order to account for temporal dependence, I also include a lagged dependent 
variable in the second model.596  In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity both within 
and between units (dyads) in the TSCS data, I also include models that apply random effects and 
conditional fixed effects specifications (for those models that incorporate time-variant 
variables).597  In order to interpret the results of each model that includes random effects, I 
employ the ‘SPost’ Stata commands developed by Long and Freese in order to create predictions 
tables.598 
                                                                   
595 I use Stata version 14.1 to develop and estimate my models.  StataCorp, Stata Statistical Software: Release 
14 (College Station: StataCorp LP, 2015). 
596 The use of lagged dependent variables in dynamic models (such as time-series) is controversial: some argue 
that lagged DVs create bias, while others argue that omitting lagged DVs does the same.  To mitigate these 
concerns, I include lagged DVs as a control in nested models (hypotheses 1-3), so the reader can observe the impact 
both of the inclusion or exclusion of lagged MMEs on the explanatory variables.  When I use lagged MMEs as the 
explanatory variables (hypothesis 4), they are the only variables included, which mitigates the concern of lagged 
DVs impacting other explanatory variables.  On the costs and benefits of including lagged DVs, see Luke Keele and 
Nathan J. Kelly, “Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: The Inns and Outs of Lagged Dependent Variables,” 
Political Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 2006): 186-205.  For a more recent discussion, see Allan Dafoe, 
“Nonparametric Identification of Causal Effect Under Temporal Dependence,” Sociological Methods and Research, 
Vol. 47, No. 2 (2018): 136-168. 
597 I use the term “fixed effects model” synonymously with “conditional fixed effects model” in the manner of 
the Stata Reference Manual; see StataCorp. Stata 14 Base Reference Manual (College Station: Stata Press, 2015).  I 
also borrow modeling techniques for Stata from Paul D. Allison, Fixed Effects Regression Models (Thousand Oaks: 
Sage, 2009), 28-47.  I do not include lagged dependent variables in the models applying random or conditional fixed 
effects specifications since lagged DVs cause a unit endogenous effect and bias in these types of models.  See Paul 
Allison, “Don’t Put Lagged Dependent Variables in Mixed Models,” Statistical Horizons, June 2, 2015, 
https://statisticalhorizons.com/lagged-dependent-variables.  
598 I only apply postestimation with random effects models and not fixed effects models because Stata’s 
‘margins’ command for fixed effects assumes the fixed effect is zero, which is not a true assumption for my models.  
See StataCorp. Stata 14 Base Reference Manual at https://www.stata.com/manuals14/xtxtlogit.pdf.  MPost 
commands are provided by J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent 
Variables Using Stata (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2014).   
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    My first hypothesis is split into two parts (a and b) and tests one part of my first argument: 
whether major powers non-allies are more likely to conduct non-traditional (‘shaping’) exercises 
with non-allies than allies.  I also determine which type of partner is more likely to conduct 
which type of exercise.  Because my argument rests on the assumption that major powers 
conduct shaping exercises with non-allies in order to reduce uncertainty, observing no difference 
between the types of exercises in which non-allies participate would undermine my argument.  
Part A of my first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1a (Argument One: General Partner-Type): With non-allies, major powers are more likely to 
conduct non-traditional (recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, or trust-developing) than 
traditional exercises. 
 
In other words, I would expect that non-allies are more likely to conduct shaping MMEs than 
traditional MMEs (rehearsal and deterrence).  Moreover, although allies sometimes participate in 
shaping MMEs, I would expect that non-allies are more likely to conduct these exercises than 
allies.  To test H1a, I conduct logit regressions with binary outcomes: my dependent variable is 
Shaping MME and my explanatory variable is Non-Ally.  I also apply both random and fixed 
effects to my model.  The conditional fixed effects model for H1a is mathematically expressed as: 
ln 
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑚⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)⁡
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑏⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)
 = αit + xit βm|b + uit 
Where:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡= Shaping MME for unit “i” and time “t” (either shaping “1” or traditional “0”); 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = Non-
Ally for unit “i” and time “t” (non-ally “1” or ally “0”); αit = within-unit time-invariant effect; i = 
1,…n units (partner-dyads), t = 1,…T years; uit = error term. 
 
    The second part of the hypothesis (H1b) tests a finer-grained argument: that certain partners 
conduct certain types of exercises.  A decision tree for partner-selection based on MME function 
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is depicted as Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3.  In general, I expect allies to conduct deterrence and 
rehearsal exercises, rivals to conduct trust-developing, fragile states to conduct capacity-
building, transitioning/consolidating states to conduct role-forming, and potential allies to 
conduct recruitment.  Hypothesis 1b is as follows: 
H1b (Argument One: Specific Partner-Type): Certain partners are more likely to participate in 
certain MME functions: allies conduct deterrence and rehearsal, rivals conduct trust-
developing, fragile states conduct capacity-building, transitioning/consolidating states conduct 
role-forming, and potential allies conduct recruitment exercises. 
 
In order to test H1b, I use a multinomial logit model using clustered partners (though not 
clustered by year, since I observe multinomial properties and marginal effects).  My dependent 
variable is MME Function and my explanatory variable is Partner-Type.  My model for H1b is 
mathematically expressed as: | 
 
ln 
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑚⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)⁡
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑏⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)
 = αit + xit βm|b + uit 
Where:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡=MME Type for unit “i” and time “t” (deterrence/rehearsal “1”, rehearsal “2”, trust-
developing “3”, role-forming/capacity-building “4”, recruitment “5”); 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = Partner Type for unit 
“i” and time “t” (allies “1”, rivals “2”, fragile state “3”, transitioning/consolidating state “4”, 
potential ally “5”); αit = within-unit time-invariant effect; i = 1,…n units (partner-dyads), t = 
1,…T years; uit = error term. 
 
    My second hypothesis tests whether major powers are more likely to conduct exercises with 
non-allies within their strategic environment; or conversely, major powers do not discern 
between partners within and outside of their strategic environments.  If major powers do not 
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discern between non-allies within and outside of their strategic environments, my argument 
about shaping operations would be challenged.  My second hypothesis is: 
H2 (Argument One: Strategic Environments): Major powers are more likely to conduct MMEs 
with non-allies in their ‘strategic environments’ than with other states outside of their strategic 
environments. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, I apply a binomial conditional logit regression model for each 
major power.  My dependent variable is MME and my explanatory variables are Same Region, 
Colonial/Sovereign History, and Contiguity.  I also control for Lag MME to ensure past exercises 
do not significantly alter the results.  I condition on Non-Ally since I am interested in non-allied 
exercises.  My most inclusive fixed effects model for testing H2 is mathematically expressed as: 
 
ln 
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑚⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)⁡
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑏⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)
 = αit + x1it β1,m|b + x2it β2,m|b + x3it β3,m|b + uit 
Where:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡= MME for unit “i” and time “t” (MME “1” or not “0”); 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 = Same Region for unit “i” and 
time “t” (same region “1” or not “0”); 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 = Colonial/Sovereign History for unit “i” and time “t” 
(former sovereign unit “1” or not “0”);⁡𝑥3𝑖𝑡 = Contiguity for unit “i” and time “t” (contiguous “1” 
or not “0”); αit = within-unit time-invariant effect; i = 1,…n units (partner-dyads), t = 1,…T 
years; uit = error term. 
 
    My third hypothesis tests the first part of my second argument: that shaping exercises have 
increased due to the uncertainty wrought by the post-Cold War rise in non-state threats.  
Specifically, my hypothesis is as follows: 
H3 (Argument Two: Increase in Uncertainty): Major powers are more likely to conduct shaping 
exercises when uncertainty is greater; that is, after the fall of communism (1992-2016) rather 
than before (1980-1991).  
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In order to test this hypothesis, I create a binary variable for the post-Cold War Era (“1” if year is 
between 1992-2016, “0” if between 1980 and 1991).  Thus, my dependent variable is Shaping 
MME and my explanatory variable is Post-Cold War; I also condition on Non-Ally.  I chose the 
year 1991 because I argue that uncertainty rose after the fall of communism in Europe, which 
mainly occurred for both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1991.  Though using a time period 
as an explanatory variable may be a less than ideal measure of uncertainty, I argue that it is better 
than alternate measures, such as number of terrorist incidents or civil wars.  These measures are 
vulnerable to problems of endogeneity since militaries actively combat these threats while 
simultaneously attempting to prevent future ones.  That is, because militaries use force against 
non-state threats (while simultaneously conducting non-traditional MMEs to manage the 
uncertainty of other threats), cause and effects are difficult to determine using political science 
metrics.  Moreover, a military’s sense of ‘uncertainty’ does not have to conform to reality: even 
though a military actively combats threats using force, it can never be perfectly certain that no 
threats remain and, thus, may continue to increase the number of exercises in subsequent years.  
In other words, major powers can never be ‘sure’ they are ‘complete’ with non-state threats.  My 
model is formally annotated as: 
ln 
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑚⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)⁡
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑏⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)
 = αit + xit βm|b + uit 
Where:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡= Shaping MME for unit “i” and time “t” (either shaping “1” or traditional “0”); 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = Post-
Cold War (1992-2016 “1”, or before “0”); αit = within-unit time-invariant effect; i = 1,…n units 
(partner-dyads), t = 1,…T years; uit = error term. 
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    My final hypothesis determines whether there is anything ‘sticky’ or habitual about military 
exercise relations between a major power and a partner, which is important to my theory because 
I argue that habitual military relations are partly responsible for the rise in MMEs since the end 
of the Cold War.  In order test this proposition, I employ a binomial logit regression model: my 
explanatory variable—MME Lag—is a lagged variable that captures whether a partner-dyad 
conducted an MME in the previous year, or not.  I use a lagged variable to understand whether 
an MME in the past year helps predict MMEs (me dependent variable) in the future.  As in the 
other models, I also condition on Non-Ally and apply year, region, and partner fixed-effects 
specifications.  My hypothesis reads: 
H4 (Argument Two: Habitual Exercise Relations): Major powers are more likely to conduct 
MMEs with non-allies with which they have conducted MMEs in the past. 
 
The results of this hypothesis will help me determine whether habitual exercise relations are 
partly responsible for the increase in MMEs since the end of the Cold War. 
 
ln 
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑚⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)⁡
Pr⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑏⁡|⁡𝑥𝑖𝑡)
 = αit + xit βm|b + x2it β2,m|b + x3it β3,m|b + uit 
Where:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ⁡𝑀𝑀𝐸⁡for⁡unit⁡“i”⁡and⁡time⁡“t”⁡(MME⁡“1”⁡or⁡not⁡“0”);⁡𝑥1𝑖𝑡= Past MME, 1 Year (yes “1” 
or no “0”); 𝑥2𝑖𝑡= Past MME, 2 Years (yes “1” or no “0”); 𝑥3𝑖𝑡= Past MME, 4 Years (yes “1” or 
no “0”); αit = within-unit time-invariant effect; i = 1,…n units (partner-dyads), t = 1,…T years; 
uit = error term. 
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8.4 Results 
Hypothesis 1 (Parts A and B): Non-Allies and Shaping Exercises 
    Table 8.1 displays the results of the impact of partner-type on choice of exercise-type (shaping 
vs. traditional).  Model 1 is the base model, Model 2 includes a lagged dependent variable, 
Model 3 applies random effects, and Model 4 applies fixed effects.  The Bayesian Information 
Criterian (BIC) is lowest in Model 3, which informs me that it is the strongest of the four models, 
though the number of observations is lower than the others due to the dropped cases when there 
was no previous dyad-year.  In each of the models, non-allies are still far more likely to conduct 
shaping MMEs than traditional MMEs. 
 
 
Model 1 
Base Model 
Model 2 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 3 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 4 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Non-Ally 1.785*** 1.139*** 2.222*** 1.160*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.16) 
(0.23) 
Lagged DV  2.740***   
  (0.17)  
 
Constant -0.168*   -1.643*** 0.134  
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.108 0.326  0.012 
N 3610 1965 3610 2508 
BIC 4362 1857 3906 2382 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table 8.1: Results for H1a with Robustness Checks 
 
Because the interpretation of coefficients is difficult with logit regressions, I interpret estimates 
using marginal predictions postestimation techniques.599  Table 8.2 below shows a predictions 
table that interprets Models 2 and 3 above, which reveals that non-allies have between a 27% and 
                                                                   
599 On the difficulty in interpreting logit results by observing the coefficients, see Long and Freese, 133-184. 
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32% greater probability of conducting shaping MMEs than allies.  Moreover, since the 
probability of non-allies conducting shaping MMEs is bewteen 72% and  85%, this implies that 
non-allies are only 15% to 28% likely to conduct a traditional MME. 
 
Non-Ally 
Probability of Conducting  
Shaping MME 
(Model 2) 
Probability of Conducting  
Shaping MME 
(Model 3) 
0 .449 0.524 
1 .718 0.848 
Difference .269 .32 
Table 8.2: Predictions Table for H1a  
 
Figure 8.2 below provides a margins plot for the probability of conducting each function for each 
partner type.600  The figure reveals that allies are most likely to conduct deterrence/rehearsal 
exercises, followed closely by recruitment.  Interestingly, rivals are most likely to conduct 
deterrence and recruitment training since trust-developing exercises are extremely rare.  Fragile 
states are most likely to conduct role-forming/capacity-building exercises, followed by 
recruitment.  Transitioning/consolidating states are most likely to conduct role-forming/capacity-
building, as well as recruitment exercies.  Potential allies are most likely to conduct role-
forming/capacity-building, followed by recruitment exercises.  The figure provides positive 
results for my predictions, except for two cases: I would expect rivals to conduct more trust-
developing exercises and potential allies to conduct more recruitment exercises.  However, trust-
developing exercises are rare (the US has only conducted six land-based trust-developing 
                                                                   
600 Note- the model used for this margins plot does not include time-dependence because Stata’s xtlogit 
command does not estimate non-binary dependent variables; see “xtolgit” in StataCorp, Stata 14 Base Reference 
Manual.  Instead, I use the “mlogit” command similar to Allison’s use in Fixed Effects Regression Models, 44-46. 
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exercises), and sometimes potential allies also help the US role-form and build the capacity of 
other states.  Moreovever, sometimes rivals are included in large rehearsal exercises as a means 
to develop trust, though this is not the main purpose of the exercise.  Regardless, there is a clear 
indiciation that non-allies conduct more non-traditional exerices than deterrence or rehearsals. 
 
Figure 8.2: Margins Plot for H1b 
 
Hypothesis 2: Non-Allies and Strategic Environments 
    I expect that major powers choose non-allied partners based on their location within each of 
the major power groups’ strategic environments.  Eastern powers (China, India, and Russia) 
generally train within their region, along their borders, and, especially for Russia, with former 
Soviet republics.  Western powers (Germany, France, and the UK) conduct exercises in Europe 
and with their former colonies.  Due to the US grand strategy of primacy, American training 
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takes place all over the globe.  Table 8.3 below lists the results of my binomial models for each 
grouping of major powers.  Model 5 tests the power of the explanatory variable (Same Region) 
against the probability of conducting an MME.  Model 6 includes sovereign and colonial history, 
Model 7 includes territorial contiguity, and Model 8 includes all geographic and historical 
variables, including a control for last year’s MME.  Model 9 includes all covariates (except the 
lagged DV) as well as random effects specifications.  Regarding, first, the Eastern powers shown 
in Table 8.3 below, it appears that being in the same region and part of the sovereign history of a 
major power greatly increases the likelihood of conducting an MME.  A non-allied partner’s 
location on the border was also significantly positive (Model 7) but is better explained by 
sovereign history (Model 8).  The predictions table reveals that being in the same region and part 
of the sovereign history of one of the Eastern powers increases the likelihood of conducting an 
MME by between 6% and 12%. 
 
Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region 1.764*** 1.199* 1.239* 0.958*** 2.650*** 
 (0.32) (0.54) (0.52) 
(0.27) (0.40) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit  2.271**  1.419*** 2.267*** 
  (0.71)  
(0.41) (0.62) 
Contiguity   1.415* 0.676 0.776 
   (0.58) 
(0.39) (0.56) 
Lagged DV    4.043***  
    (0.25)  
Constant -4.560*** -4.631*** -4.583*** -5.102*** -7.258*** 
 (0.28) (0.22) (0.26) (0.14) (0.36) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.071 0.135 0.097 0.352  
N 17378 17378   17378 16862 17378 
BIC 3021 2824 2946 2128   2206 
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table 8.3: Results for H2 (Eastern Powers) 
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Same Region 
Colony/ Sovereign 
Unit 
Probability of 
Conducting MME 
(Model 8) 
Probability of 
Conducting MME 
(Model 9) 
0 0 .007 .005 
0 1 .027 .025 
1 0 .017 .034 
1 1 .068 .129 
Table 8.4: Predictions Table for H2 (Eastern Powers) 
 
Concerning the European powers, Table 8.5 provides support for the argument that these powers 
are concerned about uncertainty in Europe and within their former colonies.   They are less 
concerned about exercises along their borders (given the few borders), but exercises with former 
colonies is a priority.  The predictions table (8.6) shows that being within Europe and a former 
colony increases the probability of non-allied participation by between 8% and 12% (driven 
largely by Cyprus and Ireland with the UK). 
 
Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region 1.007*** 1.137*** 1.039*** 1.095*** 1.463*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
(0.16) (0.24) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit  0.579**  0.463** 0.765*** 
  (0.20)  
(0.16) (0.23) 
Contiguity   -1.085 -0.776   -0.864 
   (0.85) 
(0.91) (1.04) 
Lagged DV    2.788***  
    (0.16)  
Constant   -3.287*** -3.447*** -3.287*** -3.721*** -4.328*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.016 0.023   0.017   0.137  
N 13430 13430 13430 12952 13430 
BIC 4587 4565 4594 4000 4191 
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table 8.5: Results for H2 (Western Powers) 
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Same Region 
Colony/ Sovereign 
Unit 
Probability of 
Conducting MME 
(Model 8) 
Probability of 
Conducting MME 
(Model 9) 
0 0 .026 .026 
0 1 .041 .045 
1 0 .074 .090 
1 1 .113 .145 
Table 8.6: Predictions Table for H2 (Western Powers) 
 
For the US, Table 8.7 shows that US is more likely to conduct MMEs with non-allies that are 
located outside of the Western Hemisphere.  Moreover, because of limited colonial and 
sovereign history—the US shares colonial history with the UK but the two states are allies and, 
thus, not included in the model—US exercises cannot be predicted by political history.  
However, none of the explanatory variables are statistically significant in the random effects 
model (Model 9), which informs us that both geography and sovereign history are poor 
predictors of US exercise choices.  Because of US grand strategy, this makes sense: American 
army units are responsible for shaping all over the world so selecting a particular geographic area 
is not possible.  Because the predictors are not significant, I do not include a predictions table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284 
 
 
 
Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region   -0.508* -0.508* -0.492* -0.506* -0.470 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 
(0.20) (0.38) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit    0.000    0.000   0.000 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Contiguity   -0.541** -0.341* -0.265 
   (0.20) 
(0.17)    (1.89) 
Lagged DV    2.627***    
    (0.25)  
Constant -2.145*** -2.145*** -2.145*** -2.651*** -2.768*** 
 (0.15) (0.15)   (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.004   0.004   0.004   0.163    
N 4387 4387 4387 4258   4387 
BIC 2833 2833 2833 2361 2444 
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table 8.7: Results for H2 (USA) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Shaping Exercises and Post-Cold War Uncertainty 
    The first part of my argument assumes that major powers have expanded shaping MMEs due 
to an increase in strategic uncertainty associated with the rise of non-state actors after the end of 
the Cold War.  If there is no difference in likelihood of conducting shaping MMEs during the 
Cold War or after, then my argument would be weakened.  The results of my models are 
displayed in Table 8.8 below.  Models 10-13 estimate the probability of conducting a shaping 
exercise after the end of the Cold War.  Model 10 is the base model, Model 11 includes a lagged 
DV, Model 12 applies random effects, and Model 13 applies fixed effects.  All models reveal 
that shaping exercises are more likely to take place after the end of the Cold War.  The 
predictions table (8.9) uses margins to provide predictions of Models 11 and 12, revealing that 
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partners have between a 50% and 65% greater probability of conducting a shaping exercise 
following the end of the Cold War (i.e. collapse of the Soviet Union) than before. 
 
 
Model 10 
Base Model 
Model 11 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 12 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 13 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Post-Cold War 3.880*** 3.100*** 5.021*** 4.571*** 
 (0.40) (0.54) (0.39) 
(0.51) 
Lagged DV  2.651***   
  (0.16)  
 
Constant -3.176*** -4.281*** -3.307***  
 (0.41) (0.54) (0.37) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2   0.141 0.329  0.133 
N 3610 1965 3610 2508 
BIC 4204  1849 3636 2091 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table 8.8: Results for H3 
 
 
Post-Cold 
War 
Probability of Conducting 
Shaping MME 
(Model 11) 
Probability of Conducting 
Shaping MME 
(Model 12) 
0 .053 .099 
1 .552 .750 
Difference .499 .651 
Table 8.9: Predictions Table for H3 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Habitual Exercise Relations 
    To test part of my second argument, I evaluate whether non-allies are more likely to conduct 
MMEs with major powers if they have also conducted joint exercises in the past.  Table 8.10 
below reveals that conducting MMEs in the past is a significant predictor of exercises in the 
future.  Model 14 tests only an MME in the past year, Model 12 tests MMEs in the past year, two 
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years prior, and four years prior, Model 13 includes the same variables using random effects, and 
Model 14 includes the variables with fixed effects.601  The predictions table (8.11) shows that the 
probability of non-allied participation in an MME increases by 86% if the non-ally has 
conducted exercises in the past year, two years prior, and four years prior.  Thus, the results 
support the argument that exercise relations are ‘sticky’ or habitual over time. 
 
 
Model 14 
Past MME  
(1 Year) 
Model 15 
Past MMEs  
(1, 2, and 4 Years) 
Model 16 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 17 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Past MME, 1 Year 3.479*** 2.427*** 1.771*** 1.153*** 
 (0.13) (0.10) 
(0.10) (0.08) 
Past MME, 2 Years  1.807*** 1.255*** 0.763*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Past MME, 4 Years  1.666*** 1.064*** 0.594*** 
  (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) 
Constant -3.718*** -3.843*** -4.310***    
 (0.06) (0.05) 
(0.08)  
   
  
Pseudo-R2 0.188 0.260    0.075   
N 34072 30714   30714 10548 
BIC 9048   7862   7744 4964 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table 8.10: Results for H4 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
601 As opposed to the other hypotheses, I include random and fixed effects models with lagged dependent 
variables in Hypothesis 4 since the only variables used are lags; thus, there will be no effect of lagged variables on 
non-lagged variables.  The reader can compare the results of the base models with the random and fixed effects 
models in Table 8.10; however, I only conduct postestimation with the base model in Table 8.11 in order to avoid 
concerns with the impact of lagged variables on the coefficients of other variables. 
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One-Year Lag 
MME 
Two-Year 
Lag MME 
Four-Year 
Lag MME 
Probability of 
Conducting MME 
(Model 15) 
0 0 0 .021 
0 0 1 .102 
0 1 0 .116 
0 1 1 .409 
1 0 0 .195 
1 0 1 .562 
1 1 0 .597 
1 1 1 .887 
Table 8.11: Predictions Table for H4 
 
8.7 Summary and Discussion 
    The intent of this chapter was to test my arguments using large-N regression analysis of major 
powers and all other states in the international system from 1980-2016.  These tests were 
designed to supplement my illustrative case studies by applying my argument to the entire 
‘universe of cases’, which exploits variation through counterfactual reasoning.  I developed four 
hypotheses, two for each main argument, and tested whether my predictions were supported or 
undermined.  In terms of my first argument—that major powers conduct MMEs with non-allies 
in order to reduce strategic uncertainty—I tested two propositions: that non-allies were more 
likely to conduct shaping MMEs than traditional exercises and that major powers chose non-
allied partners based on their location within a strategic environment.  If major powers conducted 
just as many shaping MMEs with both allies and non-allies, or major powers did not discriminate 
between non-allies within or outside of their environments, my argument would be undermined.  
However, my theory is confirmed by the positive results of the tests: it appears that non-allies are 
far more likely to conduct shaping MMEs and largely select non-allies based on their location 
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within a strategic environment.  For China, India, and Russia, non-allies their same region (Asia 
for China and India, Europe for Russia), along the border, and formerly part of the Soviet Union 
were more likely to conduct exercises.  For France, Germany, and the UK, non-allies within 
Europe and former colonies were also more likely to engage in joint training.  For the US, 
though there is a slight negative correlation between being in the same region and probability of 
joint training, the results were not significant, which reveals that because of US deep 
engagement, geographic and political history indicators are poor predictors of partner-choice. 
    My second argument contends that shaping MMEs have increased due to an increase in 
uncertainty wrought by the rise of non-state actors after the end of the Cold War.  This rise was a 
consequence of the collapse of communism and transnational effects of globalization.  Moreover, 
because military training is habitual in general, I argue that major power militaries extend this 
repetitive behavior to multinational training with non-allies.  I developed two hypotheses to test 
this argument, proposing that the post-Cold War period would be a significant predictor of 
increased shaping MMEs and that exercises become sticky over time.  The tests revealed support 
for my argument: both the uncertain post-Cold War environment and previous exercises were 
significant predictors of exercises with non-allies.  Thus, it appears that MMEs have increased 
due to the effects of an uncertain strategic environment as well as the cumulative effect of sticky 
military relations over time. 
    If major powers seek to reduce strategic uncertainty through shaping exercises and these 
activities cumulatively add up over time, what are the implications for international security?  Is 
shaping a positive means by which major powers can effectively prevent the negative effects of 
violent non-state actors, or could this type of military operation be a source of competition for 
influence?  The following chapter provides my conclusion as well as the implications of shaping 
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MMEs for international security, which I argue could be both a source of stability and instability 
based on how major powers manage these types of operations. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION: MILITARY EXERCISES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
 
9.1 Introduction 
    The purpose of this dissertation was to explain why major powers conduct military exercises 
with non-allies and why multinational exercises have increased since the end of the Cold War.  
Given the incentives against military cooperation—MMEs require resources, coordination, and 
distractions away from unilateral training—major power military cooperation with non-allies is 
puzzling.  Even more striking is training with rival or fragile armies in which technology and 
doctrine are exposed to untrustworthy partners; moreover, cooperation with adversaries has the 
potential to elicit negative responses from domestic constituents.  Yet major power MMEs with 
non-allies is not only common but increases globally almost every year since the conclusion of 
superpower rivalry, which is strange given the opportunity for major powers to enjoy a ‘peace 
dividend’ and focus on domestic issues in an American-led unipolar international system.  I 
argued that these two puzzles are explained by an increase in strategic uncertainty driven by the 
rise of non-state threats since the end of the Cold War; moreover, military cooperation between 
military partners develops into habitual relations that last over time.  Two sources of 
uncertainty—the character and location of threats, as well as the form of assistance to combat 
these threats—pose challenges for military planning.  Major powers use non-traditional MMEs—
which serve as a form of shaping operations—to reduce both sources of uncertainty in their 
strategic environments.  This interaction between strategic uncertainty and sticky military 
relations over time has created a cumulative effect in which the number of MMEs has grown into 
unprecedented levels. 
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    What is interesting about the rise of shaping MMEs is the inability of the extant literature in 
international security to explain this post-Cold War military behavior.  The traditional works in 
military doctrine, which were developed through analyses of Cold War and pre-World War II 
militaries, assume that major powers prepare for large-scale conventional war through the 
planning and practicing of offensive, defensive, and deterrent operations.  Moreover, they 
assume that military behavior is best explained by parochial interests, drawing on the classic 
works in organization theory.  However, non-traditional MMEs are a form of shaping, not 
‘traditional’ (offensive, defensive, or deterrent) operations; moreover, most of the institutional 
benefits militaries receive from pursuing narrow organizational interests—such as greater 
wealth, resources, prestige, and autonomy—are not afforded by shaping exercises.  Moreover, as 
the incidence of interstate war has decreased, yet the persistent threat of violent non-state actors 
has increased, an understanding of ‘what militaries do’ requires the observer to look for other 
indicators besides large-scale wars and plans for conventional war.  Thus, a new framework for 
understanding post-Cold War military behavior was necessary. 
    In order to better understand this phenomenon, I developed a typology of non-traditional 
exercise types—recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-developing—and 
compared these types of shaping MMEs to traditional exercises—rehearsal and deterrence—in 
the introduction.  I then elucidated my argument in Chapter 2 by describing the increase in 
strategic uncertainty from the last decade of the Cold War to the post-Cold War environment, 
revealed in journalism, scholarly works, as well as major power strategic documents and national 
doctrine.  After providing a brief history of military exercises and describing key concepts such 
as exercise types and strategic environments in Chapter 3, I provided four illustrative case 
studies in Chapters 4 through 7 which assessed my argument against the two alternative 
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explanations.  Chapter 4 explored recruitment exercises through the case of the US-led NATO 
Partnership for Peace program in the 1990’s.  Chapter 5 focused on capacity-building training by 
observing the UK experience in Sierra Leone from 2000 to 2016.  Chapter 6 described role-
forming exercises by examining the case of Russian-led CSTO MMEs from 2003 to 2012.  
Chapter 7 explored trust-developing exercises between rivals through an analysis of Indo-
Chinese MMEs from 2006 through 2016.  Chapter 8 leveraged binomial and multinomial logistic 
regressions to test four hypotheses using two datasets comprised of over 1,000 MMEs from 1980 
to 2016. 
    With this foundation of the causes and growth of non-traditional MMEs throughout the 
dissertation, I now turn to broader issues associated with multinational training events.  This 
concluding chapter seeks to describe the potential impacts of military exercises on international 
security.  Three aspects of MMEs and their influence on world politics are noteworthy.  First, 
there is a growing concern that civilian-led foreign policy has been ‘militarized’ in recent years; 
shaping MMEs seem to be an indicator of this trend.  Second, although shaping operations 
appear to increase security through cooperative military relations against non-state threats, there 
are three possible negative scenarios in which shaping decreases security: blowback, 
misperception of exercise-function, and major power proxy competition.  Third, the last five 
years has experienced a tremendous growth in traditional (deterrence/rehearsal) MMEs; this 
‘return’ of traditional operations between major power rivals point to the possibility of a 
reoccurrence of Cold War relations.  Each issue is explored below. 
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9.2 Shaping Operations and the Militarization of Foreign Policy 
Two Perspectives on the Militarization of US Foreign Policy 
    Especially since the George W. Bush administration’s military actions in the wake of 9/11, 
there has been a growing sense that American foreign policy is being ‘militarized’—that is, when 
foreign policy is either dictated by military officers in uniform or by decision-makers that favor 
the use force over other instruments of national power.602  Or, as Rachel Maddow puts it, “Our 
military and weapons prowess is a fantastic and perfectly weighted hammer, but that doesn’t 
make every international problem a nail.”603  These works are generally concerned about two 
aspects of US foreign policy: (1) that war is favored over other alternatives of statecraft or (2) 
that the US military is being increasingly used for tasks that were commonly carried out by other 
(civilian) departments or agencies, such as Department of State, the US Agency for International 
Development, or the Department of Justice.  One indicator of this problem is the asymmetry 
between departments’ funding and resources.  In the US, the budget of the Defense Department  
vastly outweighs that of the State Department: former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used 
to complain that there were more musicians in military bands than US Foreign Service Officers 
abroad.604  Moreover, since the end of the Cold War US military power has been used for various 
non-traditional purposes: not only to win wars but also to provide humanitarian aid in conflict 
regions, enforce peacekeeping agreements, restore stability after hurricanes, contain Ebola in 
                                                                   
602 See, for instance, Carl Boggs ed., Masters of War: Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American Empire 
(New York: Routledge, 2003); Melvin A. Goodman, National Insecurity: The Cost of American Militarism, (San 
Francisco: City Light Books, 2013); Gordon Adams, “The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy: Reversing the 
Trend,” Huffington Post Blog, April 7, 2010, accessed December 2, 2017, accessible at 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gordon-adams/the-militarization-of-us_b_451435.html. 
603 Rachel Maddow, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 
251. 
604 Jon Greenberg from Politifact reveals this is not exactly true, but close: 6,500 military musicians to 8,100 
diplomats.  Jon Greenberg, “Does the U.S. Have About as Many Military Band Members as Diplomats?” Politifact, 
March 31, 2017, accessed January 8, 2018, www.politifact.com/global-news/statements/2017/mar/31/nicholas-
burns/are-there-more-military-band-members-diplomats/. 
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Africa, and even encourage agricultural development in Africa and the Middle East.  As 
Secretary of State Madelene Albright famously asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Colin Powell, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always 
talking about if we can’t use it?”605  Many observers view both this dependence on combat 
power and the growing use of militaries to carry out Missions Other Than War (MOOTW) as a 
sign that foreign policy is being militarized to a dangerous level. 
    One of the most prominent voices of the first type of militarization is Andrew Bacevich, who 
argued in The New American Militarism that the American people—not just presidents or 
military officers but also local politicians, journalists, religious leaders, and intellectuals—have 
become enamored of American military strength and its ability to achieve the ends of American 
foreign policy.  He locates the source of this over-reliance and fascination with military power to 
the 1970’s, when military officers and emerging neo-conservatives sought to reinvigorate 
military power after the frustrations and humiliations of the Vietnam War.  This militarization is 
manifest in immense budgets, capabilities beyond mere territorial defense, permanent troop 
presence abroad, but most importantly, a ‘normalization’ of war through the excessive reliance 
on the use of force in a post-Cold War age of superior access to battlefield information, precision 
technology, and ‘low-cost’ war.  Bacevich notes: 
That even apart from fighting wars and pursuing terrorists, U.S. forces are constantly 
prowling around the globe—training, exercising, planning, and posturing—elicits no 
more notice (and in some cases less) from the average American than the presence of a 
cop on a city street corner.  Even before the Pentagon officially assigned itself the 
mission of ‘shaping’ the international environment, members of the political elite, liberals 
and conservatives alike, had reached a common understanding that scattering U.S. troops 
around the globe to restrain, inspire, influence, persuade, or cajole paid dividends.”606   
                                                                   
605 A statement after which General Powell wrote, “I thought I would have an aneurysm.”  Colin Powell and 
Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 576. 
606 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War, (Oxford, U.K.: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 18. 
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Despite this passing remark about the use of the US military for non-war purposes, he focuses 
mainly on the over-reliance on the violent use of force, reaching its apogee in the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq largely to secure oil for the US homeland.607 
    The second type of militarization is typified by Rosa Brooks’ How Everything Became War 
and the Military Became Everything, in which a former US defense official observes the growing 
tendency of the US government to rely on the military for non-military tasks, such as teaching 
law to Afghan officials or running health clinics in Malaysia.  Brooks argues that this expansion 
resulted from the current ambiguous security environment in which the traditional distinction 
between war and peace has been blurred: “As the lines we have drawn between ‘war’ and 
‘nonwar’ grow indistinct, the role and mission of the U.S. military have grown similarly hazy.  
Today, as the military struggles to respond to novel threats from novel quarters, its once 
seemingly straightforward raison d'être —defending America from armed attack by foreign 
states—is no longer clear-cut.”608  Brooks importantly asks, “And what is the military for, in a 
world in which future threats are as likely to come from computer hackers, terrorists, and other 
nonstate actors as from armies of foreign states?”609  Brooks notes that despite growing 
prosperity and life expectancy across the world, the global increase in interconnectedness, 
transportation, reach of technology, and climate change has produced an environment in which 
the next catastrophic event is unpredictable.610  Thus, for Brooks, the assumption of non-military 
tasks by soldiers is largely a response to this new uncertain environment. 
                                                                   
607 Ibid., Chapters 6 and 7. 
608 Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, 13. 
609 Original emphasis.  Ibid., 8. 
610 Ibid., 261-267. 
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    Although non-traditional exercises are largely comprised of military-to-military cooperation, 
these shaping operations have the potential to supplant civilian efforts with military power in the 
manner described by Brooks, especially in terms of diplomacy and capacity-building.  Civilian 
government officials are often suspicious of military-led foreign policy and view shaping as a 
threat to their role in diplomacy and development.  Africa Command (AFRICOM), the newest 
US Combatant Command and one of the most persistent executers of shaping operations, is often 
viewed as a significant infringement on civilian control of foreign policy by civil servants in the 
State Department and US Agency for Development.611  Recruitment exercises, in particular, are 
conducted to enlist the support of partners for multilateral missions, often the domain of civilian 
diplomacy.  US-planned and resourced ‘Cobra Gold’ exercises in Thailand usually involves civic 
action projects, such as medical visits to local families and even the construction of schools, 
carried out by soldiers.612  Exercises such as NATO’s Cooperative Nugget, explored in Chapter 
4, sought to convince the governments and civilian populations of partner states the benefits of 
military cooperation.  ‘Building capacity’ often requires military leaders to develop not only 
armies but also other public departments and agencies.  After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
then-Major General David Petraeus’ unit in Mosul was faced with a city in shambles and little 
civilian support.  Fred Kaplan notes that despite initial concerns about the army’s role in 
development, “there was no local government, so the 101st Airborne would have to create 
one.”613  Especially during ongoing civil war or in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the 
military is often granted powers to reshape entire governments; the case of Sierra Leone in 
                                                                   
611 Reveron, Exporting Security, 72-77. 
612 Lisa Ferdinando, “Annual ‘Cobra Gold’ Exercise Commences in Thailand,” U.S. Department of Defense 
News, February 14, 2017, accessed January 8, 2018, 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1083001/annual-cobra-gold-exercise-commences-in-thailand/. 
613 Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2013), 71-72. 
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Chapter 5 revealed how Brigadier Richards was granted “‘full political and military decision-
making powers” to assist the fledgling Sierra Leonean government and the UN force on the 
ground.614  As recruitment and capacity-building is carried out by the military, civilians may 
consequently see their roles and budgets diminish. 
    The debate about the origins and scope of the militarization of US foreign policy largely 
misses one of the contributions from this dissertation; that is, that the growing use of shaping 
operations is not unique to the US or other Western ‘nation-building’ powers.  Although the US 
has by far hosted the most shaping MMEs, the fact that all major powers have also increased 
non-traditional exercises should alert the observer to a trend that transcends concerns about US 
military responsibilities.  I argued and showed that in a response to strategic uncertainty driven 
by the growth of non-state threats, all major powers increased the number of exercises with non-
allies since the end of the Cold War.  This phenomenon is not just unique to one particular region 
or regime-type: both Western and Eastern powers regularly conduct role-forming and 
recruitment, while India and China cooperate almost every year to reduce the risk of inadvertent 
war.  Grand strategies may also differ: US primacy is comprised of global shaping operations 
while Eastern powers mainly attempt to influence partners along their borders.  Thus, although 
American militarism may be a consequence of societal obsession with military power or unequal 
allotment of budgets, the literature on militarized foreign policy should be aware of the ubiquity 
of this phenomenon. 
     
 
                                                                   
614 Ucko, 853. See also Andrew M., Dorman, Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra 
Leone, 79. 
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9.3 Negative Effects of Shaping Exercises on International Security 
 
    In Sources of Military Doctrine, Barry Posen argued that “Military doctrines are important 
because they affect the quality of life in the international political system and the security of the 
states that hold them.”615  The traditional works in military doctrine argue that defensive 
doctrines encourage stability while offensive doctrines increase the risk of interstate war.  What 
do we make of shaping operations?  At first glance, non-traditional MMEs appear to enhance 
international security because of the cooperative, non-war nature of these programs.  Trust-
developing between enemies, capacity-building to strengthen fragile states against insurgents, 
and recruitment to garner support for peacekeeping all seem to imply a net gain in security for 
international relations.  However, shaping exercise programs have the potential to produce 
insecurity in three respects: blowback, exercise misperception, and major power proxy 
competition.  Blowback results from negative unintended consequences from major power 
military actions abroad.  Exercise misperception occurs when a major power believes that instead 
of addressing violent non-state threats (or even deterring an adversary), another major power is 
exercising as a rehearsal for war.  The gravest problem is major power proxy competition, in 
which militaries use MMEs to compete for spheres of influence or to change the character of 
partner militaries.  As the incidence of conventional interstate war has receded, shaping MMEs 
offer an opportunity for major powers to undermine each other globally while remaining below 
the threshold of open violence.  Each of these problems is explored below. 
 
 
                                                                   
615 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 33. 
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Blowback 
    Shaping exercise have the potential to elicit blowback; that is, when a state’s foreign policy 
results in negative unintended consequences against that state.  First used by the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to describe the potential adverse impacts of overthrowing Iran’s 
leader in 1953—which the Iranian revolution in 1979 largely justified these fears—the term is 
often used to describe how a major power’s military assistance may turn against it in the future.  
Chalmers Johnson argues that US military support to the Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980’s, as 
well as the stationing of thousands of American troops in Saudi Arabia throughout the 1990’s, 
resulted in the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda.616  Two types of shaping MMEs—capacity-building 
and role-forming—have the potential to provoke negative unintended consequences.  Capacity-
building, in particular, could result in two undesirable scenarios.  First, major powers may supply 
weapons to state or non-state actors that could end up in the hands of the enemies in which the 
major power seeks to combat.  After a decade of training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Army, 
US advisors in Baghdad watched as Iraqi soldiers laid down their arms and withdrew from their 
bases as the emerging Islamic State (IS) swept across western Iraq in 2014.  Iraqi soldiers left 
weapons, vehicles, and uniforms behind as insurgents seized five army bases and an airport.617  
Especially when supplying disorganized non-state actors, equipment accountability is often 
lacking during these transfers and weapons are either lost or intentionally given to adversaries.  
For instance, a CIA-funded program beginning in 2013 to train Syrian rebels against the Syrian 
                                                                   
616 Chalmers Johnson, “American Militarism and Blowback: The Costs of Letting the Pentagon Dominate 
Foreign Policy,” New Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2002): 21-38. 
617 Kareem Fahim and Suadad Al-Salhy, “Exhausted and Bereft, Iraqi Soldiers Quit Fight,” The New York 
Times, June 10, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/exhausted-and-bereft-iraqi-soldiers-
quit-fight.html. 
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regime resulted in the loss of weapons—such as anti-take missiles—that were then employed by 
the IS against the US and its partners.618   
    Second, major powers may train and supply both state and non-state actors that behave 
counter to major powers interests.  These trained forces sometimes refuse to conduct operations, 
commit abuses against their own people, or even elect to fight against the major power.  As 
noted above, Iraqi soldiers withdrew from installations and lost massive territory in 2014, which 
then allowed IS to establish a headquarters in Mosul for its global operations.  Sometimes major 
powers assist militaries that commit abuses against non-combatants; for instance, US-trained 
Tajik special forces fired on Pamiri civilians, as well as committed other abuses, during a 2013 
raid in Khorog, Tajikistan.619  Some of the weapons used by Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan were supplied by the US government in the 1980s.  Even state actors sometimes 
turn on major powers: Afghan security forces have killed NATO troops in several “Green-on-
Blue” attacks since military training began in 2002.620  During the Iran-Iraq War, the US 
provided intelligence and permitted the sale of weapons to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, who then 
fought the US in 1990 during the Persian Gulf War.621  When employing shaping MMEs, major 
powers need to anticipate the possible adverse consequence of training and supplying both state 
and non-state actors. 
 
                                                                   
618 Jim Michaels, “The U.S. Bought Weapons for Syrian Rebels—and Some Wound Up in the Hands of ISIS 
Terrorists,” USA Today, December 14, 2017, accessed January 9, 2018, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/12/14/u-s-bought-weapons-syrian-rebels-and-some-wound-up-
hands-isis-terrorists/949209001/. 
619 Joshua Kucera, “The Tajiks Who Fight Their Own Government,” The Atlantic, June 28, 2013, 
620 Eric Jardine, “Green-on-Blue Attacks: Why ‘Insider’ Violence Has Risen in Afghanistan,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly, Issue 71 (4th Quarter 2013): 79-83. 
621 Seymour H. Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War Against Iran,” The New York Times, 
January 26, 1992, www.nytimes.com/1992/01/26/world/us-secretly-gave-aid-to-iraq-early-in-its-war-against-
iran.html. 
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Exercise Misperception 
    One problem that plagues both traditional and non-traditional MMEs is the possibility that an 
exercise function may be misperceived; states may believe that an opponent’s exercises are 
serving purposes other than those intended.  Robert Jervis highlighted the problem of 
misperception in world politics: states may over- or underestimate an adversary’s hostility and 
consequently respond in different ways.622  Exercises intended for deterrence may be perceived 
to be preparations for war; conversely, those which are intended to rehearse or serve as a cover 
for war may go unchecked.  In the first scenario, exercises intended for deterrence may 
automatically be assumed to be rehearsals, just as defensive weapons could be viewed as 
providing an offensive advantage (such as forward-deployed air defense systems).623  North 
Korea reportedly perceives semi-annual US-South Korean exercises—viewed by the alliance as 
defensive in nature—as preparation for invasion and often demands that the US cancel these 
training events.624  This misperception in exercise function sometimes leads to crises.  US 
President Ronald Reagan experienced first-hand the possibility of military training sending the 
wrong signal when he participated in NATO’s Able Archer exercise in 1983.  The event was 
designed to simulate a major conflict between the alliances to such an extent that the president 
himself rehearsed making a decision on using nuclear weapons.  The Soviet high command, 
naturally, was frightened by this exercise and feared it may be a front for a possible surprise 
attack.  President Reagan noted, “many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as 
                                                                   
622 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Chapter 3. 
623 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 202-203. 
624 Motoko Rich, “Looming War Games Alarm North Korea, but May be a Bargaining Chip,” The New York 
Times, August 16, 2017, accessed September 3, 2017, accessible at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/world/asia/north-korea-us-war-games.html. 
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potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike.”625  As President 
Reagan realized, military exercises could result in a security dilemma and severe miscalculation. 
    In the second scenario, some exercises may be used as a cover for war and go largely 
unchecked.  As explained in Chapter 2, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czech Republic in 1968 
was preceded by a military exercise along Czech-Polish border.  More recently, the Russian 
Kavkaz exercise held near the Georgian border in July 2008 consisted of 8,000 Russian troops 
with the purpose of practicing an “operation of peace enforcement”; maneuvers ended on August 
2nd, but Russian units remained and some entered South Ossetia a few days later to support 
Russian ‘peacekeepers’ already in the country.626  Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine also 
involved units that recently completed an exercise along the border.627  The Russian-Belarusian 
2017 exercise Zapad was feared to be another cover for an invasion of the Baltics: the US Army 
European Commander, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, warned his NATO allies that the 
maneuvers could be a Russian “Trojan Horse”.628  Large-scale maneuvers, in particular, are 
almost impossible to distinguish between rehearsals or deterrence—oftentimes they implicitly 
serve both purposes—which creates a major quandary for foreign policy and international 
relations.  Even non-traditional exercises may be interpreted to be hostile: Chapter 4 noted that 
the Russian Duma condemned US airborne operations into a Partnership for Peace exercise near 
the Russian border, viewing these operations as practice for a future invasion.  Fortunately, 
major powers often refrain from overreacting beyond rhetoric when faced with an opponent’s 
                                                                   
625 Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. 
Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014): 124. 
626 Andrei Illarionov, “The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1999-2008,” in The Guns of August 
2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, eds. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: Routledge, 2015), 68-76. 
627 Ian J. Brzezinski and Nicholas Varangis, “The NATO-Russia Exercise Gap,” The Atlantic Council NATO 
Source, February 23, 2015, accessed September 27, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-nato-
russia-exercise-gap. 
628 Thomas Donnelly and Gary Schmitt, “Could ‘Zapad’ be a Trojan Horse?” CNN Online, September 14, 2017, 
accessed January 12, 2018, www.cnn.com/2017/09/13/opinions/zapad-opinion-donnelly-and-schmitt/index.html. 
303 
 
exercise; moreover, covers for invasion are rare in world politics.  However, the problem of 
exercise misperception, by both under- and overestimating an opponent’s hostility, is a long-
standing problem for international security.   
 
Major Power Proxy Competition  
    The most important negative impact of shaping MMEs is when major powers employ them to 
undermine one another.  Although shaping MMEs are largely geared toward combatting non-
state actors (save trust-developing MMEs), major powers may view non-traditional exercises as 
an opportunity to bolster a state or non-state actor against their rivals.  Major powers may 
employ recruitment and role-forming exercises, in particular, to compete for power and influence 
at the expense of each other.  Sometimes this competition is unintentional: although the US 
views its promotion of democracy as non-threatening, other major powers may interpret these 
actions as diminishing their own security.  Conversely, Russia and China may view regime 
stability on its periphery as vital for national security, but Western powers perceive these actions 
as a restriction on political freedoms.   
    At other times, however, the competition is explicit.  During the Cold War NATO and the 
Soviet Union armed and trained militaries in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia to 
extend their spheres of influence under the shadow of superpower rivalry.  Today, the Middle 
East, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia comprise the centerpiece of an emerging US-Russian 
proxy competition.  Russia supports the Syrian regime with training and firepower while the US 
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arms and trains the armed opposition.629  Not only does the US conduct multiple exercises with 
non-NATO Ukraine every year, after Russia’s support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine 
beginning in 2014 the US considered sending anti-tank weapons to support Ukrainian forces.630  
Both Western and Russian analysts accuse each other of instigating ‘hybrid war’ by supporting 
third party actors to undermine one another;631 shaping exercises are often the preferred tactic to 
train partners and delegate warfighting to others while remaining out of direct conflict.  Central 
Asia is emerging as the apex of non-traditional exercise programs between almost all the major 
powers.  Since the mid-2000’s, the US, Russia, and China have conducted separate annual 
exercises in the region: the US (and UK) host Steppe Eagle, while Russia and China lead CSTO 
and SCO training.  Competition over spheres of influence through the use of shaping exercises 
may result in miscalculation and the escalation of crises between major powers.  
 
9.4 Major Power Rivals and the Return of Traditional Exercises 
    As this dissertation has shown, shaping MMEs have increased considerably since the end of 
the Cold War and appear to continue on an upward trajectory.  As noted in the previous section, 
shaping operations sometimes produce insecurity through blowback, exercise misperception, and 
proxy competition.  An even more alarming development for international security, however, is 
the recent return of traditional multinational exercises, used unambiguously for rehearsal and/or 
deterrence.  As revealed in Figure 1.6 (reproduced as Figure 9.1 below), rehearsal and deterrence 
                                                                   
629 Mark Mazzetti, Anne Barnard, and Eric Schmitt, “Putin Gains Leverage as Army Wins Syria Battles; By 
Bludgeoning Rebels, Russia Gets Upper Hand in Proxy War Against U.S,” International New York Times, August 8, 
2016, LexisNexis Academic. 
630 Michael Kofman, “For the U.S., Arming Ukraine Could be a Deadly Mistake,” The New York Times, August 
25, 2017, accessed December 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/opinion/united-states-arm-ukraine-
missiles.html. 
631 Samuel Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War,” Survival, Vol. 57, No. 6 (December 2015- January 2016): 51-
58. 
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exercises have experienced a major comeback since 2010.  The bulk of these types of MMEs 
come from NATO conventional exercises to deter potential Russian aggression in the Baltics as 
part of the Atlantic Resolve and European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) programs.  According to 
my dataset, traditional MMEs grew from 9 in 2010 to 33 in 2016: that is, by a factor of 3.6.  In 
2014, the same year in which Russia invaded and annexed the Ukrainian province of Crimea, 
traditional MMEs eclipsed non-traditional for two years straight for the first time since 1994. 
 
Figure 9.1: Traditional and Non-Traditional Exercises 
 
    In June 2016, NATO conducted its largest exercise in Eastern Europe since the Cold War.  
The exercise, Anakonda 2016, consisted of over 30,000 troops from 24 different countries, 
including non-allies such as Ukraine, Georgia, and even Kosovo.  Although deemed a “joint 
defense operation on a large scale” by the US Army, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
told other reporters in response to the event, “We will invoke Russia’s sovereign right to 
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guarantee its security with measures proportionate to current risks”.632  Shortly after the exercise, 
NATO announced that 5,000 troops from the US, Britain, and Germany would be stationed in 
Poland and the Baltics to deter possible Russian aggression.  Recent Russian exercises, including 
the 2013 and 2017 iterations of Zapad, are alleged to consist of over 100,000 troops, drawing 
concerns about an ‘exercise gap’ between NATO and Russia.633  In an interview with Reuters in 
August 2017, a senior US exercise planner noted that by fiscal year 2020, the US military plans 
to conduct exercises “that involved forces from all nine U.S. combatant commands” and increase 
troop levels to over 40,000.634 
    The return of traditional exercises is concurrent with changes to major power military 
doctrine, particularly within the US.  In October 2017, the US Army released its new operations 
manual—FM 3-0—in order to re-emphasize large-scale conventional war after almost two 
decades of counterinsurgency and other non-traditional operations.  Announcing the changes, the 
commander of the US Army Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant General Mike Lundy, noted 
that when the previous edition of the operational doctrine was rescinded in 2011: “the world was 
a different place.  The likelihood of large-scale ground combat against an enemy with peer 
capabilities seemed remote.”635  He argues that now, in 2017, “The strategic environment has 
changed significantly since then”: aggressive actions by ‘peer adversaries’ such as Russia and 
China have made major power war more likely and the US Army must return to a focus on 
                                                                   
632 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “U.S., NATO Countries Begin Largest Military Exercise in Eastern Europe since 
Cold War,” The Washington Post, accessed August 7, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/06/07/u-s-nato-countries-begin-largest-military-
exercise-in-europe-since-cold-war/?utm_term=.bf662ba04d55. 
633 Ian J. Brzezinski and Nicholas Varangis, “The NATO-Russia Exercise Gap.” 
634 Andrea Shalal, “Eyeing Russia, U.S. Military Shifts Toward More Global War Games,” Reuters, August 3, 
2017. 
635 Lieutenant General Mike Lundy and Colonel Rich Creed, “The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, 
Operations,” Military Review (November-December 2017): 14-21, quotation on 14. 
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massive maneuvers and higher-echelon operations.636  However, the senior officer notes that the 
US Army must also maintain its ability to shape the environment while simultaneously preparing 
for major power war: the manual retains the “shape” and “prevent” phases before large-scale 
combat.  General Lundy notes the vast array of enemies and scenarios the US Army must be 
prepared for: “Army forces do not have the luxury of focusing solely on large-scale land combat 
at the expense of other missions the Nation requires them to do, but at the same time, they cannot 
afford to be unprepared for those kinds of operations in an increasingly unstable world.”637  The 
Army officer’s assessment highlights the need for US forces to be ready for any type of threat, 
state or non-state, major power or not. 
 
9.5. The Future of Multinational Exercises 
    The trends described above offer a pessimistic picture of the impact of major power MMEs in 
the future.  Despite the use of non-traditional MMEs to combat non-state threats and cooperate 
with rivals over the last 25 years, not only have recent shaping exercises been used for major 
power proxy competition, but traditional deterrence exercises are making a comeback to levels 
not seen since the Cold War.  These trends imply that not only will major powers continue to 
grapple with insurgents, transnational criminals, the consequences of ethnic war, and natural 
disasters, but the prospect of major power war seems to loom larger every year.  Thus, major 
powers will most likely increase their use of both traditional and non-traditional exercises to 
combat violent non-state actors and compete with one another.  Major power-led exercises 
appear to be reflecting this need to address both state and non-state threats; MMEs are currently 
                                                                   
636 Ibid. 
637 Ibid., 21. 
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growing in size and scope in addition to quantity.  Furthermore, the stickiness of military 
cooperation implies that major powers will continue to build overlapping relationships with 
partners that could cause more insecurity among other major powers.   
    This dissertation serves as a cautionary note to both political and military leaders.  Military-to-
military cooperation provides immense benefits for international security: trust-developing 
exercises help prevent inadvertent war, capacity-building training ensures partner armies can 
provide security for their own citizens, and recruitment gathers nations together to provide 
peacekeeping in troubled regions.  However, these same exercises sometimes result in negative 
unintended consequences, are likely to be misperceived, and can leveraged to reduce the security 
of other major powers.  Moreover, the increase in deterrence exercises indicates that major 
power competition, especially between the US and Russia, is on the rise; the risk of 
misperception will likely increase as a result.  As the number of MMEs continues to rise, 
political and military leaders should be clear about what type of exercises they are conducting, 
aware of how they are interpreted by others, and, despite the incentives against doing so, attempt 
at all possible to be transparent about intentions.  The OSCE’s 2011 Vienna Protocols require 
that states declare exercises involving more than 13,000 soldiers, 300 tanks, 500 armored 
vehicles, or 250 pieces of artillery; yet militaries are sometimes able to avoid this obligation by 
manipulating the training event.  For Zapad 2017, Russia insisted that only 12,700 troops were 
taking part in the exercise, which obviated the requirement for Russia to invite OSCE observers 
to monitor the exercise.638 
                                                                   
638 Kyle Mizokami, “U.S. General Accuses Russia of Skirting the Rules for Military Exercises,” Popular 
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http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/news/a28490/us-general-russia-cheated-at-exercise-inspection-rules/. 
309 
 
    Therefore, in the face of this proliferation of MMEs, both traditional and non-traditional, 
national leaders have the option of using training to increase or decrease international security; 
that is, decision-makers can choose whether to use MMEs for war or for peace.  Major powers 
may seek war and use exercises as a cover, or they can use training to create stability.  They can 
either use MMEs to cooperate and reduce the risk of conflict, or compete and raise the specter of 
war.  They can choose to communicate and clarify intentions, or assume the worst and act 
accordingly.  Military leaders and planners should aid national decision-makers in better 
understanding the purposes and consequences of multinational exercises.  Although civilian-led 
diplomacy should guide considerations for the use of force, military officers should also seek to 
build cooperative relations with their rivals in order to understand each other’s security 
requirements.  Though armies must prepare for large-scale war in order to protect their 
populations, they can also be leveraged to build cooperative relations with other militaries. 
Hopefully, this understanding will result in a net benefit to international security and, quite 
possibly, prevent war. 
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MILITARY COALITION PARTICIPATION FROM 1980-2016 
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Notes for Appendix B: 
1. I only included multilateral, major power-led military coalitions.  Moreover, I only 
included partners that contributed ground troops to the operation (when the information 
was available).  If a major alliance was involved in an operation (e.g. NATO), I only 
included the ‘non-ally’ partners. 
2. I did not include Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)-HOA, OEF-TS, or OEF-Caribbean 
because it is unclear which countries are coalition contributors or just allow staging for 
US.  See “Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget: Justification for Component 
Contigency Operations the Overseas Contigency Operation Transfer Fund (OCOTF),” 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2013, 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2013/FY2014_Preside
nts_Budget_Contingency_Operations-Base_Budget.pdf. 
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APPENDIX C 
STATISTICAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
    This appendix provides robustness checks for the statistical tests provided in Chapter 8.  
Section 1 applies robustness checks to the same four hypotheses for all major powers by 
including region, partner, and year “dummy” (binary) indicator control variables to the random 
effects models, while including year dummy indicators to the partner-year fixed effects models.  
The purpose of including these indicator dummies in addition to the already-included random 
and fixed effects is to ensure no particular region, partner, or year significantly influences the 
original results.  Section 2 applies the same hypotheses but conditions on each major power in 
order to determine whether there are any major changes to the original pooled tests.  Deviations 
from the pooled results are discussed with each individual major power hypothesis.  
    One major theme emerges when splitting the pooled models into individual major powers: 
fixed effects specifications appear to underestimate (or drastically alter) the results for two 
explanatory variables: Non-Ally and Post-Cold War.  These two variables are ‘slowly’ or ‘rarely’ 
changing variables that pose problems for fixed effects models, which ignore time-invariant 
variables in order to observe within-unit (for my data, partner-year) variation.639  For instance, 
being in the status of ‘ally’ may change once or twice (joining an alliance/coalition and then 
leaving it), while a change in the status of the Cold War only happened once (in 1991).  Thus, I 
place more confidence in the random effects specifications than the fixed effects for individual 
powers for hypotheses 1 and 3 (although I report the fixed effects models for transparency).  
                                                                   
639 For a discussion of slowly or rarely changing variables and the problems they pose for inference, see Thomas 
Plümper and Vera E. Troeger, “Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite 
Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects,” Political Analysis, Vol 15, No. 2 (Spring 2007): 124-139.  Though 
the authors introduce a ‘fixed effect vector decomposition’ as a more efficient model to test rarely changing 
variables, their method is challenged by William Greene, “Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition: A Magical Solution 
to the Problem of Time-Invariant Variables in Fixed Effects Models?” Political Analysis, Vol 19, No. 2 (Spring 
2011): 135-146. 
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Each major power will be assessed along each of the four hypotheses, moving from west to east: 
USA, UK, France, Germany, Russia, India, China. 
 
1. Region, Partner, and Year Dummy Indicator Control Variables 
1.1. Table C.1.1 below provides a coefficients table for the robustness checks for 
Hypothesis 1.  Year, region, and partner dummy indicator variables are included in the base and 
random effects models (1, 2, and 3) to observe whether any particular year, region, or country 
had a significant impact on the results.  Being a non-ally is still a significant indicator of 
participation in a shaping MME despite these controls in the random effects models.  Only year 
indicator controls are included for the fixed effects models (4 and 5) since region and partner are 
already dropped because they are time-invariant.  Although non-ally becomes insignificant when 
adding indicators for each year to the fixed effects models, as discussed in the introduction there 
is reason to question the usefulness of fixed effects for rarely changing variables such as the 
explanatory variable, Non-Ally.  Because being an ally or non-ally changes slowly or not at all, 
the random effects model is more appropriate for these tests than fixed effects. 
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Model 1 
Base Model with 
Year, Region, 
Partner Controls 
Model 2 
Model 1 w/ 
 Lagged DV 
Model 3 
Model 1 w/ 
Random Effects 
Model 4 
Model 1 with 
Fixed Effects 
Non-Ally 1.981*** 1.457*** 1.889*** 0.550 
 (0.43) (0.38) (0.25) 
(0.33) 
Lagged DV  1.687***   
  (0.22)  
 
Constant -6.336*** -5.083*** -6.565**    
 (1.48) (0.85) (2.01) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.405 0.421  0.434 
N 2734 1483 2734   2508 
BIC 3013 1752 3053 1650 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.1.1: Hypothesis 1 with indicator control variables 
 
1.2. Hypothesis 2 tested whether major powers were more likely to conduct MMEs 
within or outside their strategic environments.  Since region is already included as the 
explanatory variable, I only add year indicator dummies to each model.  Results for the three 
groups of major powers are listed in Tables C.1.2, C.1.3, and C.1.4.  The only change from the 
tests provided in Chapter 8 are with the US: when adding an indicator for year, it appears the US 
is more likely to conduct MMEs with partners outside of this region.  The coefficients are higher 
(but in the same negative direction) than the original model, yet the new results are significant to 
the .05-level.  Thus, by adding year as a control, it appears that being outside of the Western 
Hemisphere is a stronger predictor of participation in US-led exercises than the original model 
anticipated.  However, the US grand strategy of primacy is largely oriented outside of the 
Western Hemisphere; therefore, the results largely support my argument. 
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Model 5 
Base Model w/ 
Year Indicator 
Control 
Model 6 
w/ Year Indicator 
and Random 
Effects 
Same Region 1.002** 3.073*** 
 (0.31) (0.54) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit 1.531** 2.764*** 
 (0.48) (0.80) 
Contiguity 0.614 0.876 
 (0.46) (0.71) 
Lagged DV 3.926***  
 (0.32)  
Constant -6.473*** -7.302*** 
 (1.02) (0.61) 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.411  
N 11930 11950 
BIC 2021 1816 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.1.2: Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (Eastern Powers) 
 
 
Model 5 
Base Model w/ 
Year Indicator 
Control 
Model 6 
w/ Year Indicator 
and Random 
Effects 
Same Region 1.450*** 2.452*** 
 (0.20) (0.30) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit 0.629*** 1.096*** 
 (0.18) (0.27) 
Contiguity -0.329 -0.405 
 (0.94) (1.16) 
Lagged DV 2.431***  
 (0.17)  
Constant -5.031*** -7.180*** 
 (0.58) (0.76) 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.227  
N 12677 13153   
BIC 3893 3803 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.1.3: Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (Western Powers) 
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Model 5 
Base Model w/ 
Year Indicator 
Control 
Model 6 
w/ Year Indicator 
and Random 
Effects 
Same Region -0.622** -1.176** 
 (0.20) (0.45) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit 0.000 0.000 
 (.00) (.00) 
Contiguity -0.531** -0.214 
 (0.18) (2.16) 
Lagged DV 2.687***  
 (0.35)  
Constant  1.160*** 
  (0.19) 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.251  
N 4258 4387 
BIC 2399 2360 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.1.4: Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (USA) 
 
1.3. Hypothesis 3 tested whether shaping exercises are more likely during or after the 
end of the Cold War.  I include region and partner indicator dummies to ensure no particular 
partner or region is influential; however, I do not include year indicators as my explanatory 
variable (Post-Cold War) is a cluster of years, which would mean that including year indicators 
as a control would introduce post-treatment bias.  The original results remain robust, shown in 
Table C.1.5 below. 
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 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
w/ Region and Partner 
Controls and Lag 
w/ Region and Partner 
Controls and REs 
w/ Region and Partner 
Controls and FEs 
Post-Cold War 3.614*** 5.366*** 4.571*** 
 (0.73) (0.59) (0.51) 
Lagged DV 1.935***   
 
(0.16)   
Constant -5.114*** -5.598***  
 (0.74) (0.67)  
Pseudo-R2 0.309    0.133 
N 1640 2918 2508 
BIC 1946 3644 2091 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.1.5: Hypothesis 3 with indicator control variables 
 
1.4. Hypothesis 4 tested whether there was anything ‘sticky’ or habitual about exercise 
relations.  I included region, partner, and year indicator controls for the random effects model 
and year controls for the fixed effects model in testing whether an exercise in the previous year 
predicts the likelihood of conducting an MME in the current year.  Table C.1.6. below reveals 
that the original results remain robust.640 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
640 I used a standard logit model instead of a time-dependent logit model for the estimation of coefficients using 
region and partner indicator control variables (Model 11) because using a time-dependent model (i.e. random 
effects) included too many indicator variables for Stata to calculate. 
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Model 10 
w/ Partner, Region, and 
Year Indicator Controls 
Model 11 
w/ Partner, Region, and 
Year Indicator Controls 
Past MME, 1 Year 2.335*** 1.697*** 
 (0.15) (0.11) 
Past MME, 2 Years  1.396*** 
  (0.11) 
Past MME, 4 Years  1.319*** 
  (0.14)   
Constant -3.703***   -5.327*** 
 (0.87) (0.88) 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.321 0.357 
N 27660 24068 
BIC 8957 8071 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.1.6: Hypothesis 4 with indicator control variables 
 
2. Original Models by Major Power 
2.1. The United States. 
2.1.1. Hypothesis 1A. 
 
Model 1 
Base Model 
Model 2 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 3 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 4 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Non-Ally 1.750*** 0.972* 2.747*** 2.149*** 
 (0.47) (0.42)   (0.31) 
(0.41) 
Lagged DV  2.997***   
  (0.27)  
 
Constant -0.281* -1.815*** -0.299  
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.21) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.101 0.344  0.038 
N 1335 814 1335 1032 
BIC 1665 760 1443 948 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.2.1: Results for H1a (USA) 
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2.1.2. Hypothesis 1B.  Note- results insignificant for “rival” partners. 
 
Figure C.1: Margins Plot for H1b (USA) 
2.1.3. Hypothesis 2: These results are the same as Table 8.7 in Chapter 8. 
2.1.4. Hypothesis 3.  The results in Table C.2.2 reveal that the results are significant 
across all models for the US. 
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Model 10 
Base Model 
Model 11 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 12 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 13 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Post-Cold War 3.632*** 2.898*** 4.725*** 4.672*** 
 (0.57) (0.62) (0.51) 
(0.72) 
Lagged DV  2.751***   
  (0.24)  
 
Constant -3.011***   -4.187*** -3.197***  
 (0.59) (0.62) (0.50) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.165 0.359  0.176 
N 1335 814 1335 1032 
BIC 1547 742 1319 813 
    *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.2.2: Results for H3 (USA) 
 
2.1.5. Hypothesis 4.  The results are similar to those reported in Chapter 8, though four-
year lag MME loses significance in the final model.  However, previous year MMEs (the 
year prior and two years prior) are significant predictors of future MMEs. 
 
Model 14 
Past MME  
(1 Year) 
Model 15 
Past MMEs  
(1, 2, and 4 Years) 
Model 16 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 17 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Past MME, 1 Year 2.632*** 1.790*** 1.541*** 0.994*** 
 (0.26) (0.16) 
(0.16) (0.15) 
Past MME, 2 Years  1.716*** 1.511*** 1.047*** 
  (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
Past MME, 4 Years  0.888*** 0.648*** 0.234 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) 
Constant -2.721*** -2.953*** -2.996***  
 (0.10) (0.09) 
(0.10)  
   
  
Pseudo-R2 0.160 0.236  0.078 
N 4258 3871 3871 2647 
BIC 2362 2045 2045 1473 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.2.3: Results for H4 (USA) 
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2.2. The United Kingdom 
2.2.1. Hypothesis 1A.  Although the random effects model still holds significant for 
H1A, when applying a lagged DV (last year’s shaping) and fixed effects, the models lose 
significance.  I attribute the first inconsistency to the fact that previous partners better 
explain future MMEs than choice of partner-type (which supports the ‘stickiness’ 
hypothesis); I attribute the second problem to slowly or rarely changing explanatory 
variables in fixed effects models (explained in the introduction).  That is, the explanatory 
variable Non-Ally is nearly a time-invariant variable: although from one year to the next 
the status of an ally can change—for instance, as members join NATO or a country joins 
a coalition—most non-allies remain non-allies and vice-versa.  Thus, fixed effects, which 
ignore time-invariant variables in order to assess variation within partner-dyads, may 
produce inefficient inferences that underestimate rarely-changing variables (as opposed 
to models applying only random effects).  In any case, there is still a positive relationship 
between non-ally and shaping MME, which informs us that non-allies are more likely to 
conduct shaping MMEs than allies, although allies and coalition partners also participate 
to help in these exercises. 
 
Model 1 
Base Model 
Model 2 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 3 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 4 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Non-Ally 1.017** 0.606 1.283*** 1.035 
 (0.33) (0.39) (0.34) 
(0.53) 
Lagged DV  2.687***   
  (0.28)  
 
Constant -0.091 -1.509*** 0.212  
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.26) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.033 0.280  0.007 
N 805 437 805 614 
BIC 1088 454 968 593 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.3.1: Results for H1a (UK) 
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2.2.2. Hypothesis 1B.  Note- results for rivals and potential allies are not significant. 
 
Figure C.2: Margins Plot for H1b (UK) 
2.2.3. Hypothesis 2.  Same region is the best predictor for exercise-partner; although 
there is a positive association between former colonies and MMEs, these results are not 
significant when Same Region is included. 
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Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region 0.726* 0.804* 0.772* 0.951*** 1.205** 
 (0.32) (0.34) (0.32) 
(0.28) (0.39) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit  0.278  0.253 0.406 
  (0.30)  (0.25) (0.31) 
Contiguity   0.000 0.000   0.000   
   (0.00) 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Lagged DV    2.762***  
    (0.26)  
Constant -3.203*** -3.320*** -3.203***   -3.634*** -4.039*** 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.23) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.119  
N 4883 4883 4864 4700 4864 
BIC 1725 1730 1721 1518 1587 
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.3.2: Results for H2 (UK) 
 
2.2.4. Hypothesis 3.  Although the post-cold war period is a significant predictor of 
conducting shaping MMEs, the coefficient goes to zero when adding in MMEs from the 
previous year.  This makes sense considering the British only conducted three shaping 
MMEs during the Cold War (and 268 thereafter); thus, sticky exercise relations are a 
better predictor than the post-Cold War environment by itself.  Also, like the explanatory 
variable Non-Ally, Post-Cold War is a rarely-changing variable (changes only once in 
1991) that is underestimated by the fixed effects model which usually drops time-
invariant variables.  Therefore, a random effects model is more appropriate. 
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Model 10 
Base Model 
Model 11 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 12 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 13 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Post-Cold War 4.011*** 0.000 5.037*** 37.710 
 (1.02) (0.000) (0.89) 
(17966441.90) 
Lagged DV  2.509***   
  (0.30)    
 
Constant -3.536*** -1.216*** -3.895***  
 (1.03) (0.16) (0.86) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.138 0.236  0.131   
N 805 397 805 614 
BIC 971 432 871 519 
    *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.3.3: Results for H3 (UK) 
 
2.2.5. Hypothesis 4 
 
Model 14 
Past MME  
(1 Year) 
Model 15 
Past MMEs  
(1, 2, and 4 Years) 
Model 16 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 17 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Past MME, 1 Year 2.773*** 2.085*** 1.817*** 1.030*** 
 (0.24) (0.17) 
(0.25) (0.21) 
Past MME, 2 Years  1.831***   1.625*** 0.958*** 
  (0.19) (0.26) (0.23) 
Past MME, 4 Years  1.287*** 1.054*** 0.485 
  (0.31) (0.30) (0.28) 
Constant -3.425*** -3.553*** -3.646***  
 (0.12) (0.11) 
(0.12)  
   
  
Pseudo-R2 0.109     0.176  0.061 
N 4718 4225 4225 2130 
BIC 1520 1341 1345 891 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.3.4: Results for H4 (UK) 
 
 
 
 
331 
 
2.3. France 
2.3.1. Hypothesis 1A.  Although non-allies are significantly more likely to conduct 
shaping MMEs with France than allies, the fixed effects models show the opposite 
conclusion.  However, as discussed in the introduction, fixed effects models are 
inefficient in estimating slowly or rarely changing variables such as status as ally or non-
ally; thus, we should be more confident in the random effects model (Model 1). 
 
 
Model 1 
Base Model 
Model 2 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 3 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 4 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Non-Ally 1.287*** 0.852** 1.269*** -1.343* 
 (0.34)   (0.32) (0.32) 
(0.55) 
Lagged DV  2.907***   
  (0.40)  
 
Constant -0.114   -1.822*** 0.309  
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.27) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.066 0.321  0.016 
N 608 272 608 408 
BIC 779 273 746 405 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.4.1: Results for H1a (France) 
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2.3.2. Hypothesis 1B.  Note- results for potential allies and rivals are not significant. 
 
Figure C.3: Margins Plot for H1b (France) 
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2.3.3. Hypothesis 2.  The results show that France is more likely to conduct MMEs with 
partners from Europe and former colonies. 
 
Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region 0.895** 1.128** 0.935** 0.993*** 1.064** 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) 
(0.26) (0.38) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit  0.860**  0.657** 1.104** 
  (0.27)  (0.22) (0.38) 
Contiguity   0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lagged DV    2.535***  
    (0.24)  
Constant -3.053*** -3.286*** -3.053*** -3.521*** -4.093*** 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.22) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.014 0.028 0.015 0.134  
N 4995 4995 4975 4810 4975 
BIC 2020   2000 2016 1776 1838  
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.4.2: Results for H2 (France) 
 
2.3.4. Hypothesis 3.  Like the UK, France conducted few shaping exercises during the 
Cold War; thus, the previous year’s exercise removes all the explanatory power of the 
post-Cold War environment when a lagged DV is included as a covariate.  Regardless, 
the post-Cold War remains a significant predictor by itself. 
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Model 10 
Base Model 
Model 11 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 12 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 13 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Post-Cold War 3.493*** 0.000 4.367*** 3.695*** 
 (0.70) (0.00) (0.98) 
(1.04) 
Lagged DV  2.848***   
  (0.40)  
 
Constant -2.944*** -1.480*** -2.991**  
 (0.72)   (0.22) (0.96) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.071 0.289  0.086 
N 608 262 608 408 
BIC 775 269 709 377 
    *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.4.3: Results for H3 (France) 
 
2.3.5. Hypothesis 4. 
 
Model 14 
Past MME  
(1 Year) 
Model 15 
Past MMEs  
(1, 2, and 4 Years) 
Model 16 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 17 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Past MME, 1 Year 2.677*** 2.101*** 1.695***   1.163*** 
 (0.24) (0.21) 
  (0.19) (0.17) 
Past MME, 2 Years  1.295***    0.873*** 0.453* 
  (0.18)   (0.21) (0.19) 
Past MME, 4 Years  1.380*** 0.906***   0.458* 
  (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) 
Constant   -3.246***   -3.332*** -3.555***  
 (0.13) (0.12) 
(0.14)  
   
  
Pseudo-R2 0.117 0.158  0.054 
N 4829 4334      4334 2333 
BIC 1796   1658   1648 1148 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.4.4: Results for H4 (France) 
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2.4. Germany 
2.4.1. Hypothesis 1A. 
 
Model 1 
Base Model 
Model 2 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 3 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 4 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Non-Ally 2.293*** 1.457* 2.406*** 2.432* 
 (0.43)   (0.57) (0.42) 
(1.06) 
Lagged DV  1.241***   
  (0.33)  
 
Constant -0.071   -0.918*** 0.001  
   (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.097 0.119  0.026 
N 457 246 457 366 
BIC 577 315 574 362 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.5.1: Results for H1a (Germany) 
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2.4.2. Hypothesis 1B.  Note- results for rivals are not significant. 
 
Figure C.4: Margins Plot for H1b (Germany) 
 
 
 
2.4.3. Hypothesis 2.  Germany exercises most with European states and did not exercise 
with any former colonies (according to the dataset). 
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Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region 1.671*** 1.628*** 1.664*** 1.497*** 2.274*** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) 
(0.26) (0.49)   
Colony/ Sovereign Unit  0.000  0.000 0.000 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Contiguity   0.107 0.797 0.185 
   (0.80) 
(0.89) (1.24) 
Lagged DV    3.297***  
    (0.32)  
Constant -3.911***   -3.868*** -3.911*** -4.165***   -4.906** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.33) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.046   0.045 0.046 0.179  
N 3552 3417 3552 3275 3417 
BIC 831 825 839 721 795 
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.5.2: Results for H2 (Germany) 
 
2.4.4. Hypothesis 3.  Because Germany was not considered a major power during the 
Cold War, there is no variation in the explanatory variable Post-Cold War. 
2.4.5. Hypothesis 4. 
 
Model 14 
Past MME  
(1 Year) 
Model 15 
Past MMEs  
(1, 2, and 4 Years) 
Model 16 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 17 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Past MME, 1 Year 3.432*** 3.306*** 3.306*** 1.669*** 
 (0.31) (0.42) 
(0.32) (0.30) 
Past MME, 2 Years  0.325 0.325 -0.056 
  (0.54) (0.42) (0.38) 
Past MME, 4 Years  2.827*** 2.827*** 1.316** 
  (0.42) (0.43) (0.44) 
Constant -3.963*** -4.054*** -4.053***  
 (0.16) (0.16)   
(0.14)  
   
  
Pseudo-R2 0.145 0.180  0.092 
N 3405 2969 2969 748 
BIC 740   665 673 378 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.5.3: Results for H4 (Germany) 
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2.5. Russia 
2.5.1. Hypothesis 1A.  Similar to other major powers, the results remain robust and the 
coefficients are similar except for the fixed effects model, which suffers from the slowly-
changing explanatory variable. 
 
Model 1 
Base Model 
Model 2 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 3 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 4 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Non-Ally 3.402*** 2.642** 2.719*** 1.468 
 (0.81) (0.86) (0.77) 
(0.76) 
Lagged DV  5.105***   
  (1.47)  
 
Constant -0.150 -3.126** 1.865*  
 (0.44) (0.98) (0.95) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.336 0.771  0.072 
N 241 133 241 77 
BIC 173 47 146 56 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.6.1: Results for H1 (Russia) 
2.5.2. Hypothesis 1B. 
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Figure C.5: Margins Plot for H1b (Russia) 
 
2.5.3. Hypothesis 2.  Most of Russia’s exercises with non-allies involve CSTO 
members; that is, former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia.  Thus, 
sovereign history better explains its selection of exercise partners than region (note-
Russia is considered to be located in Europe). 
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Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region 0.944 -0.684 0.423 0.198 1.264 
 (0.49) (0.80) (0.85) 
(0.50) (0.66) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit    3.780***  2.313*** 4.555*** 
  (0.73)  (0.62) (0.98) 
Contiguity   1.668 -0.203 -1.403 
   (1.08) 
(0.88) (1.13) 
Lagged DV    4.076***  
    (0.54)  
Constant    -4.738*** -6.787*** 
    (0.22) (0.57) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.018 0.251   0.048 0.451  
N 5495 5495 5495 5330 5495 
BIC 1445 1114 1410 835 870 
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.6.2: Results for H2 (Russia) 
 
2.5.4. Hypothesis 3.  The results hold for the random effects models, but experience 
drastically different results in the fixed effects model.  However, as discussed in the 
introduction, we should have more confidence in Models 11 and 12 due to the rarely-
changing explanatory variable. 
 
Model 10 
Base Model 
Model 11 
w/ Lagged DV 
Model 12 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 13 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Post-Cold War 7.044*** 0.000 8.781*** 1.475e+29   
 (1.24) (0.00) (2.04) 
(0.00) 
Lagged DV  2.813***   
  (0.73)  
 
Constant -3.738*** 1.099* -4.332**  
 (1.10) (0.49) (1.36) 
 
    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.712 0.114  0.491 
N 241 106 241 77 
BIC 81 34 83 28 
    *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.6.3: Results for H3 (Russia) 
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2.5.5. Hypothesis 4. 
 
Model 14 
Past MME  
(1 Year) 
Model 15 
Past MMEs  
(1, 2, and 4 Years) 
Model 16 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 17 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Past MME, 1 Year 5.012*** 3.057*** 2.018*** 1.152*** 
 (0.41) (0.32) 
(0.37) (0.29) 
Past MME, 2 Years  2.545*** 1.815*** 1.099*** 
  (0.32) (0.37) (0.30) 
Past MME, 4 Years  2.059*** 1.498*** 0.852** 
  (0.42) (0.38) (0.32)   
Constant -4.397*** -4.630*** -5.498***  
 (0.20) (0.18) 
(0.39)  
   
  
Pseudo-R2 0.393 0.507  0.134    
N 5330 4836 4836 888 
BIC 894 713 707 400 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.6.4: Results for H4 (Russia) 
 
2.6. India 
2.6.1. Hypothesis 1A.  Because India has no allies, there is no variation in the 
explanatory variable. 
2.6.2. Hypothesis 1B.  Because India conducts few exercises and most are recruitment, 
the results for the margins plot are mostly insignificant. 
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2.6.3. Hypothesis 2. 
 
Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region 2.637*** 2.663*** 2.567*** 2.047*** 3.053*** 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) 
(0.36)   (0.52) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit  -0.284  -0.365   -0.358 
  (0.66)  (0.61) (1.17)   
Contiguity   0.364     0.382   0.346 
   (0.59) 
(0.44) (0.93) 
Lagged DV    3.464***  
    (0.33)    
Constant -5.433*** -5.433*** -5.433*** -5.514*** -6.556*** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)   (0.27) (0.48)   
      
Pseudo-R2 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.291  
N 5923 5923 5923 5748 5923 
BIC 770 778 777 665 760 
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.7.1: Results for H2 (India) 
2.6.4. Hypothesis 3.  Because India has only conducted MMEs after the end of the Cold 
War, there is no variation in the explanatory variable. 
2.6.5. Hypothesis 4 
 
Model 14 
Past MME  
(1 Year) 
Model 15 
Past MMEs  
(1, 2, and 4 Years) 
Model 16 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 17 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Past MME, 1 Year 4.377*** 3.761*** 2.926*** 1.946*** 
 (0.28) (0.42) 
(0.40) (0.30) 
Past MME, 2 Years  0.864 0.575 0.317 
  (0.56) (0.45) (0.39) 
Past MME, 4 Years  2.155**   1.389* 0.794 
  (0.71) (0.57) (0.47) 
Constant -4.721*** -4.670*** -5.361***  
 (0.19) (0.18) 
(0.37)    
   
  
Pseudo-R2 0.220 0.238  0.131 
N 5748 5223 5223 983 
BIC 701 690 690 418 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.7.2: Results for H4 (India) 
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2.7. China 
2.7.1. Hypothesis 1A.  Because China has only one ally (North Korea) but has never (to 
my knowledge) conducted a major exercise with the ally, there is no variation for the first 
hypothesis.  
2.7.2. Hypothesis 1B.  Because China conducts so few exercises with so few partners, 
analyzing MME function by partner type does not reveal any significant results. 
2.7.3. Hypothesis 2.  The random effects model reveals that China is more likely to 
conduct MMEs with partners in Asia and those along its borders, but not those sharing 
colonial history. 
 
 
Model 5 
Same Region 
Model 6 
w/ Sovereign History 
Model 7 
w/ Contiguity 
Model 8 
w/ All 
Model 9  
w/ Random Effects 
Same Region 2.783*** 2.804*** 1.466 1.493   2.791*** 
 (0.69) (0.69) (1.40) 
(0.93) (0.62) 
Colony/ Sovereign Unit  -0.373  -0.478 -0.799 
  (0.79)  (0.31) (1.47) 
Contiguity   2.255 1.816* 2.142*** 
   (1.15) 
(0.75) (0.63) 
Lagged DV    2.930***  
    (0.48)  
Constant -5.596*** -5.596*** -5.657*** -5.774*** -7.290*** 
 (0.63) (0.63) (0.51) (0.38) (0.54) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.159 0.159 0.232 .327  
N 5960 5960 5960 5784 5960 
BIC 731 740 678 611 621 
  *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.8.1: Results for H2 (China) 
 
2.7.4. Hypothesis 3.  Because China has only conducted MMEs since the end of the 
Cold War, there is no variation for the explanatory variable. 
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2.7.5. Hypothesis 4 
 
 
Model 14 
Past MME  
(1 Year) 
Model 15 
Past MMEs  
(1, 2, and 4 Years) 
Model 16 
w/ Random Effects 
Model 17 
w/ Fixed Effects 
Past MME, 1 Year 4.339*** 2.753*** 1.567*** 0.991** 
 (0.34)   (0.56) 
(0.42) (0.35) 
Past MME, 2 Years  1.978** 0.833 0.404 
  (0.61) (0.47) (0.41)   
Past MME, 4 Years  4.163*** 2.773*** 2.070*** 
  (0.67) (0.49) (0.42) 
Constant -4.710*** -4.839*** -6.102***  
 (0.24) (0.21) 
(0.49)  
   
  
Pseudo-R2 0.195 0.324    0.125 
N 5784 5256 5256 819 
BIC 696 595 583 337 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table C.8.2: Results for H4 (China) 
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